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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I try to advance our understanding of the nature of time. In particular I 
defend the idea that there is an objective difference between the past, the present, and the 
future; a metaphysical tense. This is in opposition to the idea that these distinctions merely 
mark an aspect of our perspective on entities in time. 
 I argue that tensed beliefs – beliefs that go hand-in-hand with tensed language – are 
essential to our lives as rational animals. Firstly, they are essential to our practices of 
providing reasons for action and acting for reasons. Secondly, they are essential for our 
lives as emotional animals whose emotions are appropriately responsive to the world. 
 Perry has argued that indexical – including tensed – beliefs are essential for actions. 
In order to attend my meeting, it is not enough that I know that it is at 2pm, I must also 
know that it is now 1:55pm. Examining Perry’s argument I show that its proper conclusion 
is that tensed and first-personal beliefs are necessary for rational actions. 
 I argue that reasons are facts (not belief/desire complexes or intensional entities). 
Further, the rationality of an action derives solely from these reasons, so that when an 
agent is not mistaken their action is rational purely insofar as it is done for a reason that 
justifies it. This means that beliefs are required for rational actions only to the extent that 
they provide an awareness of reasons and thereby enable an action. 
 A proper understanding of rational action thus enables me to say that if an action 
must involve one belief rather than another in order to be rational, this must be because the 
former belief involves an awareness of a reason, hence fact, that the latter does not. 
Combining this with the proper conclusion of Perry’s argument we can say that tensed 
beliefs are required in the place of any tenseless beliefs in rational actions, and therefore 
must involve an awareness of facts that the latter cannot capture. Given that our actions are 
by and large rational, it follows there are facts captured by tensed beliefs not captured by 
tenseless beliefs. There is a metaphysical tense. 
Prior has argued that some emotions involve tensed beliefs and Cockburn has 
furthered this to show that the appropriateness of some emotions depends upon these 
beliefs. It is inappropriate to grieve a future death or fear a past danger. 
 I show that the appropriateness of emotions stems from the reasons they are felt for 
and that these reasons are revealed by the beliefs involved in these emotions. This enables 
me to argue that if an emotion must involve one belief rather than another to be 
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appropriate, then this can only be because the former belief captures a reason that the latter 
does not. In combination with Prior/Cockburn’s conclusion I am thus able to argue, 
analogously to the case of rational actions, that if there are emotions which must involve 
tensed beliefs to be appropriate and there are examples of appropriate such emotions, then 
metaphysical tense is real. 
 My thesis thus derives a conclusion about the nature of time from our nature as 
rational animals. These arguments also have implications for a proper understanding of 
first-personal indexicals, which must now be recognized to pick out facts not captured by 
non-first-personal language. The former of these conclusions has been famously attacked 
by McTaggart, and the latter by Wittgenstein, and so I will also say something to rebut 
these criticisms. My arguments also have implications for certain issues surrounding the 
cognitive significance of co-referring names/natural kind terms which I will show to be 
unproblematic. 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgments         vii 
 
Introduction          1 
 Chapter Outlines        5 
 
Part One: Tense & its Relevance to Rationality 
 
Chapter One: Tense & Emotions       8 
 1.1 Tensed Language        8 
 1.2 Metaphysical Tense       11 
1.3 The Old Tenseless Theories      12 
1.4 Problems for the Old Tenseless Theories     14 
1.5 The New Tenseless Theories      16 
1.6 Tenseless Theories’ Responses to Prior’s Thank Goodness Argument 17 
1.7 Inadequacies of the Tenseless Theories’ Response   20 
Summary         24 
 
Chapter Two: Indexicals & Actions       25 
 2.1 Indexicals         25 
 2.2 Perry’s Argument for the Essential Indexical    27 
 2.3 Details of Perry’s Argument      29 
2.4 The Sufficiency of First-Personal & Temporal Indexicals  32 
2.5 Mellor’s Tenseless Account of Essential Tensed Beliefs   35 
2.6 Inadequacies of Mellor’s Tenseless Account    37 
Summary         42 
 
Part Two: Rationality 
 
Chapter Three: Reasons        44 
 3.1 Theories & Terms        44 
 3.2 Justificatory Reasons       48 
 3.3 Motivational Reasons       55 
 
Chapter Four: Acting for a Reason       62 
 4.1 Ingredients        63 
 4.2 The Need for Beliefs & Desires      63 
 4.3 The Role & Interrelations of Beliefs & Desires    68 
 4.4 Practical Reasoning       72 
4.5 Reasons as Causes       80 
Summary         85 
 
v 
 
Chapter Five: Rationality        86 
 5.1 Distinction between Reasonable & Rational Actions   87 
 5.2 Rational Obligations       90 
 5.3 The Denial of Rational Obligations     92 
 5.4 Explaining the Appearance of Rational Obligations   95 
 5.5 What Rationality Consists In      98 
 Summary         103 
 
  Part Three: The Reality of Tense 
 
Chapter Six: The Argument from Rational Action     105 
 6.1 The Argument from Action      105 
 6.2 Justification of P9 & P10       108 
 6.3 Justification of P4        110 
 6.4 Facts         114 
 Summary         126 
 
Chapter Seven: Implications for Non-Indexical Cases    127 
 7.1 Cognitive Significance       127 
 7.2 The Application of the Argument from Action to Non-Indexical Cases 130 
 7.3 Co-Reference & Distinct Facts: Names & Definite Descriptions 132 
 7.4 Natural Kind Terms & the Argument from Action   141 
 7.5 Actions         144 
 Summary         150 
 
Chapter Eight: The Argument from Appropriate Emotions    152 
 8.1 A Cognitive Theory of Emotions      152 
 8.2 Objections to a Cognitive Theory of Emotions Rebutted   154 
 8.3 The Appropriateness of Emotions     158 
 8.4 The Reasonableness of Emotions      163 
 8.5 Appropriateness & Tense       168 
 8.6 The Argument from Emotions      171 
 
Chapter Nine: Further Considerations      173 
 9.1 The Problem of the Essential Indexical     173 
 9.2 Other Responses to Perry’s Problem     176 
 9.3 Criticisms of Perry’s Argument Rebutted    181 
 9.4 McTaggart’s Paradox       183 
 9.5 The Private Language Argument      187 
 Summary         194 
 
Conclusion          196 
 
References/Bibliography        198
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
 
vii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I owe a debt to all those who have made my academic experience to date the 
pleasure that it has been. I have greatly benefited from the help and support of my family 
and friends, and especially my supervisor Jonathan Lowe. They have been very patient 
with me when I refused all but work and encouraging when that work slowed. Jonathan’s 
calm and wisdom has provided the perfect environment for ideas to grow and his honesty 
is an inspiration. 
I must also give special thanks to a number of my friends who kindly read chapters 
for me. Alex Carruth, Stefano Catelan, Matthew Conduct, Dave Kirkby, Donnchadh 
O’Conaill, and Uli Reichard, thank you.  
 I have also been lucky enough to benefit from financial assistance from the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy and the Durham University Department of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this thesis I address topics concerning the nature of time. I take these topics to be 
of great importance because our world is temporal, everything we do and everything we 
know about is in time, or at least, depending upon one’s opinion of abstract entities, a great 
many things we know about are in time. Because of time’s pervasive nature I in fact spend 
a large proportion of this work discussing the nature of our lives as rational creatures who 
are active and emotional. However, this is done with an eye to revealing what this tells us 
about time itself. 
 
Tensed language appears to say something different about the world than tenseless 
language. We appear to know something different about an event when we know that it is 
future, than we do when we simply know tenselessly that it occurs at a specific time, or 
after any other specific event. We can know the two tenseless things but still not know if 
the event has happened yet. The difference appears to concern the nature of time. I think 
that these appearances are correct, there is an objective distinction between something 
being future, it being present, or it being past, which is captured by tensed language, and in 
this respect tensed beliefs, but which is not captured by tenseless language or beliefs. I 
refer to this as the tensed view of time and my primary aim in this thesis is to provide an 
argument to show that this view is correct [A1]. 
Not everyone shares my opinion, and I refer to those who disagree as tenseless 
theorists.1 The tensed theory as I present it above relies on two ideas, firstly, that tensed 
and tenseless language play different roles, and secondly, that this difference in roles 
involves a difference in what is described by the language. The former of these aspects 
allows us to distinguish tensed and tenseless beliefs as the different beliefs one portrays 
with the different language. The latter idea allows us to speak of these beliefs as involving 
an awareness of different states of the world, facts. 
It is possible to challenge both of these ideas and tenseless theorists have done so. 
Thus I have two secondary aims in this thesis, defending the idea that tensed and tenseless 
beliefs and language play different roles [A2], and defending the idea that this involves 
them capturing something different about the world [A3]. 
 
                                                 
1
 I will define the tensed and tenseless views in more detail in Chapter One. 
2 
 
 Early in the twentieth century the opinion was popular in philosophy that tensed 
and tenseless language didn’t play different roles and that they could in fact be 
intersubstituted for one another. This view went hand-in-hand with the popularity of 
standard first-order logic which symbolized the two equally. Since then, however, this 
view has gone out of popularity and today it is widely recognized that the two are not 
intersubstitutable, but rather differ in meaning. A view accommodated by the invention of 
tense logic. 
 There are two broad reasons for this change in opinion. Firstly, there was a 
recognition that tensed and tenseless aspects of language really do play different roles, 
there are occasions in which the former can be used and the latter cannot. This difference 
has been noted in a consideration of our everyday actions and emotions. Knowing that I 
have to cook supper tonight motivates me to go shopping in a way in which simply 
knowing anything tenseless does not. For example, knowing an obligation for me to cook 
falls on the 9th of December 2011 or after I have a particular belief might leave me 
unmoved even though it is the 9th of December 2011, if I do not know that is now the date. 
Similarly, I might be anxious because I know I am going to cook tonight, and not because 
of any tenseless knowledge I have, such that I am going to cook on the 9th of December 
2011 or after a particular belief. 
Secondly, advances were made in the philosophy of language that provided 
powerful theories of meaning according to which tensed and tenseless aspects of language 
meant different things. Direct reference theories of indexical language gained popularity, 
according to which indexical language, including tensed language, had an element of 
meaning akin to the rules of use for that language. This element of meaning distinguished 
tensed and tenseless language, as whilst one might use both ‘now’ and ‘11:15’ to pick out 
the same time, ‘now’ can also be used to pick out other times in a way in which ‘11:15’ 
cannot. 
To this extent A2 is generally accepted. And no doubt these two motivations for 
accepting it are related, as two sentences which cannot be used for the same linguistic 
purposes amongst speakers who understand both clearly differ in meaning. 
  
 In denying A3, tenseless theories of language and truth have been offered 
according to which a difference in meaning can go hand-in-hand with an identity of truth-
makers. That is, it has been argued that whilst tensed and tenseless aspects of language 
differ in meaning, the truth-value of both can coincide. Moreover, we can express the 
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truth-makers of a use of tensed language with tenseless language, and hence, we can 
suppose that the former does not capture facts which the latter does not, as the truth-
makers coincide. For example, it is suggested that a use of ‘It is raining now’, said at 11:20 
on the 9th of December 2011, will be true if and only if rain occurs[tenseless] at 11:20 on 
the 9th of December 2011. 
 This allows the tenseless theory to accept A2, and to explain the different roles that 
tensed and tenseless aspects of language have in terms of their differing in meaning. This 
can be done without needing to recognize that the two capture different facts, as the 
difference in meaning does not entail a difference in truth-makers. 
 
 A fuller consideration of the different roles tensed and tenseless beliefs play in 
actions and emotions reveals the importance of rationality (or perhaps appropriateness in 
the latter case). It is not that people cannot be motivated by tenseless beliefs in everyday 
actions, but that very often they would be acting irrationally if they were to be. I may be 
motivated to shop because I have the tenseless knowledge I am obliged to cook on the 9th 
of December 2011, but, it would be irrational of me to be if I did not know what the 
current date was (and hence have a tensed belief too). If it is now the 10th of December 
2011 or the 10th of June 2011 shopping is pointless. 
In a related way, my anxiety that I have to cook today is only appropriate if I have 
to cook today. Whereas, it is not clear it can be appropriate at all to have a tenseless 
anxiety because we ought only to be anxious about the future, and a tenseless anxiety will 
be one which is seemingly indifferent to this. If it is the 10th of December 2011 today, then 
I oughtn’t to be anxious about having an obligation to cook on the 9th of December 2011 
(even if it is appropriate to feel anxious about repercussions of having missed my 
obligation). 
 
Since the middle of the last century it has been commonly believed that actions are 
caused by belief/desire complexes which provide the reasons for those actions, a view I 
refer to as psychologism about actions. Psychologism easily accommodates a tenseless 
acceptance of A2 and denial of A3, as it focuses on the nature of the beliefs themselves 
rather than what they are an awareness of in its account of an action and its rationality. 
 In more recent times, however, psychologism has become under increasing attack. 
There is now a trend of recognizing reasons for action to be facts, and hence, that the role 
of a belief in a rational action is determined by its content, the facts it is an awareness of. 
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This non-psychologism does not sit well with an acceptance of A2 and a denial of A3, 
rather, it implies that A2 follows from A3, that is, it is because tensed and tenseless beliefs 
capture different facts that they can play different roles in rational action. An issue 
apparently unnoticed by tenseless theorists to date.  
My method in this thesis will thus be to argue that rational action differentiates 
between tensed and tenseless beliefs. In this way I defend A2 in a way that goes beyond its 
already popular acceptance. I will defend a form of non-psychologism about reasons and 
action, and will use this to argue that the difference in roles of tensed and tenseless beliefs 
stems from a difference in the facts they capture. In this way my defence of A3 will be in 
tune with contemporary achievements in the philosophies of rationality and action, and 
will thereby bring these into concert with the philosophy of time in a way which is 
currently lacking to the detriment to each of these fields. A2 and A3 lead to A1, given our 
actions are by and large rational. The tensed theory of time is thus established through a 
consideration of our nature as rational animals.  
 
In the last fifty years it has become popular in the philosophy of emotions to think 
that emotions are not mere feelings, but involve cognitive aspects, they are related to 
beliefs. It is also increasingly popular to speak of the appropriateness of emotions. To the 
extent that this has come into contact with the philosophy of time it has again been argued 
that it coincides with a tenseless acceptance of A2 and denial of A3. A form of 
psychologism is adopted according to which the beliefs involved in emotions can affect 
their appropriateness independently of the content of those beliefs. 
However, these moves have been made without a consideration of the recent 
advances made in the philosophies of rationality and action. Inspired by these I will defend 
a non-psychologism about emotions according to which they are responsive to facts which 
are the contents of their cognitive components. These facts are the reasons the emotions 
are had for, and they thereby determine the appropriateness of the emotions. This entails 
that the role of a belief in an emotion is determined by its content. 
Thus I will run a second defence of A3, A2 and A1: I will emphasize that tensed 
and tenseless beliefs play different roles in justifying emotions; I will support A3 by 
adopting a non-psychologism in regard to emotions, in doing so I will advance the 
philosophy of emotions by bringing it into dialogue with the philosophies of rationality 
and action; and, I will defend A1 on the basis that our emotions often appear appropriate, 
and if they are not, this suggests we as emotional creatures are often wrong about the facts. 
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Establishing A1, and A2 and A3, in this way relies very little on theories of 
meaning (where these are something more than just descriptions of patterns of linguistic 
behaviour). However, it has great implications for these as it implies that tensed and 
tenseless aspects of language differ in meaning in such a way that they present different 
facts. 
My primary aim in this thesis is to reveal something about the nature of time. The 
method I will adopt to do so will involve defending views on the nature of rational action 
and appropriate emotion. In defending these ideas I will adopt a method of clarifying 
advances in the philosophies of rationality and action and bringing these into play with 
advances in other fields. If these methods succeed, each field should gain, and these 
conclusions will also have a bearing on other issues, such as the philosophy of language. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
 
 In Chapter One I introduce some terminology and clarify the nature of the debate 
between the tensed and tenseless theories of time. I examine an argument given by Prior 
which shows that tensed and tenseless language play different roles. Prior’s argument 
concerns emotions, and I argue that considerations of it that have been offered by tenseless 
theorists fail to do justice to intuitions regarding the appropriateness of emotions. My 
conclusion is that tensed and tenseless aspects of language play different roles, and that in 
order to get clear about the implication of this for the philosophy of time we must get clear 
about the appropriateness of emotions. 
 In Chapter Two I introduce a little more terminology, and examine an argument 
given by Perry that shows that tensed and tenseless language play different roles. Perry’s 
argument concerns actions, and I argue that considerations of it that have been given by 
tenseless theorists fail to do justice to intuitions regarding the rationality of these actions. 
My conclusion is that tensed and tenseless elements of language play different roles, and 
that in order to evaluate the implications this has for the philosophy of time we must get 
clear about the nature of rational actions. 
 In Chapters Three to Five I take up part of the challenge raised by the conclusion of 
Chapter Two and defend a view of the nature of rational actions. In Chapter Three I argue 
that the reasons that we act for and that justify our actions are facts (not belief/desire 
complexes or something intensional). 
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 In Chapter Four I defend a view according to which acting for a reason, at least in a 
good case, involves: having a belief that is an awareness of that reason; adopting a goal of 
performing an action which is justified by the reason one is aware of; choosing to perform 
that action; and, performing that action. 
 In Chapter Five I argue that the rationality of an action derives entirely from 
reasons. It is not a matter of fulfilling normative requirements of other sorts, such as acting 
in a way that fits a certain pattern, for example, desiring x if one desires y and believes x is 
a means to y. If patterns such as this are patterns rational behaviour fits, then this is not 
because these patterns have their own normative import, but simply because they are 
patterns that are legislated by reasons. 
 Chapter Six brings together much of the preceding discussion. I argue that 
rationality demands tensed beliefs in place of any tenseless ones, and this can only be 
because the tensed beliefs capture reasons, that is, facts, that the tenseless beliefs do not. I 
also clarify the notion of fact which I use throughout this work. 
 In Chapter Seven I show that the argument of Chapter Six has implications for 
other elements of language. For example, two sentences which differ only in respect of the 
names they contain may capture different facts about the world even if those names are co-
referring. The same can be said of co-referring natural kind terms, and co-denoting definite 
descriptions. These implications are already independently defended by descriptive 
theories of meaning, according to which reference is determined by descriptive content. 
They are also supposed more generally by anyone who attempts to account for differences 
in cognitive significance in terms of associated information, even if this information is 
only taken to be an aspect of the pragmatic content of the sentence. These implications are 
therefore not worrying and in fact have independent support. These fine-grained 
distinctions in beliefs couple naturally with fine-grained distinctions between actions, 
though I argue that they only require fine-grained distinctions between desires. 
 Chapter Eight defends a cognitive view of emotions according to which they 
represent the world to be a certain way and they are had for reasons. This enables me to 
apply the lessons from rational action to emotions, and it is shown that the reasons 
emotions are had for are facts which the emotions represent. These reasons can ground our 
everyday talk of the appropriateness of emotions in a way in which cannot be met by other 
popular approaches to the normativity of emotions, i.e. in terms of their pragmatic value 
and in terms of the appropriateness of their cognitive component. Furthermore, when 
7 
 
combined with the fact that the tense of an emotion affects its appropriateness, this shows 
that tensed emotions must capture facts not captured by tenseless ones. 
 The conclusion of these arguments is that tensed beliefs capture facts that tenseless 
ones do not, and that one’s first-personal beliefs capture facts that cannot be captured by 
non-first-personal beliefs or anyone else’s beliefs. The former of these conclusions has 
been attacked on the basis of McTaggart’s paradox, and in Chapter Nine I show that this 
attack is mistaken. The second conclusion appears to conflict with Wittgenstein’s 
argument against a private language, though I show that there is no real conflict here, or at 
least, to the extent that there is, the argument against my conclusion is mistaken. It is also 
made clear why these conclusions which I have drawn differ from those commonly 
reached in considerations of the need for indexical beliefs. 
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CHAPTER ONE: TENSE & EMOTIONS 
 
McTaggart1, and this is perhaps why he is so well discussed, highlights that events 
can be distinguished both as earlier or later than2 one another, and, as past, present or 
future. For example, my lunch is both later than my breakfast and future. These two ways 
of distinguishing events give rise to two series, for example, last night’s supper is earlier 
than this morning’s breakfast, which is earlier than my writing this, which is earlier than 
today’s lunch etc. and similarly, last night’s supper is past, this morning’s breakfast is less 
past, my writing this is present, today’s lunch is future etc. McTaggart called the 
characteristics that ground this distinction the B- and A-characteristics respectively, and 
similarly, the two series the B- and A-series. A description of the B-series, if ever true, will 
always be true, whereas, a description of the A-series may be true at one time and false at 
another; this evening it will no longer be true to say “today’s lunch is future”. 
This distinction gave rise to a new sphere of debate in the philosophy of time, one 
concerning whether or not the A-series was real. The focus of this debate does not concern 
the reality of the linguistic distinctions between the past, present, and future, all parties 
agree that some entities3 are described as past whilst others are described as present or 
future. The focus is rather on the metaphysical significance of this distinction, that is, 
whether there is an actual distinction between some entity being future and that entity 
being present or past, which goes beyond the way that entity is described. This debate shall 
be the focus of my thesis, and I will argue that there is more to something’s being future, 
past, or present, than its being described or recognized as such. In this chapter I will clarify 
the debate, and some of the moves that have been made in it, also considering the validity 
of some of the arguments involved. I close the chapter by concluding that more must be 
said about the role of tensed language and beliefs in rationality. 
 
1.1 Tensed Language 
 
It is important at this stage to get clear about language and tense. Much talk of 
tense concerns the nature of language, for example, the differences between the sentences 
                                                 
1
 McTaggart:1908 and McTaggart:1927 bk.II ch.33. 
2
 I shall also use the terms ‘before’ and ‘after’ to refer to these B-characteristics. 
3
 McTaggart (ibid) took the time series to be an ordering of events, it is events that are past, present, or future, 
or that are earlier or later than one another. However, I do not wish to make this commitment, so I shall 
speak simply of entities leaving it open what ontological category these belong to. 
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‘John is running’ and ‘John has run’. These differences enable us to speak of tensed 
language, or tensed utterances, sentences, propositions, beliefs etc. Such tensed language is, 
I take it, genuine and familiar. Craig suggests the following:  
 
“In English, tense is usually expressed by altering the form of the verb (for example, 
“I write,” “I wrote,” “I shall write”), but tense can also be expressed by a rich 
variety of adverbial phrases (for example, “now,” “yesterday,” “three days ago,” 
“soon”), adjectives (for example, “past,” “present,” “future”), prepositional 
phrases (for example, “at present,” “in yet two days’ time,” “by next Saturday”), 
and nouns (as in, for example, “Today is Saturday,” “now is when he leaves”).”4 
 
Not all language is tensed, for example, the sentences ‘two plus two is equal to 
four’, and ‘patience is a virtue’ are not.5 The ‘is’ in these sentences is a tenseless one. With 
this tenseless ‘is’ we can also construct sentences concerning time which are tenseless such 
as ‘sunrise is before sunset’, or ‘A.M. is born on the 10th of July 1981’. In this way we can 
see a number of temporal expressions as tenseless, that is, they do not entail that the 
sentences they occur in are tensed. For example: those picking out the B-series relations 
(for example, ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘earlier than’, ‘later than’, ‘simultaneous with’), expressions 
giving times and dates (for example, ‘2:05pm’ or ‘10th of July 1991’), and expressions 
giving temporal units (for example, ‘minute’, ‘day’, ‘month’). I will indicate the tenseless 
‘is’ by placing it in square brackets,6 unless otherwise stated I will also take this to indicate 
that the sentence as a whole should be understood as tenseless. 
Not all sentences involving the tensed elements outlined above will be tensed, for 
example, ‘‘future’ [is] a word’ is not. Amending a suggestion of Craig’s7, we might say 
that a sentence of English is tensed if it contains a singly tensed verb, a temporal indexical, 
or a tensed predicate adjective (i.e. ‘past’, ‘present’ or future’) not being quoted.8 An 
English sentence is tenseless if it contains a tenseless or multiply tensed verb and no 
temporal indexicals or tensed predicate adjectives not being quoted. These distinctions are 
                                                 
4
 Craig:2000 p.3-4. 
5
 It could been denied that such sentence tokens really are tenseless, but I am happy to assume that they are, 
little of my argument rests on this assumption, and I will presently clarify my use of ‘tense’ in this regard. Cf. 
Smith:1993 ch.6, in a related manner see also Lowe:1998 ch.4. 
6
 Thereby in distinction to the use made by Lowe:1998 ch. 4. 
7
 Craig:2000 p.8. 
8
 This means that a sentence like ‘b is, was, or will be F’, is not tensed. The value in saying this is to leave 
some freedom for dealing with the relation between tensed and tenseless language, that is, it allows one to 
say that if time is tensed, then the tenseless ‘is’, is very often (perhaps not in cases dealing with entities 
outside time) just a short hand for the disjunction ‘is, was, or will be’. (Cf. Lowe:1998 ch.4, Smith:1993 
ch.6.2, Chisholm & Zimmerman:1997.) 
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not exhaustive, but, they clearly classify a number of ordinary cases and in so doing are 
sufficient to my purposes. 
A rather different classification states that a tensed sentence is one that says, or 
says when used, that an entity is past, that an entity is present, or that an entity is future 
(similarly for utterances, propositions, statements etc.). I take ‘the 2012 Olympics is 
present’, ‘the 2012 Olympics is now’ and ‘it’s the 2012 Olympics’, equally to say that the 
Olympics is present. Although these sentences do not all use the term ‘present’, that the 
Olympics is present, as opposed to past or future, is given by the meaning of each of these 
sentences. When someone utters a tenseless sentence such as ‘two plus two [is] equal to 
four’, one may be able to infer that an entity is present, specifically, if I am audience to 
such an utterance I might be able to know that the utterance itself is present. However, 
although the utterance to this extent implies or even informs one that an entity is present, it 
does not say that an entity is present, that is not something that the utterance means. This 
perhaps leaves some grey areas, and I will not try to clarify them, but, it does clearly 
classify many everyday examples, and is thus adequate to my purposes.9 
This latter mode of classification captures what I take to be crucial and will be the 
one that I assume, though the former, perhaps more formal classification, would serve my 
purposes and can be assumed by a reader if they so wish. On either classification it is 
obvious that the simple sentence ‘I’m making a mess’ is tensed, and the simple ‘F.P. 
makes a mess on 12th of October, 1994’ is not. 10  Tensed language thus captures 
McTaggart’s A-series, though tenseless language does not. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This description of tensed sentences does not make a commitment to there being an ontological distinction 
between an entity being present, and it’s being future or past, etc., any more than a sentence such as ‘the 
2012 Olympics is present’ makes such a commitment. This description is committed to the sentence ‘the 
2012 Olympics is present’ saying that the 2012 Olympics is present, which, given that the object-language 
and meta-language are in this case one and the same, is surely correct. It remains true whatever one takes the 
ontological commitments of the object-language, and hence meta-language to be, and to this extent, it is an 
idea independent of such ontological commitments. My description is also committed to saying that, for 
example, ‘the 2012 Olympics is now’ and ‘the 2012 Olympics is happening’ both say that the 2012 
Olympics is present. But again, this needn’t make any more ontological commitments than ‘the 2012 
Olympics is present’ makes. 
10
 For alternative classifications, one might consider, for example, Smith:1993 p.6-7, or Gale:1968 p.42. My 
overall argument could be made to work with either of these.  
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1.2 Metaphysical Tense 
 
There is such a thing as tensed language. However, the issue that I am concerned 
with is whether time, or the world itself is tensed (we might call the former linguistic tense, 
and the latter metaphysical tense). In saying this I do not mean that time or the world must 
fit the classifications of linguistic tense, the point is rather that there is something about the 
world captured by tensed language. 
One might in this regard speak of properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity.11 
Such that, the event of my being born has the property of pastness, the event of my writing 
this has the property of presentness, and the event of my retiring has the property of 
futurity. Alternatively one might say that only present time or present entities exist,12 or 
that only past and present ones do13. In a different manner, one might say that the past, 
present and future all exist, but that the future is open, insofar as, there is only one past and 
one present but there are numerous futures (there are numerous events of my retiring, but 
only one of my writing this and of my being born).14 
On all of these views saying that something is present says something about the 
nature of the world. Linguistic tense picks out metaphysical tense. An implication of this is 
that an ideal15 description of the world that utilises only tenseless language will necessarily 
be incomplete,16 it will leave an aspect of the world undescribed. More specifically, an 
ideal description of the world that utilises both tensed and tenseless language will more 
fully describe the world than one that does not use tensed language. I call any theory that 
has this implication a tensed theory, and any theory that denies it a tenseless theory.17 In 
the course of this work I will defend a tensed theory by arguing that there must be aspects 
of the world which are captured by tensed language that are not captured by tenseless 
                                                 
11
 For example, McTaggart:1908 & 1927, and Smith:1993. 
12
 For example, Prior:1967, and Bourne:2006. 
13
 For example, Broad:1923, and Tooley:1997 & 2003. 
14
 For example, McCall:1994. 
15
 We should not be bogged down by practical difficulties in compiling such a description. 
16
 McGinn:1983 (care of, Le Poidevin:1991 Introduction) has argued that a tenseless description will be 
necessarily incomplete, but that it will not miss out anything in the nature of the world, but the clause that 
follows this footnote renders McGinn’s point irrelevant, and my argument proves this latter positive clause. 
17
 Classifying theories in this way makes it awkward to say that Tooley:1997’s and McCall:1994’s theories 
are tensed theories. Because, on these views all tensed utterances have tenseless truth-conditions. This 
implies that both tensed and tenseless language will be equally descriptive. However, I am prepared to accept 
this conclusion, as I take it to be a fault of Tooley’s and McCall’s theories that they have this implication (cf. 
Bourne:2006 ch.1 II). 
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language.18 (I will generally allow the context to make clear whether I am discussing 
linguistic or metaphysical tense.) 
 
1.3 The Old Tenseless Theories 
 
If all tensed language could be translated or reduced to tenseless language, then the 
tenseless theory would be vindicated, as this would entail that tensed language could not 
tell us more about the world than tenseless language. This view of tensed language has 
been supported by a number of proponents in theories that take two general forms. 
(However, these theories have largely been superseded, for reasons I will outline in the 
following section, so I will refer to these as the old tenseless theories.19) 
One form of the old tenseless theory suggests that a tensed sentence can be 
translated by, that is, will have the same meaning as, a similar tenseless sentence which 
includes a date. Thus Russell writes: “When we are told “Mrs. Brown is not home,” we 
know the time at which this is said, and therefore we know what is meant…in order to 
express explicitly the whole of what is meant, it is necessary to add the date”.20 Similarly 
Goodman asserts: “a certain “ran” is translated by any “runs [tenseless] on Jan. 7, 1948 
at noon E.S.T.”.”21 
In fact, it is odd that Goodman makes this claim, as shortly before this he says that 
“A “Randy ran” tells us not only who did what but also when, i.e., prior to the period of 
production of the sentence itself.”22 The implication of which is that a certain ‘ran’ could 
not possibly be translated by a linguistically-tenseless ‘runs on’ and a date, but at best, by a 
linguistically-tenseless ‘runs before’ and a date; we are not given the date of the running, 
                                                 
18
 Two motivations for defining tensed theories in this way are: firstly, that it leaves open what the tensed 
nature of the world consists in, for example, whether we must say there are tensed properties of events, or 
that only the present exists, etc.; secondly, the coherence of the tensed/tenseless debate presupposes that we 
could describe whether the world was one way or the other, and the most fitting way in which to describe the 
world as tensed as opposed to tenseless is with tensed language, and hence in tensed language describing 
more than tenseless language does (it is implausible that one could show that tenseless language does not 
state facts, or that tensed language does not, so the crucial issue is whether the tensed and tenseless language 
state the same facts). In fact one might argue that one inevitably arrives at difficulties if they try to describe 
the phenomenon of metaphysical tense with tenseless language alone, a mistake of this form perhaps being 
made by McTaggart (1908 & 1927 bk.II ch.33) in his argument for the unreality of time in his attempting to 
say, apparently tenselessly, that “an event is past, present, and future” (cf. Broad:1938 pt.1)). 
19
 A title used by Oaklander & Smith:1994. 
20
 Russell:1906 p.256-7. 
21
 Goodman:1951 p.296.  
22
 Goodman:1951 p.292. 
13 
 
merely a date that the running precedes.23 This leads us to a more complete expansion of 
what we might call the old date tenseless theory, as follows. 
 
Any ‘b is Ging’ (present tense) said at t, where t gives a time and date, can be translated by 
any ‘b Gs on/at t’ (tenseless). 
Any ‘b Gd’ (past tense) said at t, where t gives a time and date, can be translated by any ‘b 
Gs before t’ (tenseless). 
Any ‘b will G’ (future tense) said at t, where t gives a time and date, can be translated by 
any ‘b Gs after t’ (tenseless). 
 
This trend can then clearly be expanded to include more complicated tensed sentences, 
thus Goodman suggestively continues: “A “Randy had been running” tells us that the 
running took place prior to a moment – presumably further specified in the context – that 
is in turn prior to the time of production of the sentence itself.”24  The application to 
different sentence types (for example, ‘The war has ended’) being similar, so we can say 
generally that a sentence in the past/present/future tense said at t can be replaced by one 
which is tenseless and includes the time t and a before/simultaneous/after relation.25 
The second form the old tenseless theory takes suggests that a tensed sentence can 
be translated by a tenseless sentence that refers to itself, thus Smart states: “All the jobs 
which can be done by the tenses can be done by means of the tenseless way of talking and 
the self-referential utterance ‘this utterance’.”26 
Perhaps the most complete account of the old token-reflexive tenseless theory (as I 
shall refer to it) was given by Reichenbach.27 He tells us, firstly, that the word “‘now’ 
means the same as ‘the time at which this token is uttered’”28. The words ‘present’, ‘past’, 
and ‘future’, presumably being similarly treated so as to translate to ‘the time at which this 
                                                 
23
 One might of course say “Randy ran at 4pm on the 27th of July 1997”, but still, the ‘ran’ alone would not 
be translated by the date, if it were this sentence would be repetitive, which surely it isn’t. 
24
 Goodman:1951 p.292-3. 
25
 Russell and Goodman were not the only people to support old date tenseless theories, followers also 
included, in a manner, Frege (1956) and Quine (1960 sect.36). However, for Frege it is the tensed utterance 
and the wider context (including the time it was uttered) that translate a dated tenseless sentence in a manner 
reminiscent to that in which Russell says a tensed sentence is incomplete, and, for Quine the tensed and 
tenseless do not share meaning, but rather are paraphrases of one another that can be used for the same 
purposes. 
26
 Smart:1963 p.134. 
27
 Reichenbach:1948 sect.50 & 51. 
28
 Reichenbach:1948 p.284. 
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token is uttered’, ‘a time before this token is uttered’, and ‘a time after this token is 
uttered’, respectively. Shortly after this Reichenbach then gives a detailed consideration of 
tensed verbs producing the following table. 
 
“the initials ‘E’, ‘R’, and ‘S’ stand, respectively, for ‘point of the event’, ‘point of 
reference’, and ‘point of speech’, and […] the direction of time is represented as the 
direction of the line from left to right: 
 
Past Perfect   Simple Past   Present Perfect 
I had seen John   I saw John   I have seen John 
---,---,---,---   ----,-----,----   ----,-----,---- 
   E   R   S      R,E    S       E     S,R 
 
Present    Simple Future   Future Perfect 
I see John   I shall see John  I shall have seen John 
-------,-------   ----,-----,----   ---,---,---,--- 
      S,R,E     S,R     E      S   E   R”29 
 
This table can be used to tell us how we might make the appropriate translation of a tensed 
phrase, presumably, for example, ‘I shall have seen John’ means ‘I see John after the time 
I utter this and before the time of reference’. Reichenbach also suggests that we might 
name a particular token in the meta-language, so that in that way token-reflexivity can be 
eliminated. For example, in the meta-language, an utterance of ‘I saw John’ might be 
named b and hence replaced by ‘I see John before the time of b’ where this latter is to be 
read as tenseless. 
 
1.4 Problems for the Old Tenseless Theories 
 
Mill30 took many words to be directly referential, picking out entities but providing 
no information about them. This view lost favour as a result of criticisms from the likes of 
Frege and Russell31 who argued that, for example, it could not account for the informative 
nature of identity statements like ‘Dodgson is Carroll’. However, in the mid twentieth 
century directly referential theories of language saw a resurgence.32 In this return to direct 
                                                 
29
 Reichenbach:1948 p.290. He goes on to discuss the fact that the time extension of the event can be 
presented as of a longer duration, such as in ‘I am seeing John’. 
30
 Mill:1884, bk I ch.II.  
31
 For example, Frege:1980 and Russell:1905. 
32
 For example, Marcus:1961, Kripke:1981, Kaplan:1989a. 
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referentiality, theories of language were advanced that raised trouble for the old tenseless 
theories, as they denied that tensed language could be translated by tenseless language. 
In Kaplan’s33 theory, for example, the indexical ‘now’ will refer directly to a time, 
but, the meaning of this expression is not given simply by this referent, its content on an 
occasion of use, but also by the rules of use of the expression, its character. For example, 
if I utter “It is raining now”, at 2pm 12th of February 1997, the ‘now’ will serve to pick out 
2pm on the 12th of February 1997, and will not predicate anything of that time. The 
expression ‘2pm 12th of February 1997’ also refers to that time, and to this extent it 
coincides with the ‘now’. However, even if we suppose ‘2pm 12th of February 1997’ to be 
directly referential, it will still only have the same meaning as the ‘now’ if it also has the 
same character as that expression, that is, if the two expressions have the same rules of use. 
But, it is clear that the two expressions do not have the same rules of use, ‘now’ should be 
used to refer to the time at which it is uttered, but, ‘2pm 12th of February 1997’ should be 
used to refer to 2pm 12th of February 1997 whenever it is uttered. It follows that “It is 
raining now” uttered at 2pm 12th of February 1997, cannot be translated by “It is raining at 
2pm 12th of February 1997”. Therefore, the old date tenseless theory is wrong. 
A similar fate befalls the old token-reflexive tenseless theory. An utterance of “It is 
raining now” could only be translated by a simultaneous utterance of “It is raining at the 
time of this utterance”, if the ‘now’ and the ‘the time of this utterance’ share both content 
and character. But it is clear that they do not, not only is the latter expression a definite 
description, and hence not directly referential (so that perhaps the definite description 
picks out the time and says of it that it is the time at which the utterance occurs), but 
further, it is clear the definite description (and even just the indexical ‘this’) have different 
rules of use from the ‘now’, and so they cannot translate it. Therefore, the old token-
reflexive tenseless theory is wrong.  
Moreover, given the manner in which the old date and token-reflexive theories 
were shown to be mistaken, it is implausible that any similar alternatives could be correct 
(within Kaplan’s theory), as it is implausible that there can be any tenseless terms that can 
share a content and character with ‘now’. Tensed and tenseless expressions appear to differ 
in character, as they differ in use, and this difference in use gives rise to a second line of 
difficulty for the old tenseless theories. Even with the particular details of Kaplan’s theory 
                                                 
33
 Kaplan:1989a. 
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put to one side, phrases which necessarily have different uses within a competent linguistic 
community clearly have different meanings. 
This second line of difficulty is to my mind most forcefully presented in an 
argument by Prior, who states, in what I shall call the thank goodness argument: 
 
“half the time I personally have forgotten what the date is, I have to look it up or ask 
somebody when I need it for writing cheques, etc.; yet even in this perpetual dateless 
haze one somehow communicates, one makes oneself understood, and with time-
references too.  One says, e.g. “Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only is this, 
when said, quite clear without any date appended, but it says something which it is 
impossible that any use of a tenseless copula with a date should convey.  It certainly 
doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. ‘Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of that 
thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’, even if it be said then.  (Nor, for that matter, does it 
mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous with this 
utterance’.  Why should anyone thank goodness for that?)”34 
 
Prior forcefully makes the point that in certain cases no tenseless utterance can play 
the role of a tensed one, from which it follows that no tenseless utterance can translate that 
tensed one, and hence, that the old tenseless theories are wrong. 
 
1.5 The New Tenseless Theories 
 
In reaction to problems such as these the tenseless theory has taken a different tack. 
The aim of the new tenseless theories (as I shall refer to them) is to admit that tensed 
language cannot be translated by tenseless language, but, to deny that one gets at facts not 
got at by the other. Crucial here is the thought that tensed and tenseless language is made 
true by the same facts. 
As with the old tenseless theories the new ones come in two forms. The date 
tenseless theory (as I will refer to it), can be stated as follows: 
 
“Any token of ‘e is occurring now’, tokened at t, is true if and only if e occurs at t.”35 
 
The token-reflexive tenseless theory (as I shall refer to it), can be stated similarly: 
 
“Any token u of ‘e is occurring now’ is true if and only if u is simultaneous with e.”36 
                                                 
34
 Prior:1959 p.17, see also Prior:1962. 
35
 Le Poidevin:1998 p.29. 
17 
 
 
As with their old counterparts, these ideas can be expanded to accommodate tensed 
expressions of different types and higher orders, for example, we might say a token of ‘e 
was future’ uttered at t, is true if and only if there is a time t*, such that e occurs later than 
t* and t* is before t.37 
The new tenseless theorist’s idea is that e occurring before, after, or at t, or before, 
after, or simultaneous with e, is something that can be stated in tenseless language. This 
enables the new tenseless theorist to say that the facts which make a tensed utterance true 
are simply tenseless facts. Thus, the tenseless theory is correct. Nevertheless, this does not 
entail that tensed and tenseless utterances are inter-translatable, because an utterance 
giving the truth-conditions of a different utterance, needn’t be taken as having the same 
meaning as that different utterance.38 
 
1.6 Tenseless Theories’ Responses to Prior’s Thank Goodness Argument 
 
The new tenseless theories do avoid the problems raised for the old tenseless 
theories by the new direct reference theories of language, such as Kaplan’s. However, they 
must say something further to respond to Prior’s thank goodness argument, as they must 
explain how it is that Prior can be relieved that the exams are over, and not relieved they 
are prior to his feeling of relief, or the date of his feeling of relief, even though the exams 
being over just is their being prior to the relief or the date of the relief (according to the 
new token-reflexive and date theories respectively). 
Prior asserts that he is relieved the exams are over, but not relieved that they finish 
before his relief, nor relieved they finish before the date of his relief (I will refer to the 
former as Prior’s tensed relief, the latter two as his tenseless emotions of relief). It thus 
                                                                                                                                                   
36
 Le Poidevin:1998 p.29. Examples of the date tenseless theory can be found in Mellor:1998, Le 
Poidevin:2007 and Smart:1980, examples of the token-reflexive tenseless theory can be found in 
Mellor:1981a, Oaklander:1991, and, Dyke & Maclaurin:2002. 
37
 For an account of how such an expansion might be made see Mellor:1998 ch.3.5. 
38
 There are difficulties surrounding these theories, specifically, in regard to how the conditions quoted at the 
start of this section are to be interpreted. If we take the quotations as giving truth-conditions, then arguably 
there is no difference between the date and token-reflexive versions, because each state that the token 
utterance must exist, even if this is only placed after the ‘if and only if’ of the token-reflexive theory. Further, 
Lowe has pointed out that one could interpret the stated conditions to be tensed, so that they in effect state: a 
token u of ‘e is now’ is now true if it is now simultaneous with e, it will be true if it will be simultaneous 
with e, and it was true, if it was simultaneous with e. The implication of which is that it is not clear that we 
can state these truth-conditions tenselessly. Cf. Lowe:1998 ch.4. 
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appears that the tensed relief is different from either of the tenseless ones. The obvious 
manner in which to distinguish these emotions of relief is to say that they have different 
objects. In the tensed relief, one is relieved for the tensed fact that the exams are over, 
whereas, in the tenseless emotions of relief, one is relieved for tenseless facts, i.e. that the 
exams finish on a certain date, or are simultaneous with a specific feeling of relief. 
However, this implies that the tensed fact is different from either of the tenseless ones, and 
hence that there are tensed facts.39 This is something the tenseless theories cannot accept. 
Mellor40 initially responds to this by denying that the emotions of relief have an 
object at all. Rather, the expression of relief given in Prior’s uttering “Thank goodness”, is 
just an expression of pure relief, and is quite distinct from the belief he has and that he 
expresses in saying “that’s over”. In fact he could just have well said “That’s over; thank 
goodness”, as “Thank goodness that’s over”. But, there remains a connection between the 
belief and the relief, because the belief is true if and only if the exams finished before that 
belief (or the date of it), and, the exams being over before the belief (or date of it) causes 
the feeling of relief. For Mellor this excuses the tenseless theorist from the need to 
postulate tensed facts; they are not needed to account for the truth of the tensed belief that 
the exams are over, as that belief can be given tenseless truth-conditions. And tensed facts 
are not needed to be the object of the relief, as the relief has no object. 
But Mellor notes that there is a further element to the story, because the relief is 
justified after the exams, but not before the exams (one shouldn’t be relieved something is 
over when it isn’t). We thus have the question, why is the relief appropriate after the 
exams? The tensed theorist has an answer to this, for example, because that is when it 
becomes a fact that the exams are over or past. The tenseless theorist cannot say this, as 
they deny such tenseless facts. Nevertheless, Mellor insists that one is mistaken to think 
that this gives the tensed theorist an advantage, because the tenseless theorist has an equal 
explanation. The relief is justified then because relief is justified when after pain, a 
tenseless fact on a par with the tensed one referred to by the tensed theorist. 
MacBeath41 argues that Mellor’s initial response is inadequate, because it is false to 
think that the relief has no object; Prior is clearly relieved about something. (This is 
                                                 
39
 We can suppose that if we spoke to Prior he would also deny having any other tenselessly expressible 
emotions of relief. (Note the difference here, even if different emotions of relief can share objects, this 
doesn’t make them the same relief, propensity to express them differently is already grounds for thinking 
they are distinct.) 
40
 Mellor:1981b & 1981a ch.3. 
41
 MacBeath:1983. 
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perhaps more clear if we speak in terms of gratitude. Prior is grateful, and not simply 
grateful – what could pure gratitude be – but grateful for something, for the exams being 
over.) Moreover, if we accept that the relief has an object, it is clearly a tensed one, as he is 
relieved that the exams are over, and he is not relieved that they finish before a certain date, 
or before a specific emotion of relief. 
MacBeath offers a different tenseless solution. He points out that belief is an 
essential intermediary between the facts one is relieved about and the relief one has as a 
result. If Prior did not believe his exams were over, he would not be relieved that they 
were. Moreover, the relief is responsive to the belief not the fact believed, because one 
could falsely believe the exams to be over and resultantly be relieved. The tenseless 
theorist can thus say that Prior’s relief has an object, namely the [supposed] fact that the 
exams are past, and this is [or would be] a tensed fact. However, in order for Prior to be so 
relieved, it is not necessary for this tensed fact to exist, it is sufficient that he believes it to 
exist. Moreover, this belief can be true, and made true by tenseless facts as outlined by the 
new tenseless theory. This relief that the exams are over is also justified, because relief that 
the exams are over is justified after the exams (a tenseless fact). 
Mellor42 subsequently concedes MacBeath’s point that emotions often have objects, 
and accepts MacBeath’s proposed tenseless solution saying: “Tensed facts figure only in 
our responses to tensed facts, and what our responses require is not the facts themselves 
but beliefs about them, i.e. tensed beliefs. But both the content and the truth of tensed 
beliefs can be fixed as MacBeath says by purely tenseless facts.”43 This solution has been 
adopted quite generally by tenseless theorists.44 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 For example, Mellor:1983 & 1998 ch.4. 
43
 Mellor:1983 p.91. 
44
 Dyke & Maclaurin:2002. It is also accepted by some tensed theorists, for example, Bourne:2006 p.17-18. 
Garratt:1988 adopts a different solution, accepting the existence of the tensed fact, but suggesting that the 
tenseless theorist can accept the existence of tensed facts. His ground for making this assertion is that he 
thinks that the tenseless theorist is only committed to denying the existence of tensed properties, and tensed 
facts needn’t entail the existence of tensed properties, but I think this is a very weak interpretation of the 
tenseless theory and the existence of tensed facts appears to be an acceptance of a tensed theory (numerous 
tensed theorists deny that there are tensed properties, for example, Prior). 
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1.7 Inadequacies of the Tenseless Theories’ Response 
 
In this section I will argue that this tenseless response is inadequate, if not 
erroneous. The problem with the tenseless response is that it does not make clear what the 
proposed tensed fact is, or the role that fact is supposed to play. 
Some tensed theorists have found this tenseless response to Prior’s argument 
inadequate.45 Craig,46 for example, argues that the issue concerns the rationality of the 
emotions. It is rational for Prior to feel relieved that the exams are over only after the 
exams (and anticipation that they will be over only before the exams). He points out that 
on the tenseless account the emotion must be irrational because relief that something is 
past must be inappropriate if nothing is past. On the tenseless theory the only relevant 
event is the exams finishing before the date Prior feels relief (I take this phrase/case to 
cover both the date and token-reflexive tenseless truth-conditions). But Craig, echoing 
Prior, finds it odd that Prior would be grateful for that. Oaklander,47  representing the 
tenseless theory, finds Craig’s response inadequate. One can understand why the tenseless 
theorist might feel this way, as Craig appears to have taken us no further than Prior 
originally did, and so MacBeath’s answer ought to stand. 
At the heart of this dispute is the tensed theorist’s insistence that Prior’s relief must 
be irrational if the tenseless theory is correct. MacBeath and Mellor, however, appear to 
have shown that this is not the case, by saying that on the tenseless theory relief that the 
exams are over is justified only after the exams, where being after the exams is a tenseless 
fact. Craig finds this response inadequate, I believe that this is because Craig (as did Prior) 
had certain presuppositions, and I will try to reveal these and thereby show an inadequacy 
in the tenseless response. 
MacBeath has rightly argued that Prior is relieved about or for something, namely 
the fact that the exams are over. I will refer to this as the object of his relief. This object is 
the reason for Prior’s relief, it is that for which he feels relief, and it is that to which he will 
refer if someone asks him why he is relieved. This object is also that which justifies Prior’s 
relief, if he is relieved the exams are over, and they are over, then his relief is justified. It is 
natural to think of the object of Prior’s relief in these ways, and it is this presupposition 
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 For example, Craig:2000, Cockburn:1997 & 1998. 
46
 Craig:2000 p.148-159. 
47
 Oaklander:2002. Oaklander is specifically referring to an argument Craig gives elsewhere (Craig:1999) but 
the arguments overlap. 
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that I think is held by Craig and Prior, and that shows the inadequacy of the tenseless 
response. 
MacBeath48 at times speaks of the object of Prior’s belief, the tensed fact, as being 
a merely intentional entity.49 Where the intentional entity ‘that the exams are over’ can 
exist even though the exams are not over. But, such an intentional entity is clearly not the 
object of Prior’s relief. If we told Prior that the exams were not over, he would not see 
there to be any reason for his relief and his relief would disappear, even if we told him that 
the intentional entity ‘that my exams are over’, still exists. (That the intentional entity 
would continue to exist is quite plausible, if intentional entities are abstract entities, as they 
appear to be.) The object of Prior’s relief is thus clearly not an intentional entity, but an 
objective entity, a state of the world. (I will reserve the term ‘fact’ for such objective 
entities.) 
MacBeath is careful to stress that he is not proposing that Prior is relieved about a 
belief, as one might express by saying “thank goodness I believe that’s over”. To this 
extent MacBeath appears to admit the object of Prior’s relief is not an intentional entity. 
And, in fact, at the end of his article he suggests a possible “rewording”50 of his position, 
that instead speaks of the object of Prior’s relief as a fact he believes to obtain. 
Nevertheless, MacBeath is right that Prior might mistakenly believe the exams to 
be over when they are not over, and as a result he might become relieved. The belief that 
they are over, this intentional entity, thus appears to play a role in the origin of Prior’s 
relief, and I will refer to it as the cause of his relief (without wishing to commit myself to a 
certain causal theory of the issues). We have seen that the cause of Prior’s relief is not the 
object of his relief, and it is clear that it is not the reason for which he is relieved. If Prior 
learnt that the cause obtained, but that the exams were in fact not over, then Prior would 
take himself to have no reason to feel relieved. Further, this cause does not justify Prior’s 
relief, if the exams are not over, Prior shouldn’t be relieved that they are. 
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 MacBeath:1983 p.86. 
49
 Sider:2001 ch.1, has what appears to be a different solution, as he speaks of temporal propositions, which 
are akin to linguistic meanings, the temporal ‘over’ assigning ‘before t’, to any t it is believed at (it is a 
function from a time to an atemporal proposition). He says that in relief one is not related to an atemporal 
proposition, but instead to a temporal one, this temporal proposition is the object of one’s attitude (where 
being related to that function at t, is different from being related to that function completed by t). However, 
Sider’s temporal propositions fair no better here than MacBeath’s intentional entities. 
50
 MacBeath:1983 p.87. Given the distinction between an intentional entity and a fact, MacBeath is 
misleading to describe this as a mere rewording, rather, it is better to see MacBeath as offering two distinct 
possible tenseless solutions. I take a confusion such as this between whether the object of Prior’s emotion is 
intentional or not, to play a part in making the tenseless response appear more credible than it is. 
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The object of Prior’s relief is a fact,51 and Garrett and others52 interpret MacBeath 
in this way. As such, the object must either be a tensed or tenseless fact, where by which I 
mean that the fact either falsifies the tenseless theory, or it does not.53 
If we take the object to be tensed, then the tenseless theorist must deny that the 
object of Prior’s relief obtains, and this entails that the object of his relief cannot justify his 
being relieved. If the object is tensed and it does not obtain, as the tenseless theory must 
here maintain, then this implies that Prior can be relieved because of something and that 
thing not obtain and his relief nevertheless be justified. But this is false, if the exams are 
not over, then Prior oughtn’t to be grateful that they are. Furthermore, if the object of the 
relief that the exams are over is a tensed fact, that implies that the belief that the exams are 
over serves to pick out that tensed fact. The tenseless theorist’s insistence that the tensed 
belief can be true thus implies absurdly that the belief can be true despite the fact it picks 
out failing to obtain. Thus, the tenseless theorist cannot account for Prior’s argument by 
referring to a tensed object as the object of his relief. 
If we instead take the object of Prior’s relief to be a tenseless object, there are still 
difficulties for the tenseless theory. We are unable to appeal to this object to account for 
the justification of Prior’s relief, nor to provide the reason for which he formed that relief. 
The problems here stem from the fact that this tenseless fact obtains, and may be 
something Prior is aware of, before the exams are over. Before they are over Prior may 
well know, and I shall suppose that he does know, that the exams finish before the date he 
feels relief. Despite this knowledge, Prior does not feel relieved until the exams are over, 
nor is Prior justified in feeling relieved that they are over, until they are. It follows that, a 
                                                 
51
 As I will make clear in subsequent chapters, especially Chapters Three and Eight, the fact that Prior could 
mistakenly take the exams to be over, and as a result become relieved, needn’t entail that the object of his 
relief is intentional, rather, one ought instead to say that in such a situation in fact there was no object to 
Prior’s relief, that is, he became relieved without reason. Though, this needn’t mean that he did not 
mistakenly believe the exams to be over, nor even that we cannot explain his relief in terms of this belief, of 
course, we can explain emotions without referring to their objects, or the reasons for which they are felt, 
perhaps, for example, in terms of chemical reactions in the brain. 
52
 For example, Garrett:1988, Dyke & Maclaurin:2002. The latter do speak of the object as being intentional, 
and yet they also appear to speak of it as being a fact when they take pains to say that ‘Thank goodness …’ 
creates a non-extensional context. This confusion is not surprising given that it appears to be a part of 
MacBeath’s argument (cf. two footnotes above). 
53
 There is some evidence that Garrett and Dyke & MacLaurin take the object of Prior’s relief to be tensed, 
insofar as, the former refers to it as such, and the latter speak of it as an intentional object, and there would 
seem to be little reason for a tenseless theorist to relegate the object’s status to intentional if they didn’t take 
it to be tensed. However, there is perhaps greater evidence to think that they took the object to be tenseless, 
because they take pains to say that ‘Thank goodness …’ creates a non-extensional context, and therefore one 
in which a person can be grateful for a tenseless fact, and yet false to describe them as such. 
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mere awareness of the tenseless object of his relief cannot account for his becoming 
relieved, nor does his being relieved for an object that obtains account for why he is 
justified in being relieved. 
It follows, that if we adopt a tenseless theory, we cannot account for the 
justification of Prior’s relief in terms of the object of his belief, the reason for which he 
became relieved. I take this to be the foundation of Craig’s assertion that if the tenseless 
theory is correct, then Prior’s relief must be unjustified. It is natural to take the object of 
Prior’s emotion to play the role of justifying his emotion, he is justifiably relived if and 
only if the object of his relief obtains.54 If one is relieved that the exams are over, and the 
exams are over, they are justifiably relieved, if they are not over, they should not be 
relieved. If one is relieved that the cows have come home, and they have come home, then 
they are justifiably relieved, and if they have not, then they shouldn't be relieved, etc. The 
tenseless theory is thus inadequate, as it has done nothing to address this natural and 
plausible idea. 
The tenseless theory does offer an alternative account for why it is that Prior’s 
relief is justified. As already noted, they refer to the brute fact that relief about an event 
that is after that event is justified.55  But, if this is said by the tenselss theorist, pace 
Mellor,56 we do not have an account that is on a par with the account that a tensed theorist 
can offer. The tenseless and tensed accounts of the justification of Prior’s relief both rely 
on  brute facts, in the former case, that relief is justified after the exams, in the latter that it 
is justified when the exams are past. But, the tensed theorist offers us more besides this 
fact, they also offer us a story of the manner in which this fact has import to the situation. 
The fact that the exams are past makes the relief that they are past justified, as this fact is 
the object of that relief, the reason it was formed for. The tenseless theorist, however, 
offers no explanation of this form.57 
The tenseless theory cannot say why one ought to be relived after an event, they 
cannot say, as surely we would, that “one ought to be relieved because the exams are over”, 
as on tenseless terms this picks out nothing to justify relief. The tenseless theory might be 
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 Actually the matter is more complex than this, as the object must also justify the emotion, as we shall see 
in Chapter Eight, but this does not vitiate my point. 
55
 Mellor does not want to say that relief is always appropriate after pain, as he believes one can enjoy pain. 
Whether or not we should accept this idea, it doesn’t negate my point, Mellor’s masochist can simply be 
relieved that their pain has started. 
56
 Mellor:1981a p.50, 1981b, 1998 p.42. 
57
 The tenseless theorist can say more than I have here considered, they might, for example, speak of it being 
an evolutionary advantage to have this relief at this time. I will consider ideas such as these in Chapter 8. 
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able to give an account of why someone was relieved in terms of the cause of their relief, 
but if we take our emotions to be something rationally responsive, then this reference to 
cause cannot provide a complete answer, and what the agent is aware of according to the 
tenseless theorist cannot either, as they were aware of it for some time before their relief. 
Prior’s thank goodness argument thus shows that the tenseless theory is inadequate, 
because it disregards a natural and plausible understanding of the justification of emotions. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter we have been introduced to a distinction between the manner in 
which entities can be ordered as earlier, later, or simultaneous with one another, and, as 
past, present or future. This distinction reflects an aspect of language, its form and the way 
it can be used to describe the world. However, it perhaps also has metaphysical import, 
capturing something of the nature of the world itself. If the world is tensed, then we cannot 
describe it fully with tenseless language alone. 
One might believe that the world is tenseless, because all tensed language can be 
translated into tenseless language. But such a view would clearly be mistaken, it conflicts 
with prevalent theories of the meaning of tensed language, and furthermore, as tensed and 
tensless language clearly differs in meaning because they differ in possible use. 
One might nonetheless believe that the world is tenseless because they believe that 
all tensed language is made true by tenseless facts. However, this view appears to struggle 
to account for the role that tensed language and beliefs play in our emotional lives. It 
appears that our emotions are justified by an object that can only be described with tensed 
language. 
The debate between the tensed and tenseless theories thus invites us to consider in 
more detail the rationality of our emotions. In the course of this thesis I will take up this 
invitation, further investigating and vindicating a view according to which an emotion is 
justified by its object. In turn I will argue that not only is the tenseless theory inadequate 
because it neglects such a view, but further, it is false because it is unable to accommodate 
it. 
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CHAPTER TWO: INDEXICALS & ACTIONS 
 
In the last chapter I introduced the metaphysical notion of tense, and linked it to 
linguistic tense. I outlined the tensed and tenseless theories, and presented Prior’s1 thank 
goodness argument in support of the tensed theory. Although the tenseless theory has 
responded to Prior’s argument, this response is inadequate as it fails to address a natural 
view of the rationality of emotions, that is, that emotions are justified by the reasons that 
they are felt for.2 
The force of the thank goodness argument rests on the fact that it shows that the 
objects of some emotions can only be expressed with tensed language. In this chapter I 
will show more generally that a large number of our actions require their agents to have 
tensed beliefs, such that the reasons that they act for can only be captured in tensed beliefs. 
This conclusion will follow from a consideration of arguments presented by Perry3 which 
show more broadly that in the majority of actions the reasons an agent acts for can only be 
captured by beliefs the expression of which necessarily involves an indexical. 
On examination, it will turn out that indexical beliefs, as I shall call them, are 
specifically required for rational actions (one could act irrationally without indexical 
beliefs). I will examine an account given by Mellor as to why tensed beliefs might be 
required for actions. I will show that, as with Chapter One, this tenseless account of the 
need for tensed beliefs is inadequate as it fails to accommodate a natural understanding of 
the rationality of the actions at hand. I will begin by making clear some issues of 
terminology. 
 
2.1 Indexicals 
 
Indexicals are words that can change their referent from one use to another.4 A 
common example is the word ‘I’, which when uttered by myself refers to me, to F.P., but 
when uttered by my friend refers to him, to B.P.. Indexical expressions include, ‘now’, 
‘yesterday’, ‘soon’, ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘he’ ‘she’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘over yonder’, and 
                                                 
1
 Prior:1959. 
2
 In Chapter Eight we will see that matters are a little more complicated than this, as the reason an emotion is 
felt for must also justify having that emotion. 
3
 Perry:1979. 
4
 Of course, all words can change their meaning or referent over time, but such a protracted change of use is 
not what is at issue here, rather, indexicals can change their referent without, we might say, changing their 
use or meaning. 
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many more besides. I think that many of these can be grouped.  ‘He’, ‘you’, ‘she’, and 
others like them appear to all be ways of referring to people, I shall call these personal 
indexicals. ‘I’, ‘me’ etc. should perhaps also be considered in this group, though I shall 
treat these separately as first-personal indexicals. ‘This’ and ‘that’ and others like them are 
all ways of referring to objects (in a broad sense) and I shall call them objective indexicals 
(they are also commonly referred to as demonstratives, on the grounds that they are often 
accompanied by a demonstration of their referent, I shall also follow this terminology on 
occasion, though plausibly other indexicals such as ‘there’ are also demonstratives). ‘Here’ 
and ‘there’ are ways of referring to places, spatial indexicals. And of course, ‘now’, 
‘yesterday’ and ‘soon’ are ways of referring to times, temporal indexicals. 
All tensed language shares characteristics with indexicals, insofar as it will refer to 
different things on different occasions of use. For example, ‘Simon is running’, said on the 
12th of July 2020, will refer to Simon’s running on that date, whilst ‘Simon is running’, 
said on the 12th of September 2005, refers to Simon’s running on the 12th of September 
2005. Thus, there are grounds for saying that all tensed expressions are indexical. 
However, it has been argued that ‘now’ is unlike present tense verbs and copulas, 
or ‘present’, as can be revealed by placing these expressions within the scope of a temporal 
operator.  Consider three utterances said on the 24th June: U1 “Tomorrow it will still be the 
case that it is raining”, U2 “Tomorrow it will still be the case that rain is present” and U3 
“Tomorrow it will still be the case that it is raining now”. If ‘now’, ‘present’ and the 
simple present tense were all equivalent we would expect these three utterances to say the 
same thing, though it appears that they may not. Rather, it has been suggested that the 
former two say that rain will occur on the 25th of June, while the latter says that rain occurs 
on the 24th and says nothing of whether or not rain occurs on the 25th. On these grounds, 
‘now’ is described as a pure indexical, while we might call ‘present’ and present tensed 
copulas and verbs mere quasi-indexicals (because they require double indexing in the 
scope of a temporal operator).5 
I think that there is something to these observations, however, I do not take this to 
deny the context sensitivity of these quasi-indexicals, but rather to delimit it. Thus, in the 
following I shall refer to all tensed expressions as indexicals, and therefore, shall use 
‘temporal-indexical’ and ‘tensed expression’ interchangeably. This will make matters 
                                                 
5
 Cf. Kamp:1972, Smith:1990 & 1993, Prior:1968, and Salmon:1986 p.34-40. 
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more simple in most cases, as the indexical/quasi-indexical distinction often makes little 
difference to the arguments at hand.6 
 
2.2 Perry’s Argument for the Essential Indexical 
 
Perry7 has presented an example which I will adapt to concern Tom. Tom was once 
in a supermarket which had a trail of sugar on the floor. As a conscientious member of the 
public he began to follow this trail in order to warn whoever was making the mess that 
they had a torn sack in their trolley. He followed the trail around a tall counter a number of 
times before suddenly stopping and rearranging the shopping in his own trolley. 
Tom believed all along that the shopper with the torn sack was making a mess and 
that they should do something about it. His sudden change in behaviour is explained by his 
forming the new belief ‘I am making a mess’. The central matter at hand, as Perry points 
out, is how to characterise this new belief. (I will pick out a belief that someone would 
express by saying, for example, “I am making a mess”, by saying that they believe ‘I am 
making a mess’. I will also describe a belief like this as a first-personal belief as it is 
expressed using a first-personal indexical, so too analogously for other beliefs.)8 
Tom might well have a belief which is similar, but which refers to Tom in a 
different manner, and not be motivated to stop and rearrange his shopping. Suppose we 
think that Tom forms the belief ‘Tom is making a mess’. This belief would only explain 
his behaviour if he also believed that he himself is Tom, that is, if he had the belief ‘I am 
Tom’. This point can be emphasized by noting that Tom’s behaviour might also be brought 
about by the belief ‘Simon is making a mess’, so long as Tom also believes ‘I am Simon’. 
Similarly, if Tom believes ‘The person wearing a purple and black hat is making a mess’, 
this will not explain his behaviour, even if the description uniquely applies to him, unless 
he also believes ‘I am wearing a purple and black hat’. 
It is possible that there are mirrors in the supermarket, and that Tom catches a 
glimpse of himself spilling sugar. He might hence form the belief ‘he is making a mess’, or 
                                                 
6
 I am not alone in thus treating them alike in these situations, e.g. Reichenbach:1948 and Perry:1997. 
7
 Perry:1979. 
8
 When I say this I do not mean that the person at issue would in fact be willing to say anything at all, they 
might be in hiding, rather, the point is that they would ideally, or if they were willing to honestly express 
their belief at all, express it by saying “I am making a mess”. Thus we can say that the belief and the 
utterance share content [in a broad sense]. One might consider the converse of this, such that, when Tom 
says (honestly etc.)  “I am X” or “I believe I am X”, we take this to inform us that Tom has the belief ‘I am 
X’. Cf. Kripke’s disquotational principle in Kripke:1979. 
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‘that man is making a mess’, or, if this is different, a de re belief of that man which he sees, 
that he is spilling sugar. Nevertheless, these beliefs will also fail to explain Tom’s 
behaviour unless he has a first-personal belief, such as, ‘I am the man in the mirror’.9 The 
indexical ‘I’, or a first-personal indexical, is essential to the belief that explains Tom’s 
behaviour.10 
Perry makes a similar point concerning other types of actions, and other indexicals. 
Consider Mike who intends to go to a departmental meeting on time and knows that it 
begins at 2pm. Nevertheless, as the meeting starts Mike remains sat at his desk. Suddenly, 
as he realizes the time, he stands up to leave. 
Mike believes all along that the meeting starts at 2pm, and all along intends to 
attend the meeting at 2pm. What explains his finally moving is his forming the new belief 
that ‘It is 2pm now’. If we attribute to Mike a different belief, which replaced the ‘now’ by 
another reference to the time, then we cannot explain his behaviour. For example, if we 
attribute to Mike the belief ‘It is 2pm at 2pm’ this would do little to account for his 
behaviour. Similarly, if we attribute to him the belief ‘It is 2pm at the time when Tom 
realizes he is spilling sugar’, this will only explain his behaviour if we also attribute to him 
the belief ‘Tom is realizing he is spilling sugar now’. The indexical ‘now’, or a similar 
present tense temporal indexical is essential to the belief that explains Mike’s behaviour. 
A third type of case arises for Arthur, who is lost in the wilderness, despite being 
an authority on the area. Arthur desires to return home, he is near Llyn Teifi, and he knows 
that his best way home from there is to head west. However, Arthur continues to look 
around himself confused, until he forms the belief ‘this is Llyn Teifi’, at which point he 
heads off to the west. No belief which lacked an indexical could explain Arthur’s 
behaviour, though a spatial indexical belief, such as ‘here is Llyn Teifi’ would. For 
example, Arthur might well believe ‘Llyn Teifi is Llyn Teifi’, or ‘the lake nearest to Strata 
Florida is Llyn Teifi’, and yet lack a motivation to head west. 
                                                 
9
 It is worth noting that the mirror is not essential to such a point, for example, when a number of people put 
their hands together in the centre of a circle, it is possible for someone to fail to recognize their hand as their 
own. Cf. Boer & Lycan:1980. 
10
 Castaneda:1966 makes a very similar point, though concerning ‘he himself’ rather than ‘I’.  This merely 
being a shift of perspective, for the use of ‘he himself’ considered is essentially that of attributing first-
personal beliefs to another.  E.g. We say Tom has the belief ‘I am F’ or similarly, Tom believes he himself to 
be F. Cf. Castaneda:1967 & 1968. 
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These examples show that beliefs on which agents act in certain circumstances 
must be expressed with indexical language. I will refer to the argument for this conclusion 
given by the use of such examples as these as the argument for the essential indexical. 
 
2.3 Details of Perry’s Argument 
 
In this section I will make clear a number of aspects of the argument for the 
essential indexical which are presupposed but not necessarily explicit. 
The force of Perry’s argument concerns the explanation of actions. The fault of 
Tom’s believing ‘Tom is making a mess’ is that this belief would fail to explain his 
behaviour. Thus, we can note that Perry must be assuming that Tom’s beliefs explain his 
behaviour. 
On one level, it seems quite simply false to say that everything that someone does 
must be explained by their beliefs. A clear example of this is their beating their heart, and a 
less clear example is perhaps their shivering in the cold. However, it seems very important 
that a great many of a person’s doings must be explained by their beliefs. These are things 
that the person does quite deliberately and for a particular reason, doings that are 
intentional and are the result of the will. Such doings are often known as actions. Actions 
are doings or behaviour that “characterises humans as ‘rational animals’…behaviour that 
provides the grounds for judgments about people’s goals, characters and values, and on 
account of which they are held to be responsible for certain outcomes”11. Or, as Anscombe 
puts it, “they are actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given 
application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for 
acting”12. 
The link with beliefs, then, is part and parcel with the fact that actions are 
intentional, and are doings for which a person has a reason. To know someone’s reasons 
for an action is to know (some of) their beliefs, and often, vice versa. Tom’s reason for 
acting as he did, was that he himself was making a mess, and similarly, the belief of his 
that explained his action was the belief that he himself was making a mess, his believing ‘I 
am making a mess’. This belief explains the action as it provides Tom’s reason for 
performing it. The explanation is of a rational form. We take an individual’s making a 
mess to be a good reason for stopping and rearranging their shopping. We take Tom’s 
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 Alvarez:2005 p.45. 
12
 Anscombe:2000 sect.5 p.9. 
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doing to be an action, and something for which there are reasons, and we take Tom to be 
acting rationally, and so, we expect these reasons to play a role in explaining his action, to 
be what he acts for. If we give the reasons that a person performed an act for, this is an 
explanation of their action, we can use reasons to predict and understand a person’s actions. 
This is not the only form of explanation. It would be quite inappropriate – well 
impossible – to account for a stone’s rolling through providing reasons it acted for, that is, 
reasons that rationalize its doing. Rather, we should likely give some form of causal 
explanation, such as, ‘the stone rolled because it was kicked by Dr. Johnson’. This is why, 
as the quote from Alvarez suggests, humans are often distinguished from other things as 
being rational. Which is not to deny that reasons can be causes of actions,13 but rather, to 
deny that all effects are the result of reasons. (Though this is not to deny that there is a use 
of the word reason, according to which, Dr Johnson’s kicking the stone was the reason it 
moved, but, this use differs from the one at hand, as it has no role in rationalizing the 
stones movement.) 
There are two potential ways of reading this role of beliefs in the explanation of 
actions. One might, as Davidson has,14 take this to mean that the beliefs were actually the 
reasons, such that, in Tom’s case one of his reasons for acting was his belief ‘I am making 
a mess’. Or, one might take it that the reasons were aspects of the world which the agent is 
aware of through their beliefs. Such that, Tom’s reason for acting was that he himself was 
making a mess, his believing ‘I am making a mess’ being his awareness of this, and 
required as one must be aware of reasons in order to act for those reasons. 15  This 
distinction does not affect Perry’s argument that indexical beliefs are essential, though it is 
an important distinction that I shall make use of in time. Whether or not one takes beliefs 
themselves to exhaust the category of reasons,16 one can still take beliefs to be essential to 
a rational explanation of action. 
The cases at hand are therefore specifically cases of actions, cases in which an 
agent acts intentionally for a reason which is provided by or through their belief. 
Furthermore, these are specifically cases of rational actions. Suppose that Tom, on forming 
the belief ‘pigs are mammals’, for that reason stops to clear up his mess. In such a case 
Tom will be acting, and his belief will be playing an explanatory role, though the belief is 
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 Though we might well deny this. Cf. Lowe:2008, Dancy:2000,  and Alvarez:2007. 
14
 Davidson:2001a. 
15
 E.g. Dancy:2000. 
16
 If one adopts the latter view, the realist view, this does not of course prevent beliefs from being reasons, 
they are, after all, aspects of the world.  Though, this is to take it that reasons needn’t be beliefs. 
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not first-personal and Tom lacks any other relevant first-personal beliefs. Such a case is 
possible, people can act irrationally doing things for reasons which are in fact no reason to 
do those things. Irrational actions therefore do not require indexical beliefs in the way that 
rational actions do, and so the argument for the essential indexical should be taken to show 
that indexical beliefs of particular types are required for rational actions of particular types. 
The necessity of an indexical belief for rational action doesn’t entail that all beliefs 
that play a role in bringing about an action must be indexical. For example, if I am asked 
“What is two plus two?” I will answer “Four”, this answer will be brought about in part by 
an indexical belief, such as, ‘I am the addressee of the question’, but will also be brought 
about by my non-indexical belief ‘two plus two equals four’. This later is clearly a reason 
for my action and partially explanatory of it. I probably would have said something 
different if I had not had that belief. However, such a belief remains insufficient to explain 
my answering as I did for the reasons Perry provides (I’ve believed this for some time, but 
my action was timely). 
It will be useful to distinguish the types of cases which demand indexical beliefs. 
Plausibly there is something about Tom’s case which means that in order to act rationally 
he must have a first-personal belief. I will refer to all cases with this property as personal 
actions, and the reasons involved as personal reasons. Plausibly, though I rest little on this 
assumption, the distinguishing feature of such cases is that the agent has a reason for 
themselves in particular to act not just for anyone to. Again there is plausibly something 
specific to Mike’s case that means that in order to act rationally he must have a temporal 
indexical belief. I’ll refer to cases with this feature as timely actions, and the reasons 
involved as timely reasons. The linking feature of cases of this form appears to be that they 
all involve reasons to do something at a specific time, not simply at any time or other. 
Again, similarly, in cases like Arthur’s I’ll speak of locational actions and locational 
reasons, the link perhaps being reasons to perform an action at a specific location rather 
than just anywhere. 
The argument for the essential indexical thus shows that a rational personal action 
requires an agent to have a first-personal belief, a rational timely action requires its agent 
to have a tensed belief, and, a rational locational action requires its agent to have an 
indexical belief. (I will at times simply speak of actions for ease of presentation, instead 
making it clear when the action at issue is an irrational one.) 
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2.4 The Sufficiency of First-Personal & Temporal Indexicals 
 
In this section, I will consider the extent to which first-personal and tensed beliefs 
are essential to the types of actions at issue. We saw in the last chapter that the old 
tenseless theory supposed that tensed language could be translated by tenseless language. 
We also saw that this view was mistaken, but with it in mind, we might ask ourselves if the 
tensed beliefs at issue in the argument for the essential indexical could be replaced by 
tenseless ones. The argument for the essential indexical clearly shows that the old date 
tenseless theory is wrong. Mike can know ‘2pm is 2pm’ and related facts, and not be 
motivated to leave his office. But one might wonder, as perhaps Russell would have17, if 
Mike could make do with a token-reflexive belief, such as ‘2pm is the time of this belief’. 
Analogously, one might wonder if Tom could make do with a token-reflexive belief such 
as ‘the believer of this belief is making a mess’. 
That token-reflexive beliefs will not suffice for Tom’s and Mike’s cases, can be 
shown by briefly considering the nature of beliefs. Arguably, a belief has a physical 
manifestation, perhaps a state of the brain. It would be possible therefore to open up 
Mike’s head and to get series of images of his brain states, his beliefs, perhaps with a 
keyhole portable instrument. If this was done we could bring Mike to believe, of the belief 
that he sees on the screen, that he has that belief at 2pm. If the images on the screen were 
live, the belief Mike had would be token-reflexive and true, our ‘2pm is the time of this 
belief’. However, if Mike does not know that the images are live, then, he will not be 
motivated to leave his office (perhaps he thinks the image must be of a past belief, and 
hence that it is too late to bother leaving, or perhaps he thinks it is somehow an image of a 
future, would be brain state, and hence that he still has plenty of time before he must leave). 
Tom might have a similar portable device, and know that he is not the only one 
with such a device, and that some of the images of brain states, of beliefs, that he sees are 
images of other people’s beliefs.18 Tom might then form a belief that the believer of the 
belief that he sees on the screen is making a mess. If the belief was Tom’s, then Tom 
would have a true token-reflexive belief ‘the believer of this belief is making a mess’. 
However, Tom will remain unmotivated to stop if he does not know the belief is his. 
Similar cases could be constructed if one instead spoke of token-reflexive utterances, or 
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 Cf. Russell:1995. 
18
 If one was inventive they could create an example where the states were seen directly rather than simply 
on a screen, but I’ll spare you this gore. 
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demonstrative reference to other things besides the beliefs themselves, as plausibly these 
will all have physical manifestations. So no token-reflexive, or demonstrative belief could 
replace the tensed belief in Mike’s case, or the first-personal one in Tom’s case, and so too 
for other timely and personal rational actions. 
One is perhaps led erroneously to the idea that token-reflexive beliefs could replace 
the tensed and first-personal ones in these cases, because we are often aware that our 
beliefs are our own beliefs and are present beliefs. What these examples in part show is the 
extent to which this awareness can be considered. If we were to describe Mike’s awareness 
in a normal situation that his belief ‘2pm is the time of this belief’ is present, it is clear that 
we oughtn’t to describe it as the belief ‘2pm is the time of that belief’ (where ‘that belief’ 
refers to Mike’s ‘2pm is the time of this belief’, and similarly below). Because that would 
mean this awareness didn’t provide the form of presence19 at issue as the argument for the 
essential indexical shows. Nor would it suffice to describe it as the belief ‘the time of this 
belief is the time of that belief’, as again this wouldn’t provide us with sufficient form of 
presence, as I have just argued, and could at best venture us on a regress. The best 
characterisation of this awareness would therefore clearly be as a tensed belief ‘that belief 
is current’. I’m not sure that speaking of this awareness of the presence of our beliefs in 
this manner is illuminating, but it is clear that it cannot help one who wishes to argue that 
token-reflexive beliefs could replace Mike’s tensed belief in his rational action. If we are 
to refer to this normal awareness, then we ought to characterise it, and if we do, then we 
ought to characterise it as tensed, and hence the essential tensed belief reappears. An 
analogous argument can be presented for Tom’s case, if we are to characterise the normal 
awareness he has that his belief is his own, we could only plausibly do this through a first-
personal belief. 
One might have a further worry in the tense case, specifically: it appears that 
demonstrative reference involves perception;20 perception can only be of what is present; 
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 To talk of this ‘presence of experience’ is not to presuppose the tensed theory, rather, the phrase is simply 
used to capture the form of awareness that Mike must have to be moved to act. 
20
 According to many theories of demonstratives an agent must recognize the referent of a demonstrative to 
be playing a particular role in a context in order to understand the use of the demonstrative, to this extent 
perception might commonly be involved in demonstrative reference. For example, some say you must 
recognize the referent as the thing demonstrated (Kaplan:1989a, Reimer:1991a, perhaps, Salmon:2002), 
others say that you must recognize it as the most salient thing in the context (e.g. Wettstein:1984, 
Reimer:1991b), or as the object of the speakers intention in the context (e.g. Kaplan1989b, Bach:1992a & 
1992b), or as the thing in a particular spatiotemporal relation to the speaker in the context (e.g. 
McGinn:1981)(these distinctions are not necessarily exclusive of one another, and are rather rough, with 
some proponents falling into more than one group, and proponents within one group differing in detail).  
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and therefore, one can only demonstratively refer to something present; and therefore, one 
can know of what they demonstratively refer to that it is simultaneous with that 
reference.21 However, this worry is unfounded, as one can refer demonstratively but in a 
mediated fashion, as in my example of pointing to an image of something and thereby 
referring to that thing not the image.22 Moreover, perception gives rise to present tensed 
beliefs.23 Thus, if we accept that in believing ‘2pm is the time of this belief’ Mike is aware 
the belief is simultaneous with his perception of it, we must also accept that Mike has the 
present tensed belief ‘that belief is present’. The question thus arises whether Mike’s 
motivation to act relies upon this tensed belief, and the problems already outlined imply 
that it does. Knowing 2pm is simultaneous with one’s belief, and that this belief is 
simultaneous with a perception of it provides no motivational force, rather one must 
actually be perceiving, that is having the tensed belief, to be motivated. In short, to the 
extent that demonstrative reference entails perception, and therefore might enable Mike to 
act, it also gives rise to tensed beliefs, and these are essential to the action, and thus the 
essential indexical re-appears.24 
Tensed beliefs are required for rational timely actions, and first-personal beliefs are 
required for personal actions. Tensed beliefs and first-personal beliefs are therefore 
irreplaceable in their roles. I will now argue that the converse is not that case, that is, 
tensed and first-personal beliefs can replace other indexical beliefs in their roles in 
locational actions. 
If Arthur, whilst at Llyn Teifi, suddenly formed the belief ‘the place where I am 
now is Llyn Teifi’, or the belief ‘the lake I see before me now is Llyn Teifi’, then he would 
become motivated to head west to get home. In this way a tensed first-personal belief is 
sufficient to play the role of an objective indexical belief and a spatial indexical belief. 
Plausibly, the same can be said of other indexicals too, so that, for example, a use of ‘you’ 
might be replaced by a use of ‘the person I am now addressing’, and so on. 
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 One is tempted to say simply ‘and therefore, one can know of what they demonstratively refer to that it is 
present’, but my opponent of course is not allowed to say this, and if they don’t, it is not even clear this 
argument is at all potent, as Mike might well know a belief is simultaneous with a perception of it and be 
unmoved to act. 
22
 Most of the views outlined in the previous footnote do not entail that one must perceive the referent (cf. 
Kaplan:1970). 
23
 Cf. Le Poidevin:2007. 
24
 There is thus a temptation to see demonstratives as tensed, Broad:1938 pt.I ch.XXXV, sect.2.24 p.305-7 
makes this implication by noting that the copula following a demonstrative appears to be tensed. 
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This does not mean that tensed, first-personal, or tensed first-personal language can 
translate all other indexical language, merely that the former can provide awareness of the 
same reasons to act that the latter language can (that is, it can play the same role in rational 
action).25 
I will not try to settle whether tensed first-personal indexicals can translate all other 
indexicals, but I will note that an argument given by Castaneda26 to show that this is not 
the case fails. Castaneda has argued that different indexicals cannot be taken to mean the 
same thing. ‘The place where I am now’ and ‘here’, for example, can be shown to have 
different meaning by considering the sentence ‘the place where I am now is here’. This 
sentence appears to be contingent, whereas the sentence ‘the place where I am now is the 
place where I am now’ appears to be necessary, and therefore, the former has a different 
meaning to the latter. Be that as it may, these appearances are misleading, and therefore, 
the argument fails. For example, if I utter “The place where I am now is the place where I 
am now” whilst moving quickly, I will utter the first ‘the place where I am now’ at a 
different location to the second ‘the place where I am now’, and therefore my utterance is 
false. It follows that the sentence ‘the place where I am now is the place where I am now’ 
isn’t necessarily true, and hence, that it doesn’t necessarily differ in meaning from the 
sentence ‘the place where I am now is here’ which isn’t necessarily true. 
 
2.5 Mellor’s Tenseless Account of Essential Tensed Beliefs 
 
Mellor, as we saw in the last chapter, adopts a tenseless theory. Despite this he 
admits that tensed beliefs are essential for timely actions. It would be natural to think that 
tensed beliefs are required for actions because through them an agent is aware of 
something that they are not aware of through tenseless beliefs, that is, reasons for those 
actions. In order to undermine this idea Mellor provides a rather different account of why 
tensed beliefs are required for timely actions.27 
Mellor considers a case like Mike’s, in which Mellor turns on his radio at 1 o’clock. 
We are invited to suppose that Mellor does this because he desires to listen to the 1 o’clock 
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 If translation were possible, then this would mean that all indexical language, beside first-personal 
language is in fact tensed language. But, it wouldn’t follow from the fact that some tensed first-personal 
language can translate all other indexical language that non-tensed non-first-personal language can translate 
all tensed and all first personal language. 
26
 Castaneda:1967. 
27
 Mellor:1981a ch.5 & 1998 ch.6.3. 
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news, and he believes that if he turns on his radio at 1 o’clock he will be able to listen to 
the 1 o’clock news. But Mellor realizes that this cannot be the whole story, because he had 
that belief and desire all morning, yet only acted at 1 o’clock, so we need something to 
explain why he acted then and not earlier. The answer Mellor proposes, in line with the 
argument for the essential indexical, is that he acts at 1 o’clock because at that time he 
forms the belief ‘it is 1 o’clock now’. 
Mellor believes that our actions are caused by our beliefs (and desires) not by the 
facts that we are aware of through them. He supports this claim by pointing out that if he 
had come to believe at some time other than 1 o’clock that ‘it is 1 o’clock now’, then he 
would at that time have turned on the radio. So tensed beliefs are necessary for timely 
actions, even though there are no tensed facts, because the beliefs and not the facts they are 
an awareness of are what the actions are responsive to. To this extent our actions occur 
irrespective of the truth-value of the beliefs that they are a response to. Nonetheless, 
Mellor believes that the truth of our beliefs are relevant to whether or not our actions 
succeed, such that, only actions caused by true beliefs are likely to succeed. 
Mellor believes, as we saw in Chapter One, that tensed beliefs can be true despite 
there being no tensed facts. For example, the tensed belief ‘It is 1 o’clock now’, will be 
true if and only if28 that belief is had at 1 o’clock, and if it is it will be made true by one or 
the other tenseless facts: the belief occurs at 1 o’clock (token-reflexive theory), or, 1 
o’clock is at 1 o’clock (date theory).29 The action Mellor makes in turning on the radio at 1 
o’clock is an action that will only succeed at a specific time. Thus the belief and action fit 
nicely together, the belief is only true at a specific time, and therefore can only cause the 
action when it is true at a specific time, and hence when the action is likely to succeed. On 
the other hand, the tenseless beliefs ‘Mellor’s tensed belief occurs at 1 o’clock’ and ‘1 
o’clock is 1 o’clock’, are true at all times if true at all, and therefore, if they caused 
Mellor’s act of turning on the radio at a time when they were true, they would not 
necessarily cause that action at a time at which it would succeed. 
Mellor’s account of why tensed beliefs are necessary for timely actions thus runs as 
follows: a successful timely action must occur at a specific time. This means that a true 
belief must cause it to happen at a specific time. A tensed belief is a belief that is only true 
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 Actually Mellor avoids stating this as a biconditional, but I think this is a more natural reading and this 
will not affect my argument. 
29
 Mellor adopts a token-reflexive theory in Mellor:1981a and a date theory in Mellor:1998, his shift in view 
is due to arguments that Smith (e.g. Smith:1993) has given against the token-reflexive theory. I think that 
Smith’s arguments are damning of the token-reflexive theory, but I have no need to rely on them here. 
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at a specific time, and hence, a belief such that, if it causes an action when it is true, it will 
cause an action at a specific time. Therefore, a tensed belief is required for a successful 
timely action. A true tenseless belief can be true at any time and therefore could cause an 
action at any time, and therefore, is not appropriate for causing an action at a specific time. 
 
2.6 Inadequacies of Mellor’s Tenseless Account 
 
Mellor is wrong to say that tensed beliefs, unlike tenseless ones, are only true at 
specific times. Moreover, Mellor says quite the opposite at other places.30 In order to make 
this clear I will consider Mellor’s own distinction between a token and a type belief. A 
belief type might be embodied in numerous different belief tokens. Thus if Mellor and I 
both believe ‘it is 1 o’clock now’, we will have different token beliefs, but these beliefs 
will be of the same type. 
When talking of belief tokens Mellor in fact says that they will, if of short duration, 
always have an unchanging truth-value. His point is that if I yesterday at 1 o’clock 
believed ‘it is 1 o’clock now’, my belief would then have been true. Further, it remains the 
case that that belief was true, even though it is not now 1 o’clock. In short, the truth-value 
of the token remains constant despite the token being tensed. In a similar way a tenseless 
token will have an unchanging truth-value, if it at any time that belief token is true, at 
every time that belief token is true. 
There is a different sense in which a tensed token is only true at a specific time, 
that is, the sense in which the belief only occurs, and hence has any properties at all, at a 
specific time. But again, this does not distinguish tensed and tenseless tokens, as a tensed 
belief that only occurs for a short duration will only be true for that duration, just as a 
tenseless belief token of parallel duration is. 
The case with belief types is slightly different. A tensed belief type might have 
some tokens which are true and some which are false, whereas a tenseless type will have 
tokens all of which have the same truth-value. But this is not to say that a tensed belief 
type changes truth-value, as much as to say that a tensed belief type does not have a truth-
value at all (in fact, it cannot have a truth-value, as Mellor’s theory of truth specifically 
refers to a time of occurrence and a type does not have a time of occurrence). Moreover, 
Mellor is concerned with the causes of actions, and it is only belief tokens, not types which 
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 Mellor:1981a ch.6, & 1998 ch.7.4. 
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can be causes. So we must focus on tokens, and when we do, we see that tensed and 
tenseless tokens are, or can be, alike in their nature as truth-bearers, so this cannot be what 
explains the need for tensed beliefs. A tenseless token can be, as a tensed token can, true 
only at a specific time, therefore, the need for a belief only true at a specific time cannot be 
what makes a tensed belief essential to a rational timely action. 
Mellor might have a true tenseless belief, such as ‘God is love’, only at 1 o’clock,31 
and this might cause him to turn the radio on. If this happens all of Mellor’s criteria are 
fulfilled, that is, the action is caused by a true32 belief, moreover, a belief that is only true 
at a specific time, and which causes an action that will only succeed when that belief is 
true. This possibility therefore shows that Mellor’s criteria do not explain why tensed 
beliefs are necessary for timely action. 
This example might appear unfair to Mellor because God’s being love appears to 
be of little relevance to Mellor’s turning on the radio to hear the news. But, the notion of 
relevance doesn’t actually support Mellor’s case. Because it is not clear that Mellor can 
show that the tensed belief that he offers, that ‘it is 1 o’clock now’, has any particular 
relevance to the action. Now, I do believe that the fact that it is 1 o’clock provides one 
with a reason to act to turn on the radio if they have a reason to hear the 1 o’clock news. 
Because of this I think that the belief that ‘it is 1 o’clock now’, also has relevance to the 
action of turning on the radio at 1 o’clock. But, Mellor, as he does not believe in the tensed 
fact, cannot say this. The only facts that exist and are related to the tensed belief for Mellor, 
its truth-conditions or truth-makers, are tenseless facts to do with the belief and its 
tenseless temporal location, i.e. the fact that the belief occurs at 1 o’clock, or the fact that 1 
o’clock is 1 o’clock. But these facts are quite irrelevant to the action of turning on the 
radio at 1 o’clock. The latter fact is a tautology, and whilst loosely relevant, it is not 
something that helps increase the likelihood of the success of Mellor’s action. Nor does the 
simultaneous occurrence of a belief have an obvious relevance, all sorts of beliefs may 
occur or not, and Mellor’s act of turning on the radio will still succeed. It is no good to say 
that the belief has relevance because it causes the action, because at this stage we are 
trying to uncover why the belief must cause the action, and to say that it must because it is 
relevant, and it is relevant because it causes the action is no explanation at all. (The 
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 It is quite possible to have a tenseless belief for only a short duration, in an unusual moment of inspiration 
I might consider God’s nature, decide that he is love, and then quickly abandon that idea. Alternatively, I 
might briefly think to myself, I have thought x at 1 o’clock, then abandon that idea because I was not actually 
sure whether it was thought x I was having.  
32
 Let us suppose. 
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tenseless belief could be the token-reflexive belief ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’, the most 
relevant fact Mellor appears to be able to suppose, if the tensed belief is supposed to pick 
out a relevant fact. We would then have fulfilled all of Mellor’s criteria without a tensed 
belief, nor hence, an explanation of the essential tensed belief.) 
Davidson, 33  from whom Mellor presumably borrows the idea that actions are 
caused by belief/desire complexes, does go a little further. He says that these belief/desire 
complexes must rationalize the action, and it might seem that the tensed belief ‘it is 1 
o’clock now’ will rationalize the action of turning on the radio in a way that the tenseless 
belief ‘God is love’ will not. However, this is now to give a quite different account for the 
need for tensed beliefs, namely, that they can rationalize actions which tenseless beliefs 
cannot. As it happens I think this is right. But, it is far from what Mellor says. Further, it is 
not clear that Davidson’s position can explain why this would be the case, we can have 
third-personal and tenseless practical syllogisms that rationalize an action in a tenseless 
way. For example: F.P. has a desire to hear the 1 o’clock news; in order to hear the 1 
o’clock news F.P. must turn on the radio at 1 o’clock; therefore, it ought to be the case that 
F.P. turns on the radio at 1 o’clock.34 
Rationality is crucial, the tensed beliefs do play a role in rational actions that 
tenseless ones cannot. One natural way to understand why this is is that tensed beliefs 
provide us with reasons that tenseless ones do not, and a rational action is one which is 
responsive to the appropriate reasons. In addition, it is natural to take the reasons provided 
to be the objects of these beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. If I go to the shop because I 
believe it sells milk, and it does not in fact sell milk, then when I arrive at the shop and 
realize my belief is mistaken I will also realize that I had no reason to go there after all. 
Our beliefs do come between our reasons and our actions, because we must be aware of 
our reasons to act. Sometimes we can have mistaken beliefs and so our actions can fall out 
of line with the reasons that there are to perform them, but this does not mean that our 
actions are not generally responsive to reasons as states of the world. 
Mellor, as a tenseless theorist, cannot tell a story like this. Instead he must refer to a 
difference between tensed and tenseless beliefs which is independent of their objects (the 
facts they pick out). He tries to do this with reference to the fact that a tensed belief unlike 
a tenseless one is true at a specific time. But, a tenseless belief can also be true at a specific 
time. Mellor cannot simply say the tensed beliefs provide reasons not provided by the 
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 E.g. Davidson:2001a & 2001c. 
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 Cf. McGinn:1979 who quite naturally presents a practical syllogism in a third-personal way. 
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tenseless ones, because we need an account of why this is. Such an account cannot be 
based on the idea of rationalizing an action, as the natural way to understand this notion of 
rationalizing, does not prevent one from constructing a tenseless rationalization. If Mellor 
leaves it as a brute fact that tensed beliefs provide reasons tenseless ones cannot, then he 
offers an account which is poor in comparison to the tensed theory’s account. The tensed 
theory can explain why a tensed belief provides reasons that a tensless one does not, by 
referring to the objects of that belief. Moreover, if the tensed theory is right that reasons 
are the contents of beliefs, not the beliefs themselves, then the tenseless theory cannot 
accommodate this in its theory, as it can’t distinguish between the facts picked out by 
tensed and tenseless beliefs, nor hence can it say that one provides reasons the other does 
not. 
There is a move open to the tenseless theory that Mellor does not emphasize but 
that appears to have relevance here. Mellor could have argued that tensed and tensless 
beliefs differ, not because only the former can be true at a specific time, but, because only 
the former can be known to be true at a specific time. The thought is that I can know all 
morning, B1, ‘if I act on my belief ‘it is 1 o’clock now’ when it is true I will succeed in 
hearing the 1 o’clock news’. However, I cannot know all morning B2, ‘if I act on my 
belief ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’ [or my belief ‘God is Love’] when it is true, then I will 
succeed in hearing the 1 o’clock news’.35 Therefore, I must act on a tensed belief, not a 
tenseless one. 
As it stands, this argument is mistaken, I could know B2 all morning. Be that as it 
may, there is something awkward in this, because, believing B2, whilst distinct from 
believing B3, ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’ [or ‘God is Love’], is nevertheless closely 
linked to it. It is natural to move from the former belief to the latter belief, insofar as, if 
one knows that they can in the future have a tenseless belief and it be true, it is natural to 
hence adopt that tenseless belief. No similar link holds in the tensed case, one can believe 
that a tensed belief will be true at some time in the future without being in anyway moved 
to therefore adopt that tensed belief at that time. If one did form the tenseless belief B3 
upon forming the belief that it will be true when believed in the future, that is, upon 
forming belief B2 early in the morning, then, B2 will no longer be correct, because it will 
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 I am here speaking of token beliefs, but little would be altered if instead we spoke of, e.g. B2* ‘if I act on a 
belief of the type ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’ when it is true then I will succeed in hearing the 1 o’clock 
news’. 
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no longer be the case that acting on B3 when it is true will lead one to hear the 1 o’clock 
news (as it will no longer be true that B3 is had only at 1 o’clock).36 
This picks out a genuine asymmetry between a case of acting on a tensed and on a 
tenseless belief. However, it is an asymmetry based on the idea that one must know in 
advance that acting on these beliefs when true will lead one to act successfully, and it is 
not clear that Mellor, or the tenseless theory, can suppose that such knowledge is required 
for the actions at issue, nor even that such knowledge would aid their case. There are three 
issues here. Firstly, when one acts rationally in turning on the radio at 1 o’clock the 
phenomenology of the situation is simply that one turns on the radio because it is 1 o’clock, 
and one wants to hear the news, and knows that one must turn on the radio at 1 o’clock to 
hear the news. It is therefore apparently false to say that an agent must also know that if 
they act on their tensed belief when it is true then they will succeed (for example, one 
needn’t believe something like B1 or B2). 
Secondly, if we suppose that one must have this knowledge (e.g. B1 or B2), then it 
no longer seems plausible that one must also know that the belief one acts on (e.g. B3) will 
be true when one has it. If I act on a belief because I know that in acting on it I will 
succeed, then I do not in addition to knowing this also have to know that it will be true 
when I act on it. To know that acting on it will be successful all I need to know is that it 
occurs at a certain time, and it is possible to know that one will have a belief at a certain 
time without knowing that it will be true at that time, because the truth-maker of a belief is 
not the only thing that can bring it about. If one needn’t know that the belief one ought to 
act on will be true, then the asymmetry between the tensed and tenseless cases evaporates, 
as it was only knowing the tenseless belief (e.g. B3) would be true in the future that might 
encourage one to form the tenseless belief in the present. Moreover, why would the object 
of beliefs such as B1 and B2 have to be beliefs that occur at a certain time, rather than 
some other timely event that is plausibly easier to predict? It would be sufficient for an 
agent to know simply that if they act when a clock says 1 o’clock, then they will likely 
succeed in acting. Once we have the higher order belief the lower order one is no longer 
necessary as the object of the higher order belief. 
Thirdly, if Mellor must know that acting on a belief such as B3 or B4, ‘It is 1 
o’clock now’, when he has it and it is true, will lead to successful action, that is, if Mellor 
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 I am supposing for Mellor’s sake, though I am not sure this would be the case, that if I believe in the 
morning that ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’, then this will be the same belief token as that I have when I 
believe at 1 o’clock ‘belief b occurs at 1 o’clock’. 
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must believe B1 or B2 in order to perform a rational timely action of turning on the radio. 
Then this implies that this knowledge plays a role in the rationality of his action. But it is 
not clear how Mellor can account for this. The natural way to understand the need for 
knowledge such as B1 and B2 to be rational, is to take beliefs B3 or B4 to be reasons to act. 
(It is because B3 or B4 are reasons for my action that I must be aware of them in order to 
perform that action rationally, that is, in a way that is responsive to reasons for that action.) 
But we have just seen that Mellor struggles to justify this idea on a tenseless framework. 
Therefore, the asymmetry picked out four paragraphs above is of no help to Mellor or the 
tenseless theory in accounting for the need for tensed beliefs in rational timely actions. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter we have seen that Perry’s argument for the essential indexical shows 
that tensed beliefs are essential for rational timely actions. Perry’s initial argument 
specifically concerned a timely and rational action, not just any old doing, and plausibly 
applies to all actions of this type. 
This fact appears to lend initial credence to the tensed theory because it implies that 
when one acts on a tensed belief this is rational in a way that acting on a similar tenseless 
belief would not be. And a natural way to understand this is that one is aware of reasons 
for their action, and that one acts for, through their tensed belief that one is not through 
their tenseless belief. 
The tenseless theory cannot accept such an account. Mellor offers an alternative 
account of the need for tense, from the stand point of a tenseless theory, based on the fact 
that tensed beliefs, unlike tenseless ones, can be held and true at a specific time. 
A consideration of Mellor’s account found it to be inadequate, as the asymmetry he 
alluded to was not a genuine asymmetry. Mellor’s account could be made plausible if a 
tensed belief is a reason to act whilst a similar tenseless one is not. However, it is not clear 
that the tenseless theory can justify such a claim. Mellor’s account could also be made 
more plausible if one had to know in advance of acting that the belief one would act on in 
acting would be true at the time one believed it and would also make one’s act likely to 
succeed (e.g. B1 or B2). However, again, it is not clear that Mellor can justify such a claim, 
as it is not clear that such a belief is rationally demanded, nor is it clear that if such a belief 
were necessary that it would make acting on a tensed belief essential to a rational action. 
43 
 
As with Chapter One, we have seen that a clear understanding of the rationality of 
our actions and our emotions can play an important role in the debate between the tensed 
and tenseless theories. In the subsequent chapters I will therefore turn to investigating the 
nature of this rationality. 
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CHAPTER THREE: REASONS 
 
In this chapter I will examine the nature of reasons. We saw in Chapters One and 
Two that in order to progress certain debates about the nature of time we need to get clear 
about the rationality of actions and the appropriateness of emotions. The rationality of an 
action is tightly bound up with reasons for that action, just as the appropriateness of an 
emotion is bound with the reasons that emotion is felt for. Whether or not we reduce this 
rationality and this appropriateness to reasons, it is clear that we cannot fully assess the 
former without considering the nature of the latter. (In my discussion I will focus on 
actions, as this is the focus common in the literature, but what I say is applicable to the 
case of emotions, as I will make clear in Chapter Eight.) 
I take reasons to be facts; for example, the fact that a car is approaching me is a 
good reason for me to jump out of the road. Further, if I spot the car, I will jump for this 
reason. I will begin this chapter by introducing terminology popular in the philosophy of 
reason, and using it to clarify my view. It will become clear that the points I make in the 
first and second sentences of this paragraph require independent defence. I will promote 
the idea that reasons are facts, and will defend it from numerous arguments. 
 
3.1 Theories & Terms 
 
We use the notion of a reason in a variety of ways, Alvarez1 picks out three. Firstly, 
we can speak of reasons that justify actions: Tom’s mess-making justifies his stopping. 
Secondly, we can speak of the reason someone acted for, what motivated them: Tom might 
stop for the reason that he is making a mess. And thirdly, we can speak of things that 
explain an action as the reasons for that action: we understand Tom’s stopping through 
being made aware that he was making a mess. 
In line with these distinctions we can speak of justificatory, motivational, and 
explanatory reasons respectively. However, as Alvarez is careful to stress, this need not 
mean that we are actually dealing with three distinct types of reasons, or even three distinct 
reasons, as it could well be that one and the same fact fulfils all three roles, and hence, is at 
once a justifying, motivating and explanatory reason. For example, Tom’s making a mess, 
justifies his stopping, motivates him to stop, and can explain his stopping. On the other 
                                                 
1
 Alvarez:2009a. 
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hand, it is possible for the three to diverge. A fact might justify Tom’s act, but if he is 
unaware of it, it will not motivate his action, and might not explain it. Tom might be 
motivated to act by a fact that does not actually justify his action. And Tom’s action might 
be explained by a fact that neither justifies nor motivates his action. Similarly, a single fact 
might justify one act, motivate another, and explain a third. The difference between the 
types of reason is not a difference in the nature of the reason, but rather, in the role the 
reason plays. A fact is a justificatory reason if it justifies an action, it is a motivational 
reason if it motivates an action, and an explanatory reason if it is used to explain an action. 
With this possibility of coincidence and divergence clear, I will go on to speak of three 
types of reason for simplicity, though the distinction is centrally one of three roles. 
For simplicity I will refer to justificatory reasons as j-reasons, motivational reasons 
as m-reasons, and explanatory reasons as e-reasons. (When I do not need to delineate a 
single role, then I will often drop the prefix.) 
For each type of reason there can be a theory about what sort of things those 
reasons are. I have been speaking of all three as facts, and thus I allow that all three can 
coincide, and I will defend this view below. However, some disagree and take the different 
types of reason to fall into different ontological categories, hence denying coincidence. For 
example, Wallace 2  takes j-reasons to be facts, but he thinks that m-reasons are 
psychological states. Tom is justified in acting by the fact that he is making a mess, but he 
is motivated to act by his believing that he is making a mess and his desiring not to. I will 
refer to the view that reasons are psychological states as psychologism about reasons. 
More specifically, I shall speak of the view that j-reasons are psychological states as 
psychologism about j-reasons, the view that m-reasons are psychological states as 
psychologism about m-reasons, and so on for e-reasons. I will refer to the view that 
reasons are facts, analogously, as non-psychologism about j-reasons, non-psychologism 
about m-reasons, and non-psychologism about e-reasons. 
Psychologism about j-reasons must be distinguished from internalism about j-
reasons.3 Internalism is the view that one’s j-reasons are in some way delimited by one’s 
motivation, or potential motivation. For example, Williams 4  has defended a view 
according to which one only has a j-reason to F, if one has a desire that would be satisfied 
by Fing, or could be brought to have such a desire through rational deliberation after 
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 Wallace:2003, see also Davis:2003, Smith:1994 & 2003, and, Mele:2003. 
3
 Cf. Hurley:2001 who gives an argument that suggests that internalism needn’t entail psychologism. 
4
 Williams:1979. 
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having been made better aware of their situation. Internalism thus places a condition on 
any j-reason, however, it does not, as psychologism does, impose an ontological form on 
those reasons. One could adopt an internalism like Williams’ and adopt either non-
psychologism or psychologism. Tom’s act could be justified by the fact that he is making a 
mess, even if it is only so justified as long as Tom could (in the relevant way) be motivated 
by that fact. Externalism, in this context, is the denial of internalism.5 
It is important to distinguish between a belief (a mental state6) and what is believed 
(a state of the world the believer is aware of). The term ‘belief’ can be used to refer to 
either of these, and thus it has an act/object ambiguity. A similar act/object ambiguity 
occurs for the term ‘desire’, which might be used variously to refer to the mental state of 
desiring, or to the object of such affections.7 Psychologism, is the view that j-reasons are 
mental states, and in this sense the view that j-reasons are beliefs and desires. If one 
instead uses ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ to speak of the facts believed or desired, then, one might 
say in accord with non-psychologism that beliefs and desires are reasons. We must 
therefore be careful. I will use the expressions ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ to speak of mental 
states, unless I make it clear otherwise. The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are commonly used 
in the literature in a thin sense. ‘Belief’ picks out a number of cognitive states, so that if 
one believes b, one might in fact doubt b, assume b, know b etc. ‘Desire’ is used to capture 
a number of pro-attitudes, so if one desires d, one might in fact want d, be inclined towards 
d, etc. I will say more about this in the following chapter, but for the time being I will also 
adopt this thin use. 
With these distinctions in the open it is possible to delineate a number of different 
views crisscrossing these distinctions. The view that I wish to defend is non-psychologism 
about j- and m-reasons. Although I will not defend non-psychologism about e-reasons,8 I 
will indirectly defend a view that e-reasons can be facts, leaving it open whether or not 
they can also fall into different ontological categories. I will stay largely quiet on the issue 
of internalism versus externalism, save for the following remarks. 
As defined – e.g. the bearing of some relation to motivation – internalism could 
take a number of different forms. Arguably, if one adopts a particularly extreme form of 
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 It is worth noting that Lowe:2008 uses the term ‘externalism’ rather differently and in a way more akin to 
my use of ‘non-psychologism’ (though Lowe goes on to talk of needs, rather than facts). 
6
 I do not mean to take a stance on the nature of beliefs and desires by speaking of mental states, as opposed 
to acts or episodes (cf. Steward:1997). 
7
 Cf. Alvarez:2010a p.3. 
8
 For arguments to this effect see Strawson:1992. 
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internalism one will have more scope for dealing with the issues surrounding the 
rationality of actions that were met in the last chapter, namely, the need for indexical 
beliefs. For example, one might insist that one has a j-reason only so long as one can be 
motivated to act whilst having an indexical belief, adding, that one can only act rationally 
if one has j-reasons. (Whilst I think this latter claim is false, I shall accept it in order to 
make the current point.) It would follow that Tom must have an indexical belief to act 
rationally, as without one nothing he did could be rational. However, such an extreme form 
of internalism appears to be very difficult to justify. It certainly doesn’t strike one as 
intuitive. Rather, Tom would have a j-reason to act whether or not he had such a first-
personal belief, so long as he was making a mess. In this regard it is telling that the forms 
of internalism commonly defended in the literature are far less extreme, and hence, more 
plausible.9 Of these more common forms of internalism Williams’ is perhaps one of the 
more hard-line.10 However, I think it is clear that an internalism of this form does not 
explain why indexical beliefs are needed for rational actions. For the fact that Tom is 
making a mess, the reason we are concerned with, could qualify as such a reason without 
Tom having an indexical belief, whether or not we adopt this internalism. For matters of 
simplification then, I shall put the internalism/externalism debate to one side, on the 
assumption that any plausible or common form of internalism (and hence externalism) will 
not prevent the problems of the essential indexical from arising. 
Occasionally a distinction is made between conclusive and pro tanto reasons. If one 
has a conclusive reason to do something then one ought rationally to do it. On the other 
hand, someone might have a pro tanto reason to do something, but also have stronger pro 
tanto reasons not to do that thing, so that all things considered they ought rationally not to 
do it. Pro tanto reasons can be weighed against one another, and having a pro tanto reason 
to do something does not mean that all things considered you ought rationally to do that 
thing, or that that thing is the most reasonable thing to do. I think this raises an important 
issue and it should be understood that in my discussion, when I say that someone has a 
reason to do something, I do not mean that all things considered they ought to do that thing, 
or that thing is the most reasonable thing to do. In short, I am very often talking about pro 
tanto reasons, unless I make clear otherwise. 
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 Cf. Williams:1979, Smith:1994, and Korsgaard:1986, for discussion McNaughton & Rawling:2004. 
10
 At least of the internalist views that will be amenable to non-psychologism. See Dancy:2000 ch.7 for a 
discussion of internalism from the point of view of one who adopts non-psychologism. 
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3.2 Justificatory Reasons 
 
The greatest adversary to non-psychologism about j-reasons is psychologism about 
j-reasons.11 (From here on in this section I will often simply speak of non-psychologism or 
psychologism, in doing so I mean to speak of non-psychologism and psychologism about 
j-reasons.) When the two are considered shoulder to shoulder, I think it is very clear that 
non-psychologism is the better theory. For example, Tom’s j-reason to stop and rearrange 
his shopping appears to be the fact that he is making a mess. Not his belief that he is nor 
his belief in anything different, nor anyone else’s belief. Whether or not he has this belief, 
there is a j-reason for him to stop. The fact that he is making a mess does not stop being 
problematic just as he does not believe he is, and similarly, it does not stop being a j-
reason for him to act to stop making a mess. 
When one deliberates about what one ought to do or to have done, one will 
consider facts. I see the fact that it is raining as a j-reason to take an umbrella, and the fact 
that the only umbrella available belongs to someone else as a j-reason not to take an 
umbrella. I do not consider my beliefs, but what they are beliefs of, facts, in order to make 
my decision.12 Kim13 has pointed out that if I were to consider my beliefs and desires this 
would move me from an act of deliberation to one of prediction. In considering that I 
believe it is raining, that I believe the only available umbrella belongs to someone else, and 
that I desire not to use other people’s belongings, I can predict that I will not take the 
umbrella. Just as another may predict my behaviour through knowing my mental states. 
But this conclusion will not tell me what I ought to do, it will not be the conclusion of an 
act of deliberation considering my j-reasons for acting, and it will leave me still with 
having to make a decision about what to do. In order to make this decision, I need to 
deliberate about the facts that obtain. 
Suppose that I lend someone twenty pounds, as I am told they need it to pay their 
phone bill.14 If I later discover that they were lying and that they just wanted to buy some 
alcohol, then I will feel that I in fact had no j-reason to lend them the money and that I 
                                                 
11
 Bittner:2001 does offer a third alternative, referring to reasons as events and states of affairs, rather than 
facts. But on the crucial issue of whether one ought to jump because there is a car approaching them, or, 
because one believes there is, Bittner, like me, would suggest the former. Bittner does not adopt 
psychologism about reasons. I will say more about my ontology of facts in Chapter Six. 
12
 This point is made by many writers, but perhaps especially emphasized by Kim:1998 and Manson:2004 
who focus on the first-person perspective. 
13
 Kim:1998. 
14
 I take the example from Alvarez:2008 & 2010 ch.5.2. 
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acted for no good reason. This implies that it was the supposed fact that they needed to pay 
a bill that was what I took to be a j-reason for my lending the money. If the j-reason had 
merely been my belief that they needed the money to pay a bill, then I oughtn’t to suppose 
that the act was unjustified upon discovering the falsity of the belief. Discovering the 
belief was false does nothing to undermine the past existence of the belief, nor hence, the 
potential for the belief to have justified the act. I learn that my act was unjustified because 
I learn that the fact I took to be the j-reason did not obtain. We can add to this common 
reference to facts as j-reasons, the idea that considerations of parsimony and simplicity 
lend weight to the view that all j-reasons fall into the same ontological category. Thus I 
take it that non-psychologism about j-reasons ought to be our default position, any other 
view would have to first unsettle it. 
Psychologism is driven by the thought that, for example, if I want to stay dry, and 
believe that it is raining so taking an umbrella will enable me to stay dry, then I am 
justified in taking an umbrella. This belief/desire pair appears to justify my action and 
hence to be a j-reason for my action, whether or not it is actually raining. However, this 
thought must be mistaken. One can easily imagine an act so heinous that no one ever ought 
to perform it, perhaps murdering a child that has a great life ahead of it. If someone were 
to suddenly form the desire to commit such a murder, and a belief that murdering the child 
in front of them would be committing such a murder, then according to the view under 
consideration this person would have a j-reason to commit this murder. The formation of 
the belief/desire complex brings a j-reason into existence as the j-reason just is that 
belief/desire complex. But this is obviously false, the murder remains unjustified.15 One 
cannot simply bootstrap j-reasons into existence through forming beliefs and/or desires, 
contra psychologism.16 In short, psychologism must be wrong. A consideration of further 
examples will clarify this. 
If Si’s mother, Jo, is unwell, Si has a j-reason to call around on his way home to 
see if there is anything he can do for her. Here the j-reason is the fact that Jo is unwell. The 
opponents of non-psychologism, however, point out that even if Jo is in fact quite well, if 
Si believes she is unwell, this seems to give grounds for saying that he ought to call around 
to see her. In this case, our original j-reason no longer occurs, so if Si ought to act in this 
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 One might argue that the formation of the desire entails that the agent will receive pleasure from 
committing the murder, and this is a j-reason, if only a very weak one, for committing the heinous act. But it 
is clear that if this is right, what is being offered as the j-reason is the fact that the agent would gain pleasure 
from the act, not simply the belief/desire pair, so psychologism is not vindicated. 
16
 Cf. Bratman:1987 p.24-27, and, Broome:2001b.  
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way, it must be the result of another j-reason, presumably his believing Jo unwell. We thus 
appear to have grounds for taking a j-reason to be a psychological state, contra non-
psychologism. 
Si appears to be subject to the complex normative requirement (hereon abbreviated 
to CNR) that one ought, if they believe their mother unwell, to call around to see her.17 
Psychologism recognizes such an obligation and assumes that Si has a j-reason to call 
around to see his mother. But we need not interpret the CNR in this way. Rather, it has 
been argued that the ought in such obligations must be interpreted to have a wide scope 
precisely in order to avoid the difficulties of bootstrapping already alluded to.18  One 
cannot conclude that Si ought to see his mother from the fact that he has a belief that she is 
unwell. The obligation cannot be detached in this way. All the CNR requires is that Si 
either goes to see his mother, or, loses the belief that she is unwell. He has a requirement to 
satisfy a disjunction, though not a requirement to fulfil either disjunct in particular. Si 
could satisfy this CNR if he did not believe that his mother is unwell. In fact, given that his 
belief is mistaken, it may well be that it would be better if he did not have that belief and 
did not go to see his mother. This would in no way appear to conflict with the CNR, and 
thus, it vindicates the idea that the obligation applies to the disjunction as a whole. 
If there is such a disjunctive obligation, then it is surely not provided by Si’s belief, 
because it can be satisfied by the absence of that belief. Rather, if there is a j-reason for 
this disjunctive obligation, then it likely comes from a fact, such as the fact that unwell 
people require help and mothers do a lot for their children.19 To insist the obligation is not 
disjunctive or that it stems from a psychological state is to go beyond the example and to 
simply assume psychologism without defence. 
A second, but related criticism of non-psychologism, concerns advice. One is able 
to advise someone how to do something, even if they take there to be no reason to do that 
thing. Ross might, for example, tell Dave how to make a birthday cake, even though he 
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 Many details perhaps need to be filled in here to make the CNR plausible, but I set these aside. The point 
is that one takes Si to be under an obligation to call around because he has this belief. To deny this much 
would be to remove the criticism of non-psychologism, to accept this much is to accept that the details can be 
filled in. 
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 Cf. Broome:2001b. See also Dancy:2000 chs.2 & 3, and Dancy:2003. 
19
 Many of the moves I make here reflect moves made by Dancy:2000. Piller:2003 has criticized Dancy on 
the grounds that these CNRs merely enable one to criticize someone who breaks them for being inconsistent. 
Dancy’s (2003) response is to say that these CNRs can themselves be grounded, as I have here, and these 
grounds enable a much stronger criticism of an agent breaking the CNR. Si wouldn’t simply be inconsistent 
if he didn’t go to see his mother, he would appear to be doing something in conflict with all she has done for 
him and the needs a person has when ill. 
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knows that Dave is wrong about the date of Jo’s birthday. He has told Dave about his error, 
but his advice fell on deaf ears. Ross might say “you shouldn’t be making a cake, but, if 
you are going to, you should start by getting the ingredients”. This is a matter of means 
end reasoning. Dave desires to make a cake and in order to obtain this end he has to do 
certain other things, including gathering the ingredients. The point of the case is that Dave 
has no j-reason to make a cake, he has no j-reason to do so even though he desires to, 
because it is not Jo’s birthday. 20 But, despite this, it appears that his desire to make a cake 
has given him a j-reason to do what subserves making a cake. This is because, regardless 
of whether or not Dave should be making the cake, if Dave went about trying to do it 
without gathering ingredients, then he would be open to rational criticism that he would 
not be open to if he gathered the ingredients first. Thus, Dave’s desire to make the cake 
appears to provide a j-reason for his gathering ingredients. 
I have said that Dave’s desire to make the cake is not a j-reason for making that 
cake. This is a general point, wanting x does not give one a reason to have (or do) x, and it 
is supported by the bootstrapping argument already given. Our question now is whether 
Dave’s desire provides a reason for his doing what subserves his desired end.21  The 
suggestion that it is comes from the idea that Dave would be irrational if he had that desire 
but did not pursue those means. We have here, again, a CNR, one ought, if they desire to 
make a cake, to gather ingredients. With this in focus, we are free to respond to this case 
just as we did with Si’s. Dave is irrational if he fails to meet this CNR, and he would do so 
if he desired to make a cake and he did not gather ingredients. Thus he is open to the 
criticism of irrationality. However, this is not because he has a j-reason to gather 
ingredients, as it is he has none, it is only that he has a j-reason (or at least a rational 
obligation) to satisfy the disjunction ‘gather ingredients or do not desire to make a cake’. 
Because it is not Jo’s birthday, Dave has no j-reason to make a birthday cake or to desire to, 
and therefore his not desiring to would be a better way for him to satisfy the CNR. 
It is possible for the critic of non-psychologism to produce numerous examples like 
Si’s and Dave’s, and the literature has many. But, the pattern of response, citing the CNR 
and denying detachment, always appears to be open, and for this reason, I think we can 
take this discussion to displace a number of other similar cases.22 Whilst I think this forms 
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 Cf. Dancy:2000 p.32, and e.g. Bratman:1987 p.23-7, Raz:2005, Wallace:2001, Broome:2005, and, 
Parfit:1997. 
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 Clearly the bootstrapping criticism can easily be applied to this case just as it was above. 
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 Cf. e.g. Darwall:2003. 
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an interesting and provocative line of criticism of non-psychologism, I take my comments 
here to show that it is inadequate to its purpose. (In Chapter Five I will say more about 
CNRs and the nature of their rational import, but my comments here suffice to show that 
one can accept non-psychologism, and accept an obligation on, for example, Si.) 
There is a second aspect to Dave’s case. Ross has a j-reason to behave in a 
particular way, for example, to tell Dave that it is not Jo’s birthday when approached about 
the cake. This j-reason looks essentially bound up with Dave’s belief and if it just is 
Dave’s belief non-psychologism is faulted. However, non-psychologism has an alternative 
to this, namely, the fact that Dave has the belief. The j-reason for Ross’s act is the fact that 
Dave believes it is Jo’s birthday. Thus non-psychologism is able to account for this 
situation. Moreover, non-psychologism’s account is very plausible. It is not simply the 
belief, but the possession of the belief at a specific time by a specific person, that is, the 
fact that Dave has the belief, that provides Ross with a j-reason. Thus, it is clear that non-
psychologism is not committed to the implausible idea that j-reasons are isolated from 
psychological states. Rather, they can play an important role when they are considered as 
constituents of facts. Moving to the third person perspective makes this distinction more 
clear. 
The final difficulty that I want to consider against non-psychologism concerns the 
so called fact/value gap. I will consider three arguments that have been given against the 
idea that values can be facts: the argument from relativity, the argument from derivation, 
and the argument from queerness. These are of relevance as j-reasons are values, insofar as 
they are j-reasons that one ought rationally to F. 
Mackie23 raises the argument from relativity focusing on moral values: there are 
large disagreements between societies geographically and temporally about moral values; 
if moral values were facts we would not expect this to be the case; therefore moral values 
are not facts. If one tried to transpose this argument to the case of rational values or j-
reasons, then we immediately hit upon a difficulty. It is simply false that there are large 
disagreements between societies about what is rational. Moreover, it is necessary that this 
premise is false. In order to understand another person, one must assume them to be by and 
large rational by one’s own standards.24 Without this assumption, it is impossible to get 
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 Mackie:1977 pt.1 ch.8. 
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 Cf. Davidson:2001g, Kim:1988 p.392-393. If one adopts a (later) Wittgensteinian view of language which 
is radically opposed to this Davidsonian view, we still find a similar point being made, but now in the idea 
that shared understanding must presuppose a shared background of judgements (cf. Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I 
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any foothold at all on what they mean or believe. This entails that anyone that did differ 
radically from oneself about what was rational, or what were j-reasons, would be someone 
that we could not even understand, let alone describe as disagreeing with us. In the case of 
rationality then, the argument from relativity is quite simply impossible. It is likely that not 
all will agree with me that the fact that Tom is making a mess is a j-reason for him to act. 
But, in order for two of us to disagree about such a matter we must first agree about a great 
many more things, a great many more of our j-reasons. Disagreements can only be minor, 
and minor disagreements ought to be expected, given that none of us are perfectly rational 
or reasonable beings. 
The argument from derivation occurs in Hume’s25 writings. It is argued that P1: no 
statement of value can be derived from statements of fact alone; and hence, C1: that facts 
cannot be values. However, if non-psychologism is correct then P1 is false. More 
accurately, if non-psychologism is correct then many statements of fact just are statements 
of value. If the facts at issue are allowed to be values, then the derivation is going to be 
straight forward. The non-psychologist can see a statement of fact that is a conclusion 
following from other statements of fact, also as a statement of value thereby offering a 
ready case in which a value was derived from a fact. In short, Hume, for example, allows 
the derivation of one fact from others, but if non-psychologism is correct, then this might 
just be an example of a derivation of a value from facts, or from other values. 
The argument from derivation has been widely discussed since Hume. For example, 
Searle26 considers an alternative that focuses on the expressions used in the statements. 
The argument being that one cannot derive a statement using evaluative expressions from 
statements that do not.27 This version of the argument meets a similar response to the one 
just given. But here we can also put more pressure on the issue. For example, a man might 
have two names, but if we do not know that he does, we will not be able to derive a 
statement using the one name from premises which only use the other. On the other hand, 
if we do know that he does, then a statement to this effect, a premise involving both names, 
will appear as a premise in our derivation. So we would still not have an example in which 
statements involving the one expression – name – can be derived from ones lacking that 
                                                                                                                                                   
sect.242). The Wittgensteinian approach makes it clear that this need not lead us to some form of 
psychologism, as the judgments at issue are essentially world involving (cf. Wittgestein:2001b pt.I sect. 241). 
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 Hume:1985 bk.III, pt.I sect.I. 
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 Searle:1964. 
27
 Of course there is slightly more to it than this, as from P one can always derive P or Q. Therefore, the 
evaluative expressions must be occurring in the conclusion in a sufficiently active way. 
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expression. But we do not take this to show that a man cannot have two names, so even if 
it were impossible to derive statements involving evaluative expressions from statements 
that lack them we shouldn’t conclude that facts are not values. 28 
Mackie’s29 argument from queerness is that: if there are objective values then these 
are objects of a queer sort, different from anything else, and we would have to know of 
them through a special faculty. The point being that objective values – j-reasons as facts – 
are odd, and demand us to be odd. 
However, being odd does not render something impossible, so non-psychologism is 
not disproven by this argument, at best it is made less attractive. But non-psychologism 
can respond more forcefully. The crucial issue is the notion of ‘queer’ involved. It appears 
that normal for Mackie is causal nomological, or science. The criticism then is that j-
reasons are unscientific. This claim is highly dubious, people spend very little of their time 
doing science, but arguably must respond to j-reasons at every turn, so if anything science 
is the queer approach to matters. If one is adamant that science will speak the whole and 
only truth, they ought to hope that science will encompass these normative facts. Further, 
in emphasizing the necessary universality of reasoning and rationality one opens space for 
a law-like, and hence science friendly view of j-reasons and rationality.30 
On the other hand, one can offer an explanation of why values are not fundamental 
properties of science. Arguably, science aims to produce a value neutral description of the 
world, in which case, it will aim to disregard values, and hence, should not be expected to 
posit them.31 I do not mean to hang much on this description of science, but rather, to put 
pressure on what exactly Mackie might mean by normal and queer, and to point out that if 
by normal Mackie means something like value neutral, then to this extent the idea that a 
normal view makes no reference to values is to be expected but is also irrelevant to the 
existence of values. Moreover, there may be good independent grounds for thinking that 
reasons and rationality cannot be reduced to a scientific causal system. Davidson’s causal 
                                                 
28
 One might argue that derivations concern propositions, not statements, (one derives a proposition from 
other propositions, not a statement from other statements). One might also argue that co-referring names will 
be captured by the same propositional elements, and hence, try to argue that if the names co-refer there is a 
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 Mackie:1977 pt.1 ch.9. 
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causes, an explanation in terms of reasons is not a causal one. 
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 Cf. Cockburn:1997 ch.5.6. 
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approach came under fire (from Davidson himself at a later date), on the grounds that 
causal accounts are susceptible to the problem of deviant causal chains.32 One might be 
caused by the right reasons, but in the wrong way (the fact that there is a storm is a j-
reason for heading indoors, but actually being forced indoors by the storm is not 
responding to the j-reason in the right way). Lowe has further argued that responding to j-
reasons cannot be a causal matter, as that would undermine the element of free choice 
essential for rational action.33 Non-psychologism can thus respond to the argument from 
queerness by admitting that its objective values are not scientific or causal properties. This 
would not be an ad hoc answer, but rather one grounded in a thorough understanding of 
rationality and perhaps science. 
To conclude this section, non-psychologism is promoted by our ready 
consideration of facts as j-reasons, and advantages of keeping j-reasons to a single 
ontological kind. Many arguments against non-psychologism occur in cases where there is 
a complex normative requirement at play, for example; one ought to F if they believe p. 
These CNRs can be interpreted in a way that denies detachment, they are a requirement to 
satisfy a disjunction, but, not to adopt any one of those disjuncts rather than the other. This 
removes the pressure to take the psychological state involved to be the j-reason, in fact 
implying the contrary. In other cases, it is a fact constituted in part by a psychological state, 
rather than the state itself that is the j-reason, the close relation between these two 
providing an error theory for psychologism’s mistake. Finally, the fact/value gap 
arguments have their potency stunted when it is noted that rationality must have a 
universal nature (there can be only one rationality and hence only one set of j-reasons). 
Further, demands for the possibility of derivation or a particular scientific nature are 
demands that non-psychologism can regard as inappropriate on independent grounds. 
 
3.3 Motivational Reasons 
 
I now turn to considering the case of m-reasons. (In this section, when I say simply 
“non-psychologism” or “psychologism” I mean non-psychologism or psychologism about 
m-reasons.) Here again, the greatest rival to non-psychologism is psychologism. Our 
concern now is with the question, why did Tom act, what motivated him, what was his m-
reason for acting? Non-psychologism takes it that Tom’s m-reason for acting was the fact 
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 Cf. Davidson:2001a and 2001b respectively. 
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 Lowe:2008 ch.9, see also McCall & Lowe:2005. 
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that he was making a mess, psychologism, on the other hand, takes it that Tom’s m-reason 
was his belief that he was making a mess perhaps in combination with a desire not to. Put 
like this, non-psychologism again gains an initial advantage over its rival. Tom would not 
take himself to be acting for the m-reason that he had that belief and desire, rather, Tom 
quite sensibly takes his believing and desiring those things to be no j-reason for his act, 
and hence, it is not something that motivates him and therefore is not his m-reason either. 
Deliberation again lends credence to non-psychologism, the things one considers when 
they consider how to act are facts, it is therefore natural to suppose that these facts are 
what motivate the individual when they finally make their decision. To insist that they 
were motivated by something different appears to undermine the very act of deliberating, 
if one does not act for any of the things that they consider acting for.34 
Dancy35 points out that any account of m-reasons must meet two criteria: EC, it 
must make it clear how a j-reason can contribute to the explanation of an action done for 
that reason; NC, it must make it clear how one can act for good j-reasons. To deny NC 
would be to assert that no one ever acts for good j-reasons, and perhaps hence that no-one 
is rational. Given non-psychologism about j-reasons, it is hard to see how anything other 
than non-psychologism about m-reasons can meet the latter of these constraints, and thus 
non-psychologism about m-reasons gains credence. It has been argued that one should not 
take NC literally, and that enough connection is maintained with normative reasons if they 
are, for example, the content of beliefs that are m-reasons.36 However, such a response is 
inadequate. It is to accept that literally no-one ever acts for a j-reason (no-one ever acts for 
a j-reason that justifies their act). This truth alone is unacceptable, whatever non-literal 
interpretations one might also give. 
Given that restricting m-reasons to a single ontological category has the advantages 
of simplicity and parsimony, we again have a case for taking non-psychologism to be our 
default position, any other view would have to first unsettle it. However, whilst non-
psychologism about j-reasons is quite popular, the case with m-reasons comes under rather 
more attack as I will now consider. 
In order to act for the fact x, one must believe x to obtain. This necessity could be 
taken to support psychologism, the need for the belief is explained by its identity with the 
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 Cf. Dancy:2003. 
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 Dancy:2000 ch.5. 
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 Cf. Wallace:2003 and Davis:2003. 
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m-reason.37 However, this support is very weak, the need for beliefs could be explained in 
a number of manners, for example the belief appears to merely enable one to be motivated. 
One must believe x to obtain in order to act for x, as believing x to obtain enables one to 
act for x. It enables as the agent is aware of x through this belief, and an agent must be 
aware of x to have it as an m-reason. It would be a mistake to identify enabling conditions 
with what they enable, so it would be wrong to identify an m-reason, with being aware of a 
fact, and hence, with having a belief. (Having legs enables me to walk, but that does not 
mean having a walk is having legs, or, that legs are walks.) The role of the belief means 
that it is possible for the belief to be part of an explanation of the action. But as already 
noted, it is possible for e-reasons and m-reasons to come apart, and we should not let the 
fact that the belief is an e-reason here make us conclude that it is also an m-reason. 
The case with desires is similar, though not identical, as it is less clear that desires 
are simply enabling conditions. Rather, those opposed to non-psychologism often take 
desires to be required for actions on the Humean grounds that desiring is being driven and 
acting for a reason is being driven.38 Smith39 gives the argument: having an m-reason is, 
inter alia, being motivated; being motivated is, inter alia, desiring; desiring is having a 
desire; therefore, desires are m-reasons. This is, however, not a valid argument. The 
conclusion one is justified in reaching is that having an m-reason is having a desire. But, 
unless the having is the same in both these cases it does not follow that the desire is the m-
reason. Dancy40 shows that it is not the same, by pointing out that having an m-reason is 
being motivated by an m-reason. On the other hand, it is not clear that having a desire is 
being motivated by a desire, therefore, the havings are not the same. This is not clear 
precisely as it is not clear that m-reasons are desires. A desire need not be what motivates 
it might instead simply be the state of being motivated. This would be sufficient to account 
for the need for desires in motivated actions, and further, for the sense in which we can say, 
as the Humean does, that having an m-reason is desiring.41 As with beliefs, a desire might 
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 Cf. Alvarez:2008 & Dancy:2000 ch.6. 
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 This can be put a number of different ways: desiring is having a pro attitude and being motivated is having 
a pro attitude, desiring is active and motivation is active, desiring considers the world the way it could be and 
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direction had by belief, belief being passive, and taking the world simply as it is). (Cf. Davidson:2001a, 
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 Smith:1994 p.116, see also Dancy:2000 p.91. 
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 Dancy:2000 p.91. 
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 Lowe:2008 p.186 suggests that desiring can be a mode of awareness of a fact (or need), to this extent it is 
like a belief and we can see it as a mere enabling condition for acting for that fact much as a belief is. 
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explain an action, it might be an e-reason, but it does not follow from this fact that it is also 
an m-reason.42 (I will say more on the role of desires in the next chapter.) 
That is to say, one cannot disprove non-psychologism by insisting that beliefs and 
desires are required for motivated actions. Nor can one do so by adopting a Humean stance 
according to which desire is the active state. 
However, it is clear that we often speak of people acting because of beliefs of theirs: 
I went to the hall because I thought it was Tuesday, she was angry as she thought she had 
been forgotten. Furthermore, this way of speaking appears to be forced upon us in a 
number of cases, specifically, those where the agent acts due to a mistaken belief. Suppose 
that Bob is in the super market with Tom, and that he too is following the trail of sugar, 
and suddenly stops to rearrange the shopping in his trolley. We can explain Tom’s doing 
so by referring to the fact that he was making a mess, this was a j-reason for him to stop, 
and he realized as much and was motivated to stop. Bob, on the other hand, was not 
making a mess, he did form the belief that he was, and stop as a result, but it appears that 
we cannot explain his stopping by referring to the fact that he was making a mess, as there 
was no such fact. In this case we explain Bob’s act by saying that he stopped because he 
believed that he was making a mess. His belief is an e-reason for his act, and it looks like it 
must also be his m-reason. Furthermore, there appears to be little ground for taking Bob’s 
case to be essentially different from Tom’s, both have beliefs playing similar roles, and 
therefore, Tom’s belief must in fact be his m-reason too. I shall refer to this as the error 
case, and I take it to be the strongest argument against non-psychologism.  
At this point we can emphasize the distinction already noted between a belief and 
the fact that the belief is held. It might be that it is the fact that the belief is held, not the 
belief, that provides the explanatory force. Furthermore, psychologism’s error case 
argument assumes that Bob’s m-reason is what is referred to when we explain Bob’s 
action by reference to his belief, that is, that it is the explanans or e-reason. However, we 
know that e-reasons and m-reasons can part company. I could explain Bob’s act by 
referring to contractions of his muscles, but these are clearly not his m-reasons. In the 
present case it is clear that the e-reason is not Bob’s m-reason. If we ask Bob what is 
motivating him, Bob would not cite the fact that he believes he was making a mess, but 
instead, his making a mess. This latter is also what he would consider in deciding to act. 
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Psychologism was perhaps encouraged to identify this e-reason with Bob’s m-
reason on the grounds that the explanation of Bob’s behaviour does reveal something 
about his m-reason. However, it is not necessary for the explanation to do this, that the e-
reason cited is the m-reason. In this case, the m-reason is revealed by the e-reason because 
it is what is believed by Bob. That is, the e-reason is the fact that Bob believed he was 
making a mess, the m-reason is the content of this belief.43 
Nevertheless, psychologism might still insist that Bob does not make a mess; this 
fact does not obtain, and therefore, it cannot be what motivates Bob, pace my implication 
to the contrary. The problem as psychologism sees it is that what does not exist cannot 
motivate. 
Lowe 44  has suggested a possible response to this, which uses Plantinga’s 45 
distinction between states of affairs and facts, facts simply being states of affairs that 
obtain. We could take it that Bob is motivated by the state of affairs Bob making a mess, 
something which does exist, though which is not a fact as it does not obtain. Tom is 
similarly motivated by the state of affairs Tom is making a mess, a state of affairs which 
actually does obtain and so is a fact. If this view were adopted, non-psychologism about 
m-reasons would have to be altered to allow that m-reasons can be mere states of affairs, 
that is, non-obtaining states of affairs, as well as facts. Non-psychologism about j-reasons 
though need not alter at all, as Bob, despite having an m-reason, does not have a j-reason 
for his action. 
An alternative response, and the one I shall assume, is to deny that Bob does have 
an m-reason at all, but also to deny that this need prevent him from being motivated. This 
response is supported by Bob’s willing to cite something non-existent as his m-reason. It is 
possible to have beliefs concerning something that does not exist. Bob has a belief about 
his making a mess, something that does not exist. One can take a number of attitudes 
towards the non-existent, such as when they are afraid of the monster under the bed, or 
when Bob is ashamed of his making a mess. Therefore, we ought to expect that Bob can be 
motivated by something that does not exist, or more accurately, be motivated without there 
being anything that motivates, without having an m-reason. Being motivated is in this case 
simply another example of adopting an attitude towards a non-existent. A matter of taking 
something to be a j-reason or to speak in favour of their act, and of being moved to act in 
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so taking things. To this end, one clearly does not need to have an m-reason to be 
motivated.46 (One should not confuse two issues here, even if there is a metaphysical 
demand that beliefs about non-existents are constituted by an existent, such as a 
proposition, it does not follow that the proposition is what they are about, or that in this 
sense they are about anything at all.) 
Moreover, we are free to evaluate Bob’s behaviour on the grounds of his belief, not 
because we can assess his m-reason, he does not have one, but because we can consider 
what would be the case if his beliefs were true. If Bob’s belief that he is making a mess 
were true, he would have an m-reason that was a j-reason. Because of this his act appears 
to be rational, even though it is in fact without reason. (I will say more about these issues 
of rationality in Chapter Five.) 
Linked with the idea that what does not exist cannot motivate, is the idea that what 
does not exist cannot explain. However, it is clear that this is not a criticism of non-
psychologism as I have defended it, as the e-reason does exist, it is the fact that Bob 
believes he is making a mess. Suggesting that there is no m-reason does not entail that 
there is a non-existent e-reason, but rather, that one cannot explain the case in terms of m-
reasons.47 
It is the case that we sometimes refer to beliefs even in non-error cases: I thought 
you would be here, John knew the boat was leaking, and so on. Advocates of 
psychologism might wonder why we would do this if the belief was not the m-reason. 
Alvarez48 offers three explanations, though I suspect there are more. Firstly, one might 
simply be concerned to bring their audiences’ attention to that belief. (They might be 
concerned to reveal the psychological mechanisms at play in acting, as well as the m-
reason.) Secondly, one might want to be withholding their judgment about whether the 
belief was true. (I might doubt that the road really is closed, but still take that to be 
motivating the bus driver.) Thirdly, one might want to reveal the epistemic nature of the 
agent (as is particularly clear when one uses ‘knows’ rather than ‘believes’). Crucially, 
however, none of these explanations entail that the belief referred to is the m-reason. So 
non-psychologism can readily accept that people speak of beliefs in describing actions. 
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Dancy, has offered us a different sort of example in which it does seem appropriate 
to speak of belief in citing a j-reason.49 If Jo has the paranoid belief that kettles are after 
her, then this might lead her to remove all kettles from her house and avoid tea rooms. 
However, the fact that she has this belief is a j-reason for her to go to see a psychiatrist, as 
she is clearly unwell. As a j-reason, this must be a fact. So when we say “Jo ought to go to 
see a psychiatrist because she believes kettles are after her” it is clear that the phrase ‘she 
believes kettles are after her’ refers to a fact. Given that this phrase so refers here, we have 
grounds for believing that our phrasing in reference to Bob ‘he believed that he was 
making a mess’ also refers to a fact. That is, even if such phrases can refer to belief states, 
it is clear they can also refer to the fact that someone has a belief, and we have grounds for 
thinking that they do so when we use them to rationalize agent’s behaviour.50 
Jo’s example can also be used to ground an attack on psychologism. If Jo was to be 
confronted about these paranoid beliefs, she might be carefully persuaded that she ought to 
go to see a psychiatrist. If so, she will act for the j-reason cited, that is, she will take the 
fact that she believes kettles are after her, as an m-reason to go to the psychiatrist. This 
lends further credence to non-psychologism, as it is now clear that cases in which one’s 
belief, or rather the fact that they have that belief, are m-reasons, are unusual cases. This 
undermines psychologism’s view that all m-reasons involve beliefs.51 
There are thus clear reasons to adopt non-psychologism about m-reasons. Further, 
it is clear that a number of arguments which appear to support psychologism about m-
reasons fail to meet their target. Non-psychologism can accommodate the idea that beliefs 
and desires are e-reasons for an agent’s action; beliefs are necessary conditions for acting 
for a reason, but they are not themselves m-reasons, desires are states of being motivated, 
but they are not themselves m-reasons. Non-psychologism can also account for error cases, 
when an agent is mistaken about what facts obtain. In such cases an agent simply has no 
m-reason, though their belief might still be an e-reason for their act. 
I thus conclude that j-reasons and m-reasons ought to be taken to be facts. In the 
next two chapters we will see how this view of reasons fits with the notion of rational 
action.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ACTING FOR A REASON 
 
In the last chapter I examined the nature of reasons and showed that justificatory (j-) 
reasons are facts. It was also shown that motivating (m-) reasons are facts, and that often 
one and the same fact both motivates and justifies an action. It is the fact that Mike’s 
meeting starts shortly that justifies his leaving his office. If Mike becomes aware that his 
meeting starts shortly, then he can become motivated by that fact and act for that reason (if 
an agent acts for a reason, then that reason is one of the agent’s m-reasons). 
The present chapter is concerned with the topic of acting for a reason. This takes us 
beyond the scope of the last chapter, as to act for a reason is not simply to behave in a way 
that accords with what there is a j-reason to do. If I am being approached by a speeding car 
I have a good j-reason to jump out of the road. But if I am given an electric shock causing 
my muscles to spasm in such a way as to propel me out of the road, I will not be acting for 
that reason. 
I will not provide a fully worked out metaphysics of what it is to act for a reason. 
Instead I will bring to the fore a number of important issues and show how these form a 
coherent view. In doing so I will argue that it is necessary for an agent to have beliefs and 
desires when they act for a reason, and that these beliefs and desires must fit together in a 
certain way. This reflects the fact that when an agent acts for a reason, they not only have 
m-reasons but also goals towards which they act. These goals will structure the reasons an 
agent considers when they perform instances of practical reasoning as all of these reasons 
will be relevant to these goals, however, the goals will not appear as premises or reasons. 
The conclusion of such a piece of practical reasoning will be an action, not a belief about 
what one ought to do, though of course a consideration of reasons might also lead an agent, 
in a parallel manner, to form such a judgement. 
When we explain an agent’s behaviour in terms of the reasons they act for, and 
perhaps the goals they have in acting, this is not a causal explanation. Causal explanations 
are law like or nomological and explanations in terms of reasons are not. This shows that 
the causal influences of a reason are not what determine whether or not it is a reason that 
an agent acts for. However, this leaves open the question of whether or not a reason does 
happen to cause a particular act. 
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4.1 Ingredients 
 
Perhaps the best known theory of what it is to act for a reason is that offered by 
Davidson1. Davidson suggests two necessary conditions for acting for a reason: 
 
“C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under description 
d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain 
property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that 
property.”2 (p.5) 
“C2. A primary reason for an action is its cause.” (p.12)3 
 
In this Davidson clearly takes reasons, or at least m-reasons, to be psychological states. 
The arguments of the previous chapter tell us that this is incorrect, and to this degree we 
can dismiss Davidson’s view. We can also dismiss a number of other views that take a 
similar form, such as those offered by Wallace, Davis, Smith and Mele.4 However, there 
are a number of aspects to this Davidsonian view, and it is not clear that the arguments of 
the previous chapter warrant a rejection of all of them. Davidson’s view also tells us that 
when acting for a reason: an agent will have a belief, they will have a pro attitude, this 
belief and pro attitude will stand in a certain relation to one another, and further, this belief 
and pro attitude will together cause the action. It is possible to accept all of these ideas, and 
to hold non-psychologism about m- and j-reasons. In the following sections I will consider 
each of these ideas. 
 
4.2 The Need for Beliefs & Desires 
 
We must distinguish the idea that a belief and a pro attitude are necessary for an 
agent to act for a reason, and the idea that the belief and the pro attitude are reasons, 
Humeanism5. In the previous chapter the latter view was shown to be incorrect, but, many 
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 Davidson:2001a p.5. 
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of the arguments given to support that view can go some way to supporting the idea that 
beliefs and pro attitudes are necessary in order for agent to act for a reason. 
It is clear that in order to act for a reason an agent must be aware of that reason. If 
there is a car approaching me then I have a good j-reason to jump out of the road, but if I 
am unaware of this j-reason I cannot act for it and it cannot be an m-reason for me. I might 
jump out of the road for some other reason, perhaps I drop some papers onto the pavement. 
In so acting my action will also be in accord with the j-reason that is the fact that I am 
being approached by the speeding car, but this is coincidence, I do not take up this latter j-
reason and act for it, and it is not an m-reason for me. 
Belief is a paradigmatic state of awareness; often when one is aware of a fact they 
have a belief about it, and vice versa. However, there are also a number of other cognitive 
– that is representational – states, such as knowing and suspecting. Therefore, one cannot 
simply move from the fact that an agent must be aware of a reason to act for it, to the 
conclusion that an agent must have a belief when they act for a reason. That said, it is 
common in the literature to use the term ‘belief’ as an umbrella term also covering these 
other cognitive states.6 This is a practice I adopted in the previous chapter and which I will 
continue, and with this particular turn of phrase we can conclude that an agent must have a 
belief in order to act for a reason. 
Following this line of argument we can also say something of the nature of the 
belief at issue, namely, it will be a belief about the agent’s m-reason, that is, it will be a 
belief with the m-reason as content. In order for the fact that an agent is being approached 
by a car to be that agent’s m-reason to jump out of the road, the agent must have a belief 
with that fact as content, that is, they must believe that they are being approached by a 
speeding car.7 
In the last chapter I adopted the common practice of using ‘desire’ as an umbrella 
term which is also supposed to cover states such as wanting and being inclined towards,8 
and to this end we can take it to coincide with Davidson’s notion of a pro attitude.9 
                                                                                                                                                   
the view that an agent’s motivational reasons are a combination of beliefs and desires has become known as 
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The idea that a desire is necessary in order for an agent to act for a reason is 
supported by the fact that if someone does something deliberately then they must have had 
some inclination towards doing it. Perhaps I reluctantly wash up my breakfast bowl, I do 
not like washing up, and do not desire (in the narrow sense) to wash up, but I am 
nonetheless drawn to do so. It would appear quite odd if someone insisted they did 
something deliberately but with no inclination at all to do so. To this end it appears an 
agent will have a desire (in the umbrella sense) when they act for a reason. As Alvarez10 
points out, the state of desiring is a state that a person is in when they are motivated. 
The distinction between desire as a state of motivation, and as an m-reason is one 
we met in the previous chapter. There I raised an argument presented by Smith to support 
Humeanism, the argument runs as follows: “(a) Having a motivating reason is, inter alia, 
having a goal; (b) Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit; and (c) 
Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring.”11 I responded to this argument 
with reference to Dancy12 who points out that the only relevant conclusion that can be 
drawn from these premises is that having an m-reason is, inter alia, desiring; not, as Smith 
had intended, that desires are m-reasons. This valid conclusion13 coincides with the idea 
that desires are states of being motivated, and, entails that desires are necessary in order for 
an agent to act for a reason. I stand by this response to the argument, but quoting the 
argument as I have here brings to the fore Smith’s notion of a direction of fit, which it is 
useful to clarify. 
Smith takes beliefs and desires to be states with a different direction of fit.14 He 
suggests that a desire is a state with a world-to-mind direction of fit, whilst, a belief is a 
state with a mind-to-world direction of fit. The idea is that if the world does not match the 
way you desire the world to be, then you should change the world to fit the desire.15 
                                                                                                                                                   
objects of desire are not reasons to act, but are perhaps goals one has in acting. It appears that Davidson takes 
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Whereas, if what you believe does not match the way the world is, then you should alter 
your belief. A world-to-mind direction of fit is required in acting for a reason, and thus, a 
desire is required in acting for a reason. I think there is something right in this metaphor 
but, it shouldn’t be taken to carry too much weight as it encourages the idea that a desire is 
faulty when it does not match the world, just as a belief is when it is false. However, this is 
surely wrong, most often we are quite right to desire what is not the case.16 Further, it 
implies that having a desire justifies one in changing the world to meet one’s desire, but 
non-psychologism, as defended in the previous chapter, shows this to be wrong.17 
To further clarify these notions Smith18 gives a counterfactual definition of belief 
and desire. Smith suggests that a belief that p and a desire that p will have a different 
counterfactual dependence on a perception that not-p. The perception will tend to make the 
belief go out of existence, but the desire will endure. This point accompanies a 
dispositional account of desires, according to which to desire something is to be disposed 
to act in certain ways as revealed by such counterfactual dependencies.19 However, these 
ideas should also be taken with caution. It seems quite plausible that an agent, upon 
realizing that what they desired did not obtain, should lose that desire. For instance, if I 
desire to be talking to my brother, but discover I am actually speaking to my dad, then I 
might well simply alter my desire (it is good to talk to either of them and since my dad is 
there).20 More generally the account is open to the criticisms of any counterfactual account 
of dispositions, for instance finkish or antidote cases, 21  where the appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                   
want to F” or “I want b to F”, but it is awkward if not misleading to try to capture it with a that clause “I 
want that b F” (Alvarez:2010a ch.3 & 4, see also Ben-Yami:1997 and Thargard:2006). Thagard:2006 argues 
that desires are not propositional attitudes, though primarily on the grounds of evidence from comparative 
psychology and neuroscience. Alvarez:2010a ch.3.3 also argues for this conclusion on the related grounds 
that animals can have desires, but look incapable of grasping propositions. I think that Alvarez’s argument is 
overly hasty, but some of the points raised by Thagard can be used to fill it out. Specifically, Thagard points 
out that if we interpret desires as propositional attitudes, and therefore express them with that-clauses, we 
must take them to involve relations and agents, e.g. the difference between desiring a beer and desiring that I 
have a beer. A recognition of relations and oneself is arguably a higher order capacity, and hence, less 
plausibly something many animals can do, however, animals can desire, and therefore desires are not 
propositional.  
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 Cf. Alvarez:2010a p.69. 
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 Cf. Alvarez:2010a p.69. 
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 Smith:1994 p.115. 
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 Smith:1994 p.113. 
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 Cf. Alvarez:2010a p.69 and Schueler:2003 p.34.  
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 Cf. Martin:1994 and Bird:1998. 
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circumstances for the disposition to manifest arise, but the disposition is otherwise 
prevented from manifesting.22 
Still, I think that there is something right in both of Smith’s characterisations. 
Making these ideas precise would be very difficult, but I take it that we are familiar 
enough with the notions to make sense of the issue at hand. Desire does appear to be a 
state of being motivated, and to this end it goes hand in hand with a tendency to act, and, 
in so acting to change the world. Moreover, it differs from belief in just these respects. 
This is not to say that one cannot be motivated by a reason that they are aware of in having 
a belief, nor that belief is in this manner impotent. Rather, as desire is the state of being 
motivated, not what motivates, it is clear that what motivates must be found elsewhere. 
When one is motivated by a j-reason, when they believe that reason to obtain and hence 
adopt it as an m-reason, they are thus at once also in a state of desire. The fact that one 
must be in a state of desire if they are in a state of belief concerning an m-reason that is 
motivating them – this necessary covariance – does not entail that the desire is identical 
with the belief, nor with what it is a belief of (that is, nor with the m-reason). 
One might be hesitant to accept this identification of desiring with a state of being 
motivated on the grounds that we on occasion appear to have desires but lack motivation, 
for instance, when we desire something we know we can do nothing to obtain, as when I 
desire that I did not just drop my bowl on the floor.23 However, there is a difference 
between having a desire to F and not Fing, and having a desire to F and not being 
motivated to F. Motivation is such that a motivation to F can be manifested in the 
consideration of the means to, and implications of Fing. Factors which might in turn mean 
that one’s motivation to F is outweighed by other conflicting motivations, or as in the case 
at hand, is halted at that stage as there simply are no means to Fing. An unwillingness to F 
or to consider means or implications of Fing is evidence that an agent does not in fact 
desire to F (even if this is inconclusive). This link is what has driven Humeanism and 
underlies Smith’s arguments. I take this link to be real, and I have shown that it does not in 
fact entail Humeanism. 
Accepting non-psychologism about j- and m-reasons therefore does not entail that 
an agent need not have a belief or a desire in order to act for a reason. Rather, there are 
good grounds for supposing that an agent will always have a belief and a desire when they 
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act for a reason. In the next section I will consider in more detail the role these beliefs and 
desires play. 
 
4.3 The Role & Interrelations of Beliefs & Desires24 
 
A j-reason to do something is a fact that makes that action reasonable.25 An action 
can be reasonable in two different ways, intrinsically or instrumentally. For example, I 
might enjoy going for walks, and that fact is a j-reason for me to walk. The action of 
walking is an end in itself, it is intrinsically reasonable. On the other hand, there is nothing 
intrinsically reasonable about putting my shoes on. But the action of putting my shoes on 
is a means to going for a walk. The fact that it is a means to walking, which is reasonable, 
is a j-reason to put on my shoes. Putting on my shoes is instrumentally reasonable, as it is a 
means to a reasonable end.26 
There must be actions which are intrinsically reasonable if there are actions which 
are instrumentally reasonable. Instrumental actions are means to ends, but if there were no 
intrinsically reasonable actions, it would follow that there were no actions that were the 
fulfilment of ends, and hence, that instrumental actions were without ends, which is 
impossible. The fact that putting on my shoes is a means to walking is a j-reason to put on 
my shoes only in combination with the fact(s) that makes walking reasonable (in this case 
this is intrinsic, but of course the chain could be much longer). One does not have a j-
reason to do all things which are means to other things. My collecting a saw might be 
means to my chopping my bed in half, but this does not give me a j-reason to collect a saw 
as I have no j-reason to chop my bed in half, this is not an end.27 
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 Cf. Alvarez:2010a p.12. 
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 The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental actions is not one original to me (e.g. Alvarez:2010a 
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highly dubious (there possibility is generally doubted, e.g. Leibniz:1974, Kant:1996 B436-437, 
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69 
 
I will not delineate exactly what renders an act intrinsically reasonable, but we can 
find various examples in the literature. Alvarez,28 perhaps following Aristotle and Aquinas, 
speaks of actions which involve goods such as pleasure, health, beauty or friendship. In a 
different manner Lowe29 speaks of j-reasons not as facts but as needs, such as the need to 
drink, but this could be transposed as the suggestion that acts which are the fulfilment of 
needs are intrinsically reasonable. More generally Parfit and others have defended a 
substantive view of rationality according to which any rational agent must care about 
particular things such as their own health. 30  For example, a person who has every 
opportunity to take a medicine to prevent themselves from dying, and will gain nothing 
from dying, appears to be irrational if they do not recognize any value in taking that 
medicine. Again, this view might be transposed as the suggestion that acts directly 
responsive to these substantive demands are intrinsically reasonable. I will follow Alvarez, 
and to this end, an act that gives pleasure,31 promotes health, or is an act of friendship or 
beauty, is an intrinsically reasonable act, and the fact that the act possesses these qualities 
is a j-reason to perform that act. Instrumental actions will be actions that are means to 
actions which are themselves intrinsically reasonable, and the j-reason to perform these 
acts is the fact that they are such means. But the adoption of a different substantive view of 
rationality would do little to alter my point. 
Very often there will be more than one j-reason to perform an act. Alvarez is 
careful to point out that this can happen in two different ways.32 Firstly, the j-reasons 
might be independent of one another, as, for example, when my going to a café will enable 
me to have a coffee, and, will enable me to see a friend. Either of these facts without the 
other is a reason for me to go to the café, they each independently pick out something 
reasonable about my going there. Secondly, we have cases where the j-reasons are not 
independent, that is, where a number of facts together make an action reasonable, though 
independently they would fail to do so. One example of this has already been indicated, i.e. 
instrumental reasons are only j-reasons in combination with intrinsic reasons. The fact that 
putting on my shoes is a means to walking, is only a reason for me to put my shoes on if I 
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also have a reason to go walking. A second example of this concerns facts which support 
an instrumental or intrinsic reason. For example, putting on my shoes is a means to 
walking because of various other facts, such as the fact that my feet are delicate. However, 
the fact that my feet are delicate is not a reason to put my shoes on independently of other 
facts, specifically those facts which along with it support the instrumental reason. For 
example, the fact that my feet are delicate combines with the fact that walking involves 
being on one’s feet a lot to support the fact that putting on my shoes is a means to walking. 
We might refer to these as supporting reasons.33 
When one acts for a reason they are motivated to act for that reason. We know 
from the preceding discussion that being motivated to act for a reason involves having a 
desire, and to this degree being motivated to act for a reason implies desiring for a reason. 
In fact, we can distinguish two varieties of desires, those which are had for reasons, and 
those which simply assail us. I shall refer to the former as rational desires, and the latter as 
non-rational desires.34 
It is clear that some of our desires simply assail us, for example, when we suddenly 
feel the urge to scream, or when we become thirsty. These are non-rational desires (which 
is not to say they are irrational). However, other desires we have clearly are affected by 
reasons that we consider. For example, if I wish to become faster at sprinting and I learn 
that doing squats is a means to becoming faster at sprinting then this may well lead me to 
desire to do squats. If this is the case, then this desire to do squats will have arisen because 
of the reason that doing squats is a means to sprinting. That is, I will have formed this 
desire for a reason. This is not to say that one’s rational desires are directly subject to one’s 
choice – that we can choose what to desire – but simply to say that the reasons we consider 
can give rise to desires which are responsive to them.35 
When an agent is motivated to perform an action they will have a desire, and the 
object of that desire will be precisely to perform that action.36 Here we must again be 
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mindful of the act/object distinction. When an agent is motivated they will be in a state of 
desire (act), there will therefore also be something that the agent desires, an object of 
desire, this will be to perform the action. Following Alvarez, I will refer to such a desired 
object as a goal, it is the goal with which we act.37 It is possible that one will also have a 
different goal in acting, for example, when one’s act is instrumental they will not only 
desire the means, the action, but also the end that this act is a means towards. This is not to 
say that we act to fulfil every desire we have, and to this end not all objects of desire are 
adopted as goals.38 Further, sometimes an agent will desire for something or someone else 
to do something or to be a certain way, in this case if the agent acts for a reason and 
towards a goal their goal might be related to this object of desire, for example, my goal in 
acting is to get that object or person to do that thing or be that way.39 
Let us consider again the case of walking. Walking is an action that possesses an 
intrinsic good, it is something that gives me pleasure. The fact that walking gives me 
pleasure is therefore a reason for me to walk. If this reason motivates me to walk, I will 
desire to walk, and my goal in walking will simply be to walk. On the other hand, my 
putting on my shoes is an action that does not possess an intrinsic good, but it does possess 
an instrumental good, as it is a means to walking. The fact that putting on my shoes 
possesses this instrumental good (the fact that it is a means to walking), is a reason for me 
to put on my shoes. If I act for this reason, then I will be motivated to put on my shoes. I 
will have the goals both of putting on my shoes, and of walking. 
Alvarez40 argues that goals should not be conceived of as reasons, because goals 
are not facts that make an action good. Going walking is not a reason to go walking, rather 
the fact that going walking will give you pleasure is. Similarly, when one is putting on 
their shoes, they do not do this for the reason of walking, walking is not a reason to put on 
one’s shoes, though, the fact that putting on one’s shoes is a means to walking is a reason 
to put on one’s shoes. There are thus two distinct elements in acting for a reason, the 
reasons and the goals. We might say we are walking simply for walking’s sake, but, it is 
plausible that this either means that we are walking because we enjoy walking, find it 
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relaxing etc., and are not doing it as a means to anything else, or, we mean we are simply 
acting without a reason at all. 
When one is assailed by a non-rational desire and they simply act in response, then 
one is not acting for a reason. This is clear when the act is immediate, for instance when I 
already have a drink to hand, and can simply drink when thirst strikes. We saw in the last 
chapter that desires were not reasons for acting, and so it is clear that in this case the agent 
would not be acting for a reason. Nevertheless, people must drink in order to survive. With 
this in mind an agent might, upon feeling thirsty, take themselves to require water, that is, 
they may realize that drinking will be good for their health and hence that they have a 
reason to drink. In this case the agent can of course drink for this reason. (It is also 
possible to explain an agent’s action with reference to a non-rational desire that simply 
assails them and then compels them. A non-rational desire can be an explanatory reason, 
an e-reason, though of course this doesn’t mean it is an m- or j-reason, moreover, the more 
accurate thing to say might be that the fact that they have that desire is the e-reason.) 
There is a clear relationship between our m-reasons and our goals, and hence 
between the beliefs and desires an agent must have when they act for a reason. When an 
agent performs an action, they must have that action as a goal, that is, they must desire to 
perform that action, and, they must believe that that action possesses either an instrumental 
or intrinsic good. That is, they must be aware of their reason, and motivated to perform 
that act. To this end we can agree with Davidson that an agent in acting for a reason will 
have a belief and a desire and these will stand in a particular relationship. However, the 
form of this relationship is quite different from that suggested by Davidson. 
 
4.4 Practical Reasoning41 
 
One can reason about whether to pursue a goal, or about how to pursue a goal. 
However, not every instance of acting for a reason will involve practical reasoning. For 
example, if I enjoy singing I might simply sing for that reason, and this need not require 
me to do any reasoning. When an agent acts for an instrumental good they will usually 
have engaged in reasoning to the extent that they recognize an action to be a means to an 
end, thus connecting the instrumental and intrinsic reasons together. Similarly, if an agent 
acts for a supporting reason then they will usually have performed some reasoning, in 
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order to connect this supporting reason with the instrumental or intrinsic reason it supports. 
If I put my shoes on because my feet are delicate, I might have connected this fact with the 
fact that putting my shoes on is a means to going for a long walk, and in turn, with the fact 
that going for a long walk will give me pleasure. 
Practical reasoning is commonly taken to have a particular form, namely: b desires 
F, G is a means to F, therefore, b ought to G.42 (This being a piece of practical reasoning 
that leads b to do G.) This view of practical reasoning is open to numerous criticisms. 
Firstly, the form of the syllogism is too narrow, as it does not allow for other desires an 
agent might have and how these might interact.43 For example, if b also wanted to H, and 
wants to H more than he wants to F, and the only means to H is to not G, then one might 
expect that b shouldn’t G. Moreover, this form, even if it were somehow expanded so as to 
accommodate other desires, would be subject to a criticism stemming from the 
bootstrapping argument considered in the last chapter, and more generally from non-
psychologism about reasons. An agent does not have a reason to F or do what subserves 
Fing just because they have a desire to F, desires are not reasons.44 In short, the conclusion 
of such a syllogism does not follow from its premises. 
The premises of a piece of practical reasoning ought to be reasons to perform an 
action.45 If we consider that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is that one 
ought to act,46 for example, b should G, then the premises of good practical reasoning will 
have to lead to this conclusion. But, considerations that make an act good just are reasons 
to perform that act, therefore the premises are or express reasons. This is the fault we 
found with including a desire as a premise, as desires cannot be reasons.47 
Just as we saw that acting for a reason involved having a desire, practical reasoning 
will also involve having a desire.48 Here again the desire will be a state of motivation, one 
which gives rise to the practical reasoning. Moreover, the object of that desire, the goal, 
will delimit the practical reasoning. If I desire to go for a walk, if I have a goal of going for 
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a walk, then, this will specify the sort of reasoning that I will engage in, and the reasons 
that will appear as premises in that reasoning. As already noted, if I desire to go for a walk, 
this might be simply for the reason that walking is pleasurable for me. And I might simply 
walk without needing to perform any practical reasoning (if for instance I am in a position 
in which I needn’t take any means to go for a walk). In this case my reason for walking 
will be the fact that I find walking pleasurable, and, this reason will also have given rise to 
a desire to walk, so I will have a goal of walking. If I do need to take means to go for a 
walk, then my goal of walking will lead me to reason in a particular way, specifically, it 
will lead me to consider what the means to walking are. My goal of walking will not 
appear as a premise in my reasoning, walking, or to walk, is not a premise leading to the 
conclusion that one ought to put on shoes. Nor is the desire itself such a premise. But, 
given this goal, only certain patterns of reasoning, only the consideration of certain reasons, 
will be initiated or appropriate. Namely, those concerning means to walking, or the value 
of walking. Thus, when I am motivated by the fact that walking is pleasurable, I will have 
a goal of walking, and if I need to take means to walking, then I will perform reasoning 
about what the means to walking are. I might for instance reason: walking gives me 
pleasure, walking involves being on my feet a lot, my feet are delicate so being on my feet 
a lot requires the wearing of shoes, I have no shoes on, so putting on shoes is a means to 
going for a walk, so I ought to put on some shoes. The desire to walk and the goal of 
walking do not appear in this reasoning, but they clearly play a role in motivating it, and, 
the reasoning/reasons are clearly related to the goal of walking, they are fitted to it.49 
If one were to reason about which ends to adopt as goals, which objects of desire to 
pursue in an instance of action, as opposed to how to pursue these goals, then matters will 
be a little different. Now one might consider the intrinsic or instrumental value in 
performing a desired action, and compare this to the intrinsic or instrumental value in 
performing a different desired action. One might also consider the means required to 
perform each of these actions. All of these factors will be premises in one’s reasoning, and 
potential reasons for their action of adopting one goal rather than another. In this one will 
again be motivated, and one will have a goal. One’s goal might simply be to reach a 
decision, or it might also involve the objects of the desires under consideration. Either way, 
it is not required that any of these goals, or the desires they are the objects of, appear as 
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premises in this reasoning. But, the reasons I do consider, the premises of my reasoning, 
will all be related to one or more of these goals. 
As Alvarez, Anscombe and others50  have said, desires, or the objects of these 
desires, do not appear in practical reasoning, contra the traditional view. But we have not 
moved too far away from this view, as the premises that do appear will concern these 
desires, they will be facts concerning the value of goals or the means to achieving those 
goals. 
Broome, for example,51 takes practical reasoning to have a different general form: 
b intends to F, b believes G is a means to F, therefore, b intends to G. In this Broome 
supposes that intentions and beliefs are both states with propositional content, and this 
content will hence form a general pattern such as: b will F, G is a means to F, therefore, b 
will G. The preceding discussion concerning taking desires as premises applies equally to 
taking intentions as premises, neither are fit for the job. However, if we instead take the 
premise to be that b will F, matters are different. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the 
fact that b will F, is not a reason for b to G. 52  If it were it would imply that the 
consideration of the means to F could not unsettle the fact that b will F. But this is false. It 
can be that when one performs practical reasoning one decides against pursuing a goal, for 
example, if I realize that in order to be rich I must abandon my friends, I will decide that I 
will not pursue the goal of being rich. If b Fing appears amongst the premises, this can 
only be as a mere possibility, which is to say, not as the fact that b will F at all. Rather, one 
might say that b Fing appears more clearly as a possibility in a fact such as, that Fing gives 
b pleasure, that is, in a reason for b to F as already mentioned above. 
A different concern with the traditional understanding of practical reasoning is 
whether it is in fact at all practical. The thought being that one could conclude that one 
should G, without thereby being motivated to G and without Ging.53 Practical reasoning is 
not supposed to be merely reasoning about actions, but is to be reasoning bound up with 
actually acting. If one’s reasoning never influenced their actions then their reasoning 
would not be practical reasoning. Reasoning to predict one’s own behaviour is not 
practical reasoning because predicting one’s own actions does not have the right 
connection with acting. Similarly, one might reason to construct a moral theory, but if one 
                                                 
50
 Cf. Alvarez:2010b, Anscombe:2000. 
51
 Broome:2001a & 2002, see also Rundle:1997 p.192. 
52
 At least not generally. 
53
 Rundle:1997 ch.7. 
76 
 
does not adopt this theory, then that reasoning will not be practical, but purely theoretical. 
Thus one is driven to the view that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is an 
action.54 However, the view that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is an 
action has met criticism. 
Broome55 expresses the idea that: reasoning is essentially a mental activity, and 
therefore, the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning must be something mental, such 
as a mental state; actions are rarely something mental56 and therefore they cannot be the 
conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning. This, however, is clearly just question 
begging; it is to assume from the start that actions cannot be conclusions. But this does 
relate to a more general worry, namely what is it about practical reasoning so described 
(with action as conclusion) that makes it an example of reasoning?57 
It is clear that an action cannot be deduced from premises as it is of the wrong 
ontological kind, therefore if one must be able to deduce a conclusion from premises to 
have an instance of reasoning, practical reasoning cannot conclude in an action. But it is 
clear that not all reasoning does involve deduction; one can reason inductively. Moreover, 
taking theoretical reasoning as a paradigm of reasoning, theoretical reasoning is an activity. 
It is generally assumed that logical relations such as entailment hold between propositions, 
and these are distinct from the beliefs, sentences, statements and utterances that can 
express them. When one concludes a piece of theoretical reasoning one forms a belief, and 
as a belief it is of the wrong ontological form to be deduced. In short, theoretical reasoning, 
as embodied in beliefs, does not strictly have a logical form. Rather, reasoning is 
responsive to broadly logical form, as the propositions expressed by the premise beliefs, if 
true, will (ideally) be evidence for the truth of the proposition expressed by the concluding 
belief. This radically closes the distance between practical and theoretical reasoning. An 
action, as the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning will not have a propositional 
content, unlike the belief which concludes theoretical reasoning. But, the action which is 
the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning will be such that if the propositions 
expressed by the premise beliefs are true, then (ideally) the action will be rational. In both 
theoretical and practical reasoning one brings together beliefs relevant to a specific issue 
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and one considers the way these beliefs hold together – in terms of their content and how 
the truth of one relates to the truth of the others – and this gives rise to the conclusion. In 
short, the fact that an action lacks a propositional content does not stop it from being 
sensitive to the broadly logical relations that hold between propositions expressed by one’s 
beliefs, and as so sensitive it is similar to the concluding belief drawn in instances of 
theoretical reasoning. (For example, in reasoning to reach the conclusion of acting to put 
on my shoes, I will consider the fact that walking gives me pleasure, that walking involves 
being on my feet, that being on my feet is uncomfortable without having shoes on, etc. If 
we say that the propositions capturing these facts are the contents of the beliefs I have in 
reasoning, it is clear that these propositions are related in ways determined by their broadly 
logical form, and it is only because they are so related that we act as we do in conclusion 
and that this concluding act is a reasonable one, or rather, it is because the facts are so 
related that the propositions that express them have the logical relations they do.) 
A different concern with the idea that practical reasoning concludes in action arises 
from the appearance that one can perform practical reasoning without acting, for instance, 
if one reasons about what to do, unawares that oneself is paralysed.58 However, it is not 
clear that this undermines the idea that an action can be the conclusion of a piece of 
practical reasoning. We can distinguish a number of cases. Firstly an agent might reason 
about what they ought to do at some time in the future. For example, going to the meeting 
will give me pleasure, in order to go to the meeting I must leave my office at 2pm, 
therefore … . We should not expect this reasoning, if performed at 1pm, to result in the 
agent immediately standing up to leave their office as the action is not required for some 
time. If the action is supposed to be the conclusion one must say that the reasoning is not 
complete until the action occurs, and a conclusion is not drawn until that time. This delay 
in concluding the reasoning might appear uncomfortable. But, there are grounds for taking 
this to be the case even if we suppose that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning 
is a belief. If the conclusion is a belief it must be closely tied to action, but arguably no 
belief that can be (accurately) drawn at 1pm can have this closeness, for example, the 
belief ‘b should leave his office at 2pm’ does not. The belief ‘b should leave at 2pm’ is 
generally impotent without a belief such as ‘b should leave now’ which can only 
accurately be held at 2pm. Therefore, this latter belief appears to be essential to the 
concluding of the reasoning, and therefore, even if we suppose that the conclusion of a 
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piece of practical reasoning is a belief we should expect that conclusion to only arise at the 
time when it is appropriate to act, not at the time when most of the reasoning occurs. A 
delayed action is therefore not a criticism of the idea that a piece of practical reasoning 
concludes in an action. 
An alternative way to see such a case is to suggest that action in fact begins, and 
therefore concludes the reasoning at 1pm. At this stage the action takes the form of efforts 
to determine subsequent reasoning and actions so that they all enable the agent to leave 
their office at 2pm.59 This gives the action a slightly different form from that of simply 
leaving the office, but, in cases where no time delay is necessary there is no reason to 
suppose that action cannot be manifested in this latter more direct way.  
A second case in which a piece of practical reasoning will not result in an action is 
a case in which the premises promote inaction. If, that is, it appears that the best thing to 
do is not to act, for example, to wait a little longer to see if your parcel will arrive. We are 
here dealing with the case of omissions.60 The recognition of omissions as of normative 
significance is growing. Omissions are increasingly recognized as having a relation to 
reasons, intentions and the like. Although this is usually in respect of an omission going 
against the reasons an individual might have to act, this also opens up the possibility to see 
an omission as in fact responsive to reasons. As such, it appears that we have some scope 
for recognizing an omission as a conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning in the 
relevant cases. Recognizing an omission as a conclusion is not of course recognizing an 
action as a conclusion, but, it is also clearly not in conflict with allowing that actions can 
be the conclusions of instances of practical reasoning. 
A third example in which practical reasoning may not result in an action is a case 
in which, as stated above, an agent is, unbeknownst to themselves, unable to act. Any 
practical reasoning that such an agent could perform could not conclude in an action. 
However, this is only a criticism of the idea that practical reasoning concludes in an action 
if such an agent in fact concludes any of their practical reasoning, but it is not clear that we 
should think that they do. The agent might complete a piece of theoretical reasoning about 
what they can do, or will do, or should do, but, it is not clear why we would want to call 
this practical reasoning. This is not a matter of offering a disjunctive account where a 
unified account would be better, but rather, a matter of taking practical reasoning to have a 
particular form that theoretical reasoning lacks, a form clearly not present in the assumed 
                                                 
59
 Cf. Korsgaard:2009. 
60
 Cf. Williams:1995. 
79 
 
case. (Alternatively, one might suppose that the action begins, the agent coordinates their 
attention etc., but they were prevented from carrying out the action in full.) 
Thus I find no good reason to think that an action cannot be the conclusion of a 
piece of practical reasoning, rather recognizing action as conclusion respects the 
practicality of the reasoning. Practical reasoning will be guided by a goal, which unites the 
premises of the reasoning, but which is not itself one of those premises. The premises will 
all concern the goal insofar as they will either be facts concerning the reasonableness of 
the goal, or the means to reaching that goal. The conclusion of this reasoning will be an 
action (or omission), embodying one of these means. 
None of this is to deny that the consideration of reasons can give rise to certain 
judgements, such as the judgment that one ought to G. But, this judgment needn’t come 
between the consideration of the reasons, and the action. Even if it is a fact that one ought 
to G, being responsive to this fact isn’t required in order for one to G, as recognizing that 
Ging is intrinsically reasonable – e.g. is good for one’s health – is already sufficient (if it 
wasn’t then it is doubtful it could be sufficient for the judgment either). If a consideration 
of reasons gives rise to both a judgment and an action, then it is best to think of these as 
arising in parallel. Similarly, although desires can be responsive to reasons this doesn’t 
mean that they ought to be recognized as the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning, 
even if one supposes that one must desire if one acts for a reason. Desire is not that which 
motivates, rather, it is the state of being motivated. As such, it needn’t be a stage between 
the reasons one considers and one’s act. Rather, it is best considered as parallel to one’s act, 
or as involved in it; both are responsive to reasons. This does not mean that one can choose 
to desire, merely that choosing to act goes hand in hand with forming a desire. (Even if the 
choice affects the onslaught of the desire, it does not follow that the desire was chosen, 
there is more to being chosen than being the result of a choice. Moreover, given our thin 
umbrella notion of desire as encompassing all pro attitudes, it is appropriate to think that 
some of these will be receptive to our choices.) (I believe that this distinction is where one 
ought to look for an account of cases of akrasia, that is, in the idea that in cases of akrasia 
an agent considers reasons and is hence moved to form a judgment about what one ought 
to do, though one is not moved to act. A possibility opened up by the idea that the 
judgment and the action are, or would be independent conclusions to an instance of 
reasoning.) 
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4.5 Reasons as Causes 
 
In this section I will consider Davidson’s suggestion that a reason an agent acts for 
(an agent’s m-reason) is necessarily a cause of the action done for that reason. I am 
concerned to argue that recognizing a reason as a reason that an agent acted for doesn’t 
involve recognizing that reason as the cause of the agent’s action. In arguing for this I will 
leave open the question of whether or not the reason does in fact happen to be a cause of 
the action. 
Davidson believed that it was necessary that a reason was a cause of an action done 
for that reason. Davidson’s61 concern was that a person might be aware of a number of 
different reasons for an action, and perform that action, but only perform the action for a 
subset of the reasons they were aware of. For example, I might be aware of a number of 
reasons to cross the road, my crossing the road will enable me to get away from my 
associate who is irritating me, and, it will enable me to help a person who has just fallen 
and is clearly suffering. But I might insist that the reason that I do actually cross the road 
for is that it will enable me to help, not that it would enable me to avoid my associate. We 
must then be able to distinguish between the reasons we act for, and the ones we are 
merely aware of. To this end Davidson suggests that the reasons we act for must be those 
which cause our action, the reasons we do not act for do not cause our action. If Davidson 
was right this would imply that recognizing a reason as a reason an agent acted for would 
involve recognizing that reason as a cause of that act as this is all there is to stand apart 
those reasons acted for and those reasons merely had in mind. (Davidson was thinking of 
reasons as belief/desire complexes, not as facts as I do, but for the present purpose this 
changes little.) 
This account immediately meets a difficulty in the form of deviant causal chains, as 
Davidson62 himself later noted. Davidson63 gives an example in which a climber is holding 
their partner on a rope, and the weight of their partner is threatening to pull the climber off 
their ledge. The climber might recognize that ridding themselves of the weight of their 
partner would potentially be good for their health and that one means to that end is to let 
go of the rope. This awareness might unsettle the climber causing them to shudder, as they 
become horrified of the thought of willingly dropping their partner. In shuddering the 
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climber might in fact lose hold of the rope and drop their partner. If this were to happen it 
would be clear that the climber did not drop their partner for the reasons they were aware 
of, yet these reasons did cause their letting go. Davidson’s response to this problem was to 
suggest that the reasons must cause the action in a specific way in order for the action to be 
performed for those reasons. It follows that if the causal account is correct then 
recognizing a reason as the reason an agent acted for involves recognizing that reason as a 
very particular type of cause of their action. However, it has remained quite elusive just 
what particular form such causation ought to take,64 which to me already casts suspicion 
on the idea that recognizing a reason as a reason an agent acts for involves recognizing 
such an unknown causal relation to obtain. 
Davidson does not try to argue against other accounts of the connection between a 
reason and an act performed for that reason, and therefore, his argument only has force so 
long as we take a causal account to be the only possible account.65 However, Lowe66 offers 
a rather different account, the reasons that an agent acts for are those reasons that they 
chose to act for, or that they chose in light of. Further, to make sense of this it is not 
necessary to suppose that the choice itself must have been caused by the reasons; rather, 
choice is already a familiar notion which is taken to be responsive to reasons but not 
caused by them. This is shown by the phenomenology of choosing to act in light of a 
reason, wherein one does not feel caused to act by the reason, quite the contrary, it appears 
as if the reason is impotent without one’s act of choosing. Moreover, one is struck by the 
fact that taking one’s choice to be the causal result of a reason conflicts with the very idea 
of making a choice.67 But one’s choices are not mere chance events, they are responsive to 
reasons we consider. 
We can discover which reasons an agent chose to act in light of in a number of 
ways. Very often it is sufficient to simply ask the agent, and while an agent might try to 
deceive you or themselves, this does not show that there is not a fact of the matter, or that 
we must resort to a consideration of causes to settle the issue. Rather, it is plausible that 
one can deceive themselves and others about choices one makes. Further, one might 
uncover such hidden choices through considering the reasons an agent is aware of and 
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their character, that is, the choices they have made in the past.68 Matters which themselves 
needn’t entail that we are thinking of the choices as caused by the reasons. 
The notion of choice can be fitted into the account given above by taking the 
choice to be an action of the agent. The choice can then be seen as the conclusion of a 
piece of practical reasoning. This needn’t entail that the conclusion of a piece of practical 
reasoning cannot be an action such as putting on one’s shoes, as such an action can be 
recognized as beginning in a choice.69 There is little value in supposing that an agent must 
perform an act of choice before they can perform a chosen action, in fact it is hard to 
conceive what such a pure act of choice could be.70 When one simply decides to walk, and 
need take no means to walking, then this decision is manifested in their very walking. 
There need be no gap between the decision and the act itself, rather, in such cases the lack 
of action is good evidence for the lack of a decision having been made. In cases where 
means are necessary, or where there appears to be a temporal gap between a decision and 
an action the comments I made above in regard to concluding a piece of practical 
reasoning apply. One’s decision to walk, when means are necessary, will be manifested by 
actions to uncover and pursue means to walking, and in turn with walking. 
An alternative ground for taking the reasons an agent acts for to be causes of their 
action might occur if the explanation of an agent’s action in terms of their reasons for 
acting was a causal explanation. However, in considering this we must be mindful of a 
distinction drawn by McGinn 71  between giving a causal explanation and giving an 
explanation in which the explanans happens to be a cause of the explanandum. It is 
possible to explain one thing, b, in terms of another, c, without c being the cause of b (in 
logic or mathematics we do this all the time). If one does this one will give an explanation 
of b, but, one will not give a causal explanation. An explanans needn’t be a cause. Of 
course, one can provide causal explanations, so an explanans can be a cause. Nonetheless, 
it is also possible that we explain b with reference to c, and that c does in fact cause b, but 
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that the explanation we give is not a causal explanation, that is, the explanation does not 
assume or utilise that causal connection. 
Causal explanations are not simply explanations that explicitly refer to the notion 
of a cause, and so it can be difficult to distinguish causal and non-causal explanations. One 
way of doing so is to note that causes are lawlike, so a causal explanation ought to be an 
explanation that falls under a law.72 This appears to be Davidson’s own view.73 However, 
this makes trouble for Davidson, as he believed that reasons were belief/desire complexes, 
and that there were no laws linking these with actions.74 In saying that reasons acted for 
just are reasons that cause, Davidson thus appears to contradict himself by implying that 
there was a lawlike relation between a belief/desire complex and an action.75 
Not taking reasons to be belief/desire complexes my issue appears to be 
fundamentally different from Davidson’s. However, it has been argued that explanations in 
terms of reasons are elliptical for explanations citing beliefs and desires, because, as 
already noted, an agent must be aware of any reason they act for.76 To this end, I will 
consider explanations in terms of beliefs and desires (even though the reasons are the 
objects of these beliefs). 
It is clear that we do not take there to be a lawlike relation between beliefs/desires 
and an action when we accept an explanation of that action in terms of those beliefs/desires 
(or the reasons the action was performed for).77 This stems from the idea that an agent 
chooses to perform that act in light of those reasons and they could have chosen to do 
otherwise. Frankfurt has famously argued that an agent needn’t be able to do otherwise 
than they do in order to be free or to choose the action they perform.78 But this position is 
disputable, as it relies on assuming that someone can control how an agent chooses or acts, 
and it is not clear that this idea makes sense, that is, it is not clear that what would result 
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from such control could be an action or choice.79 I will not try to settle this issue here, but, 
the point I wish to draw is more general. This very discussion of the possibility of doing 
otherwise shows that the thought that an agent cannot do otherwise is not straightforwardly 
derived from the thought that they act for a reason they are aware of in their beliefs/desires. 
It follows that any explanation of an agent’s action in terms of the reasons they act for 
cannot be a causal explanation.80 The force of such an explanation cannot be derived from 
a lawlike, or hence causal, relation between the reason and the action, as the explanation 
can stand in the face of doubts about any such relation. 
Manson81 proposes that we needn’t take the explanation at issue to be grounded in 
generalizations or lawlikeness at all. An explanation here is simply something that can lead 
one to understand why an agent did what they did. But because we are all ourselves agents 
and familiar with acting for reasons, in being informed of the reasons an agent acts for we 
can put ourselves in their shoes, and thereby come to comprehend their action. This 
distinction bears a resemblance to the distinction between the theory-theory and the 
simulation-theory approaches to interpersonal understanding.82 On the former view we 
must construct a theory of how other people work, involving generalizations about 
relations between beliefs/desires and actions. On the latter view this is not necessary, 
rather, as we are agents if we know what another agent believes/desires, we can place 
ourselves in their shoes, effectively running a simulation, and as a result be led to expect 
certain actions. In this latter case, there is no need to assume lawlike connections hold 
between belief/desires and actions, nor to suppose a causal relation holds, yet one is 
brought to understand why an agent made an action. 
Recognizing a reason as a reason an agent acts for does not require one to uncover 
a special causal relation between that reason and that action, nor even to presume that such 
a connection could be uncovered. Though, this is not to assert that no causal connection 
will happen to hold between a reason and an action done for that reason.  
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Summary 
 
So far I have defended a view according to which an agent acts for a reason when 
they choose to act for that reason. This involves the agent being aware of that reason and 
hence having a belief with that reason as content. When the agent is not required to take 
any means to that action then this choosing will manifest in that very act of the agent. The 
agent will be motivated to act, and therefore will have a desire with that act as content, 
they will have the act as a goal. For example, if I enjoy singing and am aware of that, then 
I might simply sing. My deciding to sing will simply involve my singing, which will be 
something that I desire to do. This action might also be accompanied by a judgement that 
one ought to sing, but, this needn’t pre-empt or bring about the decision. 
If an agent is not able simply to perform an act, F, that they are aware of a reason 
to perform (or if they are also aware of reasons not to perform that act) then they will 
perform an act of practical reasoning. The premises of this reasoning will involve reasons 
to perform that act and also means to performing it. If G is a means to Fing, then that fact 
is a reason to G. An agent that becomes aware of this fact in reasoning might then choose 
to G. This decision would be embodied in the act of Ging which will conclude the practical 
reasoning. This action will also embody a decision to F and the agent will desire both to F 
and to G. When the agent has Ged they may then F, this action will be a reaffirmation of 
the earlier decision to F. For example, if I become aware of the fact that walking will be 
good for my health, then I will consider that fact and also the means I might take to 
walking. If I realize that I can walk if I put on my shoes, then I might decide to put on my 
shoes and walk, and this decision will simply be embodied in my putting on my shoes. 
Having put on my shoes I may then walk, and in so doing reaffirm my earlier decision to 
walk. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RATIONALITY 
 
In the last chapter I showed that acting for a reason involved being aware of a 
reason, and then choosing to act for that reason, adopting that action as a goal, and acting. 
For example, I gain pleasure from whistling, and I might become aware of this fact and 
hence form a desire to whistle and decide to whistle, and whistle. This shows that there is 
more to acting for a reason than simply acting in a way that accords with a reason. The 
present chapter is concerned with rationality, or with rational actions. It appears that this 
takes us beyond the topic of simply acting for a reason, because an agent can act rationally 
when there is no reason for their action. If I am not being approached by a speeding car, 
but believe that I am, it appears to be rational for me to jump out of the road. These error 
cases have led to the suggestion that a rational agent must meet a number of complex 
normative requirements. 
Thus it appears that we can distinguish two kinds of normative element. The first 
stems from reasons, specifically, there are acts that one has a reason to perform, reasonable 
acts. The second concerns requirements of rationality, actions that it is rational to perform, 
rational acts. It appears that rational actions will not always be reasonable actions. This has 
led some to believe that the requirements of rationality provide a source of normative 
requirements independent of reasons. In this chapter I will argue that this view is mistaken. 
There are no independent requirements of rationality, only reasons to act. Rationality is 
primarily a matter of responding correctly to reasons, that is, of acting for j-reasons. If a 
rational action is not a reasonable one, this can only be because the agent is mistaken about 
what j-reasons obtain. The rationality in this error case is derived from the rationality of 
the primary case. The error case qualifies as rational because of similarities it bears to the 
primary case of acting for a j-reason. Sensitivity to reasons, in terms of knowing that they 
obtain, is not a rational matter, a rational agent cannot be expected to be omnipotent. 
However, sensitivity to reasons, in the sense of reacting appropriately to those reasons one 
is aware of, is a matter of rationality. When an agent acts rationally, and acts for a j-reason, 
their j-reason and action form a structure which is isomorphic with the structure formed by 
their belief about their j-reason and their desire which gives their goal in acting. When an 
agent is mistaken about what reasons obtain, and therefore fails to act for a j-reason, they 
may nonetheless still have a structure of beliefs and goal giving desires. If this structure 
would have been isomorphic with a structure formed by their action and a j-reason, had 
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their belief been true, then their action is sufficiently similar to the primary case of acting 
for a reason to qualify as a rational action. If an agent were sufficiently knowledgeable, 
then their rational actions would simply be their reasonable actions, and they would be 
rational simply because they were reasonable. If an agent acts rationally, but not for a j-
reason, then they are not doing something they ought to do, though they are sufficiently 
close to this ideal to be in some sense excused. 
 
5.1 Distinction between Reasonable & Rational Actions 
 
If I believe that eating salmon gives me pleasure then it is rational for me to eat 
salmon.1 This is so whether or not eating salmon does actually give me pleasure, and 
thereby whether or not I have a reason to eat salmon. This shows that rational and 
reasonable actions needn’t coincide. Rationality thus appears to track the reasons one 
believes oneself to have for an action, rather than the reasons one does actually have.2 If 
eating salmon would give me pleasure I would have a reason to eat salmon, and it is 
because of this that my eating salmon is a rational action. 
As already noted, it is popular to suppose that the conclusion of a piece of practical 
reasoning is a desire or intention. It is also popular to suppose, and I take this to be correct, 
that the conclusion of a piece of theoretical reasoning is a belief. (The distinction drawn 
between practical and theoretical reasoning essentially resting on this distinction of 
conclusions.3) With this in mind rationality has often been described as a matter of the 
consistency between states of an agent, between beliefs (about what reasons obtain) and 
other beliefs or intentions formed for those reasons, or chosen in response to those beliefs. 
Returning to my example, it might be said that rationality concerns the consistency 
between my believing that I will gain pleasure from eating salmon, and my intending to eat 
salmon. I believe that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is a chosen action, 
not an intention. Nevertheless, when an agent chooses to act they will have that action as a 
goal, that is, they will desire to perform that action. This desire can take the role of the 
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88 
 
intentions just alluded to, so that rationality can be thought of as a matter of consistency 
between an agent’s beliefs about what reasons obtain, and their other beliefs and the 
desires which give their goals in acting. 
The consistency at issue is often taken to be given by a number of complex 
normative requirements (CNRs). For example, in the case of my eating salmon the 
requirement at issue appears to be of the form: 
 
CNR1: One ought rationally to have F as a goal if one believes there is all things 
considered reason for them to F.4 
 
The notion of all things considered reason is to make matters more precise, as for most 
actions an agent will be aware of numerous reasons for and against an action. In a 
circumstance in which an agent is aware of a reason to F, but also of more reasons not to F, 
then Fing will not be the rational thing to do. So in giving my salmon example I supposed 
there were no other such reasons at issue. 
When I say ‘all things considered reason’ this does not mean that the agent has 
considered everything, but rather, that of all those reasons the agent takes to obtain if they 
did obtain the agent would have most reason to F. The notion of most reason is not simply 
a matter of having a greater number of reasons to F, but rather of having a greater weight 
of reasons to F. I am thus speaking of pro tanto reasons, which can conflict with one 
another and be weighed against one another.5 I will not go into the issue of how reasons 
ought to be weighed but I take the notion to have a familiar sense. For example, when one 
takes the fact that an action will be very good for an agent’s health to be a weightier reason 
to act than the fact that an action will give a very small amount of pleasure. As far as the 
agent is concerned the weight they give to reasons will be revealed in their choosing.6 We 
can ignore the complexities of weighing, as I did in giving my example, if we suppose the 
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agent only believes there is one reason to F, and doesn’t believe there are any reasons not 
to F, in such a case the agent will believe there is an all things considered reason to F. 
Correspondingly we ought to say that a reasonable action is one that there is most reason 
to perform, not simply a reason to perform (but again we can simplify cases such as the 
salmon one to be such that there are no other relevant reasons).7 
The rationality of an agent, the relevant consistency of their states, appears to 
involve meeting a number of other requirements too: 
 
CNR2: One ought rationally to have G as a goal if one has F as a goal, and one believes 
that one cannot F unless one Gs.8 
CNR3: One ought rationally not to have F as a goal if one believes one cannot F and G, 
and one has G as a goal.9 
CNR4: One ought rationally to believe that p if one believes that q, and believes that q 
entails p.10 
 
(Perhaps the wording or detail of these CNRs will be disputed, but they clearly point 
towards something plausible and are precise enough for my purposes. One might also wish 
to add more to this list,11 but my intention here is merely to emphasize the extent to which 
rationality appears to be given by CNRs and how this differs from reasonableness.) 
Variants of CNR2 are often referred to as the Instrumental Principle as they 
concern taking means to ends. Suppose that I believe that I have all things considered 
reason to go walking and that I believe that putting on my shoes is a necessary means to 
going walking, and this is something I am quite capable of doing. I would be irrational if I 
did not put on my shoes. The point of CNR2 is to capture this irrationality of being aware 
of means to ones ends, but being unmoved to take those means. This irrationality lingers 
                                                 
7
 I am perhaps assuming that there will always be something that there is most reason to do, Korsgaard:2009 
thinks that there is something awkward in believing this if one is a non-psychologist about reasons in the 
manner in which I am, as it is not clear that the reasons must always point in one direction, as it is not clear 
that facts must. But, I see little more problem in assuming that reasons thus conceived will always point in 
one direction than assuming, as Korsgaard does, that reasons must point in a single direction. Further, I can 
drop this assumption and allow that there might be cases in which two acts are equally reasonable. 
8
 Cf. Broome:2007a, Korsgaard:1997. 
9
 Cf. Kolodny:2008, Broome:2007a, and Parfit:2001. 
10
 Cf. Broome:2007a. 
11
 Cf. Kolodny:2005 p.557 adds a negative form of CNR1, e.g. one ought not to F if one believes that one 
lacks sufficient reason to F. 
90 
 
even if we suppose that I was in fact mistaken and I have no reason to go walking, and so 
again reasonableness and rationality part company. 
If I decide to go to the cinema, and know that I cannot go to the cinema and to the 
restaurant, then I clearly oughtn’t to also decide to go to the restaurant (not without 
changing my other decision). Someone who acted in this way would be irrational, and this 
is the point of CNR3. Again this irrationality lingers however we suppose the reasons 
actually to fall, that is whether or not we take there to be more reason to go to the 
restaurant, or to the cinema, or equal reason to do either. 
CNR4 probably needs to be tightened up, so that it is clear that the agent believes p 
and that p entails q, at the same time, we might also want to say that the entailment is in 
some way apparent (not merely borne out by a long series of connectable premises). But 
the point of the CNR is clear. If I believe that I am in Durham, and believe that if I am in 
Durham I am not in London, then it is quite irrational of me to remain uncertain as to 
whether or not I am in London. Moreover, this remains the case even if we suppose that I 
am mistaken and that I am in fact in London. I might then have no reason to believe that I 
am not in London, but it would be irrational for me not to do so. 
Rationality and reasons thus appear to be quite distinct because an action can be 
rational but not reasonable. Moreover, the two appear to be distinct in form too, as whether 
or not an action or belief is reasonable depends only on the reasons that obtain, that is, the 
facts. However, whether or not a belief or goal giving desire is rational does not depend on 
the facts as much as on what the agent believes to be the case. Further, rationality appears 
to be determined by requirements of consistency, i.e. CNRs. 
 
5.2 Rational Obligations 
 
In stating the requirements of rationality – or CNRs – I spoke of what one ought 
rationally to do, as if rationality can place obligations on an agent. The examples I 
mentioned support this idea; apparently an agent should avoid being irrational. It is thus 
plausible to think that CNRs provide agents with j-reasons.12 
However, the idea that the requirements of rationality provide an agent with j-
reasons quickly runs into a familiar problem. Suppose that CNR1 provides me with a j-
reason to act in accord with it. We saw that if I believe that eating salmon will give me 
                                                 
12
 Some even go so far as to suggest that all reasons derive in some way form requirements of rationality, e.g. 
Korsgaard:1997. 
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pleasure then according to CNR1 I ought to adopt eating salmon as a goal. But, if 
uninterrupted, my adopting eating salmon as a goal will simply be a matter of my eating 
salmon, so in short I ought to eat salmon. This is so whether or not eating salmon will give 
me pleasure, or whether or not I have any other j-reasons to eat salmon (excluding CNR1 
itself). It follows that if I have a j-reason to accord with CNR1, then simply through 
forming the belief that a j-reason obtains I bring it about that I have a j-reason to eat 
salmon. But this is exactly the sort of scenario that we considered in Chapter Three, and 
that we rejected. One cannot simply bootstrap j-reasons into existence by forming beliefs 
or desires. It does not follow from the fact that I happen to form the belief that I have a j-
reason to F, that I do in fact have a j-reason to F. It remains the case that I will not gain 
pleasure from eating salmon, and that I have no j-reason to do so or to adopt doing so as a 
goal, even if I mistakenly believe that I do. Beliefs about j-reasons are not self-fulfilling. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, this problem has been considered by a number of 
writers, and a solution has been proposed.13 As it stands one could read CNR1 in two ways: 
 
CNR1W: One ought rationally to <have F as a goal if one believes there is all things 
considered reason for one to F>. 
CNR1N: One ought rationally to <have F as a goal> if one believes there is all things 
considered reason for one to F. [Or: If one believes there is all things considered reason for 
one to F then one ought rationally to <have F as a goal>.] 
 
In CNR1W the conditional falls within the scope of the rational obligation, whereas, in 
CNR1N, it does not. This makes a difference to how one can satisfy the CNR. 
Suppose that I believe that eating salmon will give me pleasure. In order to satisfy 
CNR1N, I would have to eat salmon. However, I could satisfy CNR1W without eating 
salmon, but by instead dropping my belief that eating salmon will give me pleasure. It 
follows that if we interpret CNR1 with wide scope, i.e. CNR1W, then we do not have the 
bootstrapping problem. Rather, if one forms the belief that one has a reason to F, CNR1W 
gives one a reason, either to F or drop one’s belief, but, it does not give one a reason to 
adopt either one of these disjuncts in particular. 
Similar remarks hold for the other CNRs. Each is susceptible to a bootstrapping 
criticism, but this criticism can be rebutted if it is insisted the CNRs are to be understood 
                                                 
13
 Cf. Dancy:2000 and Broome:1999. 
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in a wide scope manner which denies we can derive a specific obligation/reason from a 
reason to satisfy a complex. So it appears that the requirements of rationality do give 
agents j-reasons, and that we can make sense of this fact. 
 
5.3 The Denial of Rational Obligations 
 
As just noted, accepting that CNRs provide agents with j-reasons is dependent 
upon denying detachment, otherwise we end up bootstrapping j-reasons into existence. 
However, in this section I will argue that we cannot deny detachment in the case of CNRs 
and therefore that we should not take them to provide reasons (my argument here will be 
largely that of Kolodny’s14). 
Kolodny points out that we can interpret CNRs as either state or process 
requirements. A state requirement simply demarcates certain states (or combinations of 
states) as irrational. A process requirement tells an agent that they ought to do certain 
things, or that certain processes are irrational. Requirements of rationality appear to be 
process rather than state requirements, as they can be used to advise or guide agents, not 
simply to evaluate states they are in. If they are reasons, or provide reasons, then they 
clearly provide reasons to do certain things, not simply to be a certain way. 
Broome and Kolodny15 have both noted that an agent will only violate a wide 
scope state requirement, if they would also have violated a narrow scope one, and vice 
versa. Consider CNR1 as a state requirement: 
 
CNR1WS: One ought rationally to <have F as a goal at time t if one believes at time t that 
there is all things considered reason for one to F>. 
CNR1NS: One ought rationally to <have F as a goal at time t> if one believes at time t that 
there is all things considered reason for one to F. 
 
There are three ways that an agent might be relevant to this requirement: A1, the agent has 
F as a goal at t, and believes at t that there is all things considered reason for them to F; A2, 
the agent believes at t that there is all things considered reason for them to F but they do 
not have F as a goal at t; A3, the agent does not believe that they have all things 
considered reason to F. 
                                                 
14
 Cf. Kolodny:2005, 2007, 2007b & 2008. 
15
 Broome:2007b, and, Kolodny:2007a. 
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If the agent is in state A1 then they will satisfy both CNR1WS and CNR1NS. If 
they are in state A2, then they will violate both CNR1WS and CNR1NS. And if they are in 
state A3, then they will satisfy CNR1WS, but will not have any relevance to CNR1NS. 
This makes it appear that as far as state requirements are concerned there is in fact little 
difference between CNR1WS and CNR1NS, each evaluates the same states to be 
irrational.16 (And we shouldn’t focus instead on the positive ascription of rationality based 
on fulfilling such requirements, rather than the negative one of not breaking them, 
precisely as it is not less rational to fail to fulfil an irrelevant CNR.)17 
However, if we take CNR1 to be a process requirement then the distinction 
between a wide and narrow scope interpretation is much more telling: 
 
CNR1WP: One ought rationally if one believes at time t that there is all things considered 
reason for one to F and one does not at t have F as a goal, to <either, going forward from t 
on the basis of the content18 of that belief, take up F as a goal, or, going forward form t on 
the basis of the content of the lack of one’s having F as a goal, revise one’s belief that 
there is all things considered reason to F >. 
CNR1NP: One ought rationally if one believes at time t that there is all things considered 
reason for one to F and they do not at t have F as a goal, to <going forward from t on the 
basis of the content of that belief, take up F as a goal >. 
 
These CNRs differ from the original CNR1, but the differences are there to make best 
sense of the requirement being understood as a process requirement. As a state 
requirement CNR1 picks out a certain combination of states as irrational, the process 
requirement reflects this by considering processes that will avoid such a state. If we drop 
the ‘on the basis of’ condition, then the requirement would clearly be false, as it is not 
rational to make that move in all possible ways. It is not rational if one drops a belief, or 
                                                 
16
 Broome:2007b does try to bring out a distinction in discussing an agent painting themselves into a corner, 
such that, if an agent does paint themselves into a corner, only a wide scope requirement can allow them a 
way out. But Kolodny:2007a responds by saying that it is not clear we should allow the agent a way out, 
after all, this doesn’t mean the agent is trapped, merely that they are irrational in an instance. Further, 
Korsgaard:2009 puts pressure in the other direction, when she speaks of a wide scope cook book being rather 
useless. Her point being, and this really respects Kolodny’s emphasis on process requirements, that wide 
scope requirements are poor guides, which is to point out that one could still follow the wide scope 
requirement deeper into the corner. 
17
 Broom clearly thinks of rationality as given in this negative way, e.g. with a focus on not breaking the 
CNRs cf. Broom:2007b (and Kolodny:2007a).  
18
 I do not mean to imply that the belief must be true, by talking of its content. 
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gains a desire as the result of being hit on the head. A different way to fill out this 
condition would be to say that one ought to do so on the basis of other relevant beliefs or 
goals, or lacks thereof. But this is no good, as there needn’t be any other beliefs or goals or 
lacks thereof of this sort.19 
An agent might violate CNR1NP, but not violate CNR1WP. This will happen if an 
agent believes at t that there is all things considered reason for them to F and they do not at 
t have F as a goal, and going forward from t they do not take up F as a goal, but they do 
drop their belief that there is all things considered reason for them to F. This indicates that 
a process understanding of CNR1 is different from a state one, and moreover, that if one 
thinks that wide scope and narrow scope requirements say different things of rationality, as 
it is common and natural to, then one must be thinking of process requirements. 
Now it is clear that requirements of rationality are process requirements, it is no 
longer clear that we ought to take them as wide scope requirements. It is rational to move 
as CNR1NP prescribes, from believing oneself to have all things considered reason to F, to 
having F as a goal. CNR1WP although not prescribing this behaviour, nonetheless 
recommends it as rational. However, CNR1WP also recommends as rational the quite 
different behaviour of moving from lacking F as a goal, to the abandonment of a belief that 
one has all things considered reason to F. But this latter behaviour does not appear to be 
rational, rather, such behaviour strikes one as quite wrong, what one ought to do shouldn’t 
be expected to bend to one’s desires.20 
Similar remarks apply to CNR4, it is irrational to move from a lack of belief that p, 
to the abandonment of a belief that q, or, that q entails p. In fact, it is hard to see how the 
lack of a belief or goal, a lack as opposed to the fact that a belief or goal is lacked, could be 
effective at all. (Which is not to say that grounds for believing not-p could not be grounds 
for believing not-q or not-q-entails-p, nevertheless these grounds are not what are 
discussed by these CNRs.) Further, the problems here would apply equally to various 
different interpretations of the CNRs I give. The point of CNRs like 1 and 4 is to link 
beliefs about reasons (or possible reasons), to further – I will say concluding – beliefs or 
goal giving desires which might be justified by those reasons (were they to obtain). The 
                                                 
19
 See Kolodny:2007a for a fuller account of this. 
20
 It is no counterexample to this to cite a case in which one’s lack of having F as a goal moved one to 
inquire again whether or not one did have reason to F, which in turn led one to discover that one did not in 
fact have reason to F. Firstly, this example supposes one can delay one’s rational obligation, until after one’s 
investigation, but this is wrong. Further, the CNR ought to apply regardless of what reasons there happen to 
be, and so, in cases where this option of reinvestigating (or something similar) is not even open. 
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CNRs in this way reflect the structure of reasons (and the would be structure of would be 
reasons), if the reasons believed to obtain did obtain, the concluding beliefs and goal 
giving desires would be justified. The denial of detachment aims precisely to allow that the 
beliefs about what reasons obtain might be mistaken, and hence that it might be that they 
ought to be changed. The linking of this with the concluding beliefs or goal giving desires 
in a CNR, entails that this change is directly linked to the possession or lack thereof of 
these concluding states. These points must be common to the variety of versions of the 
CNRs 1 and 4, and these points are all that are required to apply the above criticism of a 
wide scope interpretation, and subsequently the application of a bootstrapping criticism to 
a narrow scope interpretation. 
It will not do to respond to this by suggesting that the obligations of rationality are 
distinct from j-reasons, so that we have two forms of broadly rational oughts. Not only is it 
obscure what these other rational obligations might be, and how they would interact with 
the obligations of j-reasons. But crucially, this would not seem to avoid the troubles here 
raised, for the bootstrapping argument could be applied in a similar way to rational 
obligations that were not reasons. It is not simply that forming a belief that one has reason 
to F or a desire to F, does not give one a j-reason to F, but furthermore, that such beliefs 
and desires do not make it the case that one ought to F, whether or not we interpret this 
ought as grounded in j-reasons. 
It follows that we ought not to suppose that the requirements of rationality provide 
reasons or obligations, as if we do we ought to take many of them as narrow scope; and if 
we do that, then we can simply bootstrap j-reasons (or oughts) into existence by believing 
there are j-reasons, and this is unacceptable. 
 
5.4 Explaining the Appearance of Rational Obligations 
 
Kolodny, following Raz,21 has offered an error theory for why one might have 
thought CNRs did represent rational obligations. His method has two central stages. Firstly, 
it is noted that one might expect that CNRs provide obligations, as it is thought that if one 
is in a state/process that would violate a CNR, then one is in a state/process that would 
violate an obligation. So for each CNR a relevant violation claim is drawn out. Secondly, it 
is shown for each violation claim, that reasons could provide the obligations that would be 
                                                 
21
 Kolodny:2005, 2007b, & 2008, and, Raz:2005. 
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violated. It is thus shown that a state/process that would be against a CNR would also be 
against reasons. This shows that we need not refer to CNRs to provide obligations, but also 
given this closeness between the nature of reasons and the CNR at issue, it is also shown 
how one might mistakenly promote CNRs. 
In the case of CNR2, for example, the violation claim appears to be: 
 
VC2: If one has F as a goal, and believes that G is a necessary means to F, and one does 
not have G as a goal, then one violates some obligation. 
 
If CNR2 provided an obligation, then this would be violated in the case picked out by the 
violation claim. However, we needn’t adopt the CNR on these grounds, as we could refer 
to the breaking of different obligations to satisfy the violation claim. Specifically, in line 
with the argument above that only reasons provide obligations, we can refer to a relevant 
reasons claim: 
 
RC2: If one has conclusive reason to believe that one will F only if one Gs, then one has 
reasons to G at least as strong as one’s reasons to F.22 
 
According to RC2, one will go against reasons if one has F as a goal, and believe that G is 
a necessary means to F, and one does not have G as a goal. That is, the nature of reasons 
picked out by RC2 shows that reasons can provide the obligations that VC2 refers to (in 
place of CNR2). Moreover, RC2 picks out what is plausible in VC2, that is, either one 
needn’t G to F, or, if one has reason to F one has reason to G. 
One should not be worried about the talk of conclusive reasons in RC2. We can say 
two things of the case in which an agent has a merely inconclusive reason for their beliefs. 
Firstly, we can say the case for conclusive reasons itself provides an error theory for the 
case for inconclusive reasons, that is, because of the violation of reasons in one case it is 
naturally assumed there is a violation of reasons in the other case. Secondly, one can note 
that as one’s belief becomes less conclusive, and so less certain, it is less clear that one is 
irrational in failing to act in accord with it. That is, if I am uncertain I have a reason to do 
something, then I am not obviously irrational for not doing it. 
                                                 
22
 Cf. Kolodny:2007b p.151, and Raz:2005. Kolodny actually argues that RC2 cannot be correct, and instead 
proposes a different reasons claim. But, my concern here is not to provide all the necessary details, rather, to 
show how the general picture works, and so I stick with the more clear idea reflected in Raz’s position. 
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One might have been mistakenly led to believe that CNR2 provides one with 
obligations, because one accepted VC2. However, VC2 in fact has an explanation 
stemming from reasons, as is revealed by RC2. Thus reasons provide the only rational 
obligations at issue, but it is understandable how one might have mistakenly thought that 
CNRs were of relevance as both would explain VC2. 
This pattern can be repeated for the other CNRs I mentioned above. In the case of 
CNR1 we might refer to: 
 
VC1: If one believes that there is all things considered reason to F and one does not have F 
as a goal, then one violates some obligation; and, 
RC1: If one has conclusive reason to believe that there is all things considered reason to F, 
then one has reason to adopt F as a goal. 
 
In the case of CNR3, we might refer to: 
 
VC3: If one believes that one cannot F and G, and one has F as a goal and has G as a goal, 
then one violates an obligation; and, 
RC3: If one believes that one cannot G and F, has G as a goal, and has F as a goal, then 
either one believes without conclusive reason that one will G, or one believes without 
conclusive reason that one will F, or one believes without conclusive reason that one 
cannot G and F.23 
 
The connections in RC3 are made in part by assuming that if one adopts an action as a goal, 
that is if one chooses to do something, then one will believe that one will do it. One cannot 
choose to do something that one believes one will not do.24 So if the agent has both F and 
G as goals, they must believe they will F and G, and one of these beliefs must be wrong if 
they correctly believe they cannot F and G. And in the case of CNR4 we might refer to: 
 
VC4: If one believes that p and that p entails q, and one does not believe that q, then one 
violates an obligation; and, 
                                                 
23
 Cf. Kolodny:2008 p.371. 
24
 Kolodny raises some doubts about this idea, and instead offers an alternative reasons claim (cf. 
Kolodny:2008). 
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RC4: If one lacks conclusive reason to believe that q, then one either lacks conclusive 
reason to believe that p or one lacks conclusive reason to believe that p entails q. 
 
Of course much more could be said about these RCs and VCs.25 However, my 
point here has merely been to show that one can provide a plausible error theory to account 
for why it is that someone might take CNRs to provide rational obligations, when in fact 
they do not. The answer being, that the individuals at issue no doubt accept a number of 
VCs related to these CNRs, and their mistake arises from supposing that the CNRs account 
for the VCs when in fact it is plausible that there are RCs that fulfil this role. This moves 
one towards the idea that rationality is little more than responsiveness to reasons, one is 
irrational when not appropriately responsive to reasons. 
 
5.5 What Rationality Consists In 
 
The preceding discussion shows that if we focus on the cases in which an agent is 
mistaken about what reasons obtain we can easily be misled, concluding from this that 
there must be requirements of rationality distinct from the requirements of reasons. One 
can notice the similarity with the reasons case, there we also saw that we should not let 
appearances concerning error cases mislead us, but instead focus on the good cases, and 
see how the two relate. 
We will get a better account of rationality if we focus on the primary or paradigm 
cases of rational actions, or rationally forming beliefs or goal giving desires.26 I will focus 
on the case of rational actions, and practical rationality. In an ideal case an agent will be 
aware of all the reasons there are, and they will do the action that there is most reason to 
do, for the reasons that there are to do it. The rational action will be the action that the 
agent ought to perform, where this obligation stems from the reasons that there are to 
perform it. However, agents are not omniscient, and they should not be expected to be to 
be rational, so instead of an ideal case we have a paradigm case of acting rationally. A 
paradigm case of acting rationally is a case in which an agent has an all things considered 
j-reason to do something, and they do that thing for that reason (the agent is ignorant of 
some reasons, but acts to do what the reasons he is aware of oblige for those reasons). If I 
                                                 
25
 Kolodny has gone to lengths to provide more detailed accounts (cf. Kolodny:2008, 2007b & 2005). 
26
 I am most indebted to Jonathan Lowe, who pointed out the value of these paradigm cases to me in 
discussion. 
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will gain pleasure from eating salmon, and I am aware of that, and I eat salmon for that 
reason, then I will be acting rationally. In the ideal and paradigm cases rationality is simply 
a matter of doing what the j-reasons one is aware of prescribe doing, and doing it for those 
reasons. In the paradigm cases acting rationally just is acting for reasons, once we allow 
that omnipotence isn’t a requirement of rationality. With the paradigm case in mind there 
is little temptation to say that one is obliged to act rationally, as it is obviously the case that 
acting rationally just is doing what one is obliged – by the reasons – to do. 
In the last chapter I distinguished between independent and dependent reasons, the 
latter being reasons that were reasons only in combination with other reasons, i.e. 
instrumental and supporting reasons. For example, the fact that going to the shop enables 
me to buy food is a reason for me to go to the shop only in combination with another 
reason, such as the fact that I gain pleasure from buying food. A dependent reason alone 
does not reveal the good of an action, as an action will only be justified given that 
dependent reason and other reasons. Because of this it is perhaps more fitting to say that a 
dependent reason is not a complete reason. An intrinsic reason to perform an action is a 
complete reason, as it can reveal an action’s good on its own. I will say that a combination 
of an intrinsic reason and an instrumental reason linked to that intrinsic reason is also a 
complete reason. For example, the fact that I gain pleasure from reading newspapers, and 
the fact that buying a newspaper is a means to reading a newspaper, are together a 
complete reason for me to buy a paper. Similarly, an intrinsic reason along with one or 
more supporting reasons that support it, will also be a complete reason. For example, the 
fact that I enjoy walking, and the fact that walking involves stretching my legs are together 
a complete reason for me to go walking (supposing that stretching my legs supports the 
fact that I gain pleasure from walking, perhaps it is in part because walking involves 
stretching my legs that I enjoy it). And finally, an intrinsic reason and an instrumental 
reason linked with it, and a supporting reason that supports that instrumental reason are a 
complete reason. For example, the fact that I gain pleasure from running, and the fact that 
going outside is a means to running, and the fact that I am currently inside, together form a 
complete reason for me to go outside. Complete reasons will also result from combinations 
of the same structure, essentially, a supporting reason must be accompanied with the 
reason it supports, and an instrumental reason must be accompanied by a reason to perform 
the action that it is a means to. If these conditions are not met, then the reasons at hand are 
incomplete. With this in mind it might be more accurate to say that in the paradigm or 
primary cases of acting rationally, an agent acts for a complete reason However, rationality 
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still primarily concerns acting for a reason that justifies your action, it is just that some 
facts are reasons only in combination with others, so I will generally not include the 
‘complete’ prefix.  
When we turn to error cases, cases in which an agent mistakenly takes j-reasons to 
obtain that do not obtain, we should not think of there being different requirements of 
rationality at issue, that is, requirements beyond j-reasons. Rather, we should say that an 
agent can sometimes be forgiven for not acting for a j-reason. In the error case an agent 
does not do what they ought to do as they do not act for a j-reason. When we nonetheless 
describe the agent as rational, this is not because they have done what they ought to do (i.e. 
fulfilled a rational requirement like a CNR), but because what they do is sufficiently close 
to the paradigm case for the agent to be excused for falling short and failing to do as they 
ought to. If I mistakenly believe that I will gain pleasure from eating salmon, and have a 
goal giving desire to eat salmon, then I am rational. This is not because I act for a reason, 
nor because I fulfil a CNR, but, because I am sufficiently close to the case of acting for a 
complete reason to be forgiven. 
More specifically, we can say that an agent will be forgiven if, had their beliefs 
about what reasons obtained been true, these beliefs and other beliefs and goal giving 
desires of the agent would form a network isomorphic with that of the network of reasons 
and the beliefs and actions they are reasons for. For example, if I will gain pleasure from 
eating salmon, and there is no reason for me not to eat salmon, and I am aware of this 
reason to eat salmon and I eat salmon for this reason, then I will be acting rationally; in 
fact, my action will be a paradigm of rationality. It would be a paradigm of acting 
rationally because it would be a case of acting for an all things considered j-reason. In such 
a case my reason for eating salmon and my eating salmon are related in a particular way. 
Further, my belief about that reason and my goal giving desire of eating salmon are also 
related in an isomorphic way. Suppose instead that I would not gain pleasure from eating 
salmon, so I had no reason to do so, but believed I would and had eating salmon as a goal 
and resultantly ate salmon. Then my belief and desire giving goal would not be isomorphic 
with the relations between my j-reasons and my actions, because there were no j-reasons. 
However, had my beliefs been true, there would have been j-reasons, and further, there 
would have been isomorphism. I suggest that something like this demarcates those cases 
which qualify as being rational from those which do not, and it does so because it 
demarcates a number of cases in which we would forgive an agent for not acting for an all 
things considered j-reason. These are perhaps cases in which one is tempted to say that had 
101 
 
the agent’s beliefs about what reasons obtained been true, those agents would have acted 
[formed a belief or goal giving desire] for all things considered j-reasons, and no doubt the 
obtaining of this counterfactual conditional would encourage forgiveness, that is, qualify 
the agent as rational. 
Similar points are made by both Raz and Kolodny.27 Raz speaks of a faculty of 
rationality, which is the faculty which enables an agent to respond appropriately to reasons. 
For Raz, when an agent acts irrationally this is not a matter of their going against particular 
reasons, nor of them breaking a CNR, but rather, of them acting in a way that reveals a 
fault in their rational faculty. The fault is an insensitivity to the general nature of reasons, 
where a sensitivity to reasons in the relevant sense would be captured by the isomorphism 
or would be isomorphism I spoke of just above. However, I find this notion of a faculty of 
rationality unclear and even misleading insofar as it suggests that one has a sensitivity to 
reasons in the error cases where there are in fact no reasons to be sensitive to. I take the 
more telling issue to be the closeness of the relation between error cases and paradigm 
cases. 
Kolodny again draws the boundary between rational and irrational cases in the 
same place, though he focuses instead on the perspective of the agent and the reasons that 
they take themselves to have. For Kolodny, an agent will be rational insofar as they act in 
accord with the reasons that they take themselves to have to act. When I mistakenly 
believe that I will gain pleasure from eating salmon, from my perspective I have a reason 
to eat salmon, and so I will be rational so long as I do so. An advantage of this view is that 
it can explain why, from the agent’s perspective, being told what the rational thing to do is 
is not merely a matter of having the situation evaluated, but rather, also of being given 
guidance about what they ought to do. From the third party’s perspective, describing such 
an action as rational is merely evaluating it, but, from the perspective of the agent mistaken 
about what reasons obtain this is a matter of being told what these reasons are reasons for, 
and hence, what they ought to do. Thus from the perspective of the agent the appearance of 
obligations lingers in the error cases, even though there is in fact none. I think that 
Kolodny is right about this, though it remains that these error cases qualify as rational 
solely on the basis of the closeness they bear to paradigm cases. If acting rationally did not 
involve acting for reasons as it does in the paradigm cases, it would not involve acting in 
accord with the reasons one takes oneself to have in the error cases. 
                                                 
27
 Raz:2005, and, Kolodny:2005, 2007b & 2008. Scanlon says things which reflect aspects of both ideas, see 
Scanlon:2010 and Scanlon:2007 respectively.  
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This account clearly links to the patterns suggested by CNRs 1 and 4. In fact, 
satisfying CNRs 1 and 4, involves having a network of beliefs about reasons28 and other 
beliefs and desire giving goals, which, if those beliefs about reasons were true, would be 
isomorphic with the network of j-reasons and the beliefs or actions they are j-reasons for. 
The story with the other CNRs is perhaps less clear, but the RCs noted above open a 
window here. The RCs show that in paradigm cases of acting [desiring or believing] 
rationally in accord with these CNRs one is acting [desiring or believing] in accord with 
reasons. Acting [desiring or believing] rationally, is also arguably a matter of acting 
[desiring or believing] in a way somehow responsive to reasons or one’s beliefs about 
these reasons, not any old bodily movement [or urge or imagining] is rational, rather only 
those with a specific form of responsiveness are (ones which do not qualify in this way 
will be simply non-rational.) It follows that in the paradigm cases of acting [desiring or 
believing] in accord with these CNRs an agent will not merely act [desire or believe] in 
accord with reasons but will act [desire or believe] for reasons. The error cases will then 
have a closeness to these paradigm cases which can be described in terms of an 
isomorphism or would be isomorphism, even if this now concerns the states mentioned by 
the CNR and other states, rather than merely the states mentioned by the CNR as with 
CNRs 1 and 4. 
Irrationality will then consist in acting without appropriate responsiveness to 
reasons. There are two obvious ways that this can come about. If an agent is aware of a 
number of reasons to perform an action, but a number of far stronger29 reasons not to 
perform it, and yet they nonetheless perform the action, then they do not have the 
appropriate accord with reasons and are irrational. Alternatively, if an agent is aware of a 
fact and for that fact performs an action, so that they adopt it as an m-reason, but that fact 
is not a j-reason for their action, then the agent does not have appropriate accord with 
reasons and is therefore irrational.30 
                                                 
28
 In the case of CNR4 these are the beliefs that q and that q entails p, as the fact that q and the fact that q 
entails p are together reasons to believe that p. 
29
 We might allow that weights are vague, so in some cases one can be equally rational to go one way or the 
other. 
30
 One might think that there can be cases in which one is irrational because one acts for a j-reason, but 
couldn’t have known the fact was a j-reason, or similarly, are rational because one acts for a fact which one 
understandably takes to be a j-reason, but which in fact is not. But such cases will not raise trouble for the 
view at hand, because this view takes it that the reasons ought to be complete reasons, so must involve an 
intrinsic reason. Thus, we have specifically cases of agents taking facts to not be or to be intrinsic reasons. 
These beliefs might be insufficiently responsive to reasons, or appropriately responsive to them, and this will 
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Summary 
 
The only rational obligations on an agent are those provided by j-reasons. In 
paradigm cases an agent will be aware of what there is most reason to do, and they will do 
that thing for those reasons. However, an agent can be mistaken about what reasons obtain; 
when they are, they may nonetheless qualify as rational. They will do so not because they 
do as they ought to, that is, what there is most reason to do, nor least because they fulfil a 
CNR, but rather because they act in a way sufficiently close to the paradigm case. 
Specifically, because they have a network of beliefs and goal giving desires which, were 
their beliefs about what reasons obtain true, would be isomorphic with the network of 
reasons and the actions they are reasons for. From the agent’s perspective the rational thing 
to do will always appear to be the thing that they ought to do. Though a third party can see 
that in error cases what it is rational for an agent to do and what they ought to do, or the 
actions that they have reasons to perform, can be distinct. But, despite this distinction they 
will always bear a certain relationship, a closeness which enables the one action to qualify 
as rational in light of the other’s reasonableness. This links back to the account of acting 
for a reason given in the last chapter where it was shown that to act for a reason involves 
an agent having a belief and a desire which gives their goal. Because this belief and desire 
are of import to acting for a reason, and hence to the paradigm cases of acting rationally, 
the beliefs and desires of an agent can also be of import to whether or not other actions 
qualify as rational. 
Before closing I will say how this fits with the use made of CNRs in Chapter Three. 
There I referred to two apparent CNRs: one ought, if one believes their mother unwell, to 
call around to see her; and, one ought, if one desires to make a cake, to gather ingredients. 
The former of these is a specification of CNR1, the point at issue being that one’s mother 
being unwell is a reason to call to see her; one believes that reason to obtain, so one ought 
to have a goal giving desire to go around to see her. As such the best thing to say is that, if 
Si (the agent at issue) is mistaken in believing his mother unwell, he is irrational for not 
going around to see her, but this does not mean that he ought to go around to see her; 
rather, as she is well, Si should carry on home to his children. The second CNR is a 
specification of CNR2, gathering ingredients is a means to making a cake. An agent with 
                                                                                                                                                   
be the central issue. In the former case, for example, we could say the agent is irrational in their belief that 
the fact is an intrinsic reason, but, they are nonetheless rational in acting. 
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the goal of making a cake is irrational if they do not gather ingredients despite believing 
that they must do so in order to achieve their goal. In the previous chapter the agent at 
issue is Dave, who desires to make a cake, but whose desire is ill founded and not had for a 
reason as he is mistaken in believing that it is his friend’s birthday. In advising Dave that 
in order to make a cake one must gather ingredients, or even in saying that the rational 
thing for Dave to do given he has the goal [and belief] he does, is to gather ingredients, 
one is not specifying what Dave ought to do. Rather they are evaluating certain actions as 
rationally excusable. Nevertheless, from Dave’s perspective (unwilling to accept it is not 
his friend’s birthday or resultantly to drop his desire) he will feel that he has reason to 
gather ingredients, and hence the evaluation will strike him as advice on what he ought to 
do. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE ARGUMENT FROM RATIONAL ACTION 
 
In this chapter I will take up and defend an argument mentioned in Chapter Two. 
There we saw that many actions will only be rational if their agents have tensed and/or 
first-personal beliefs. Mellor tried to account for this need in terms of the causal roles of 
beliefs; however, I raised some doubts about the adequacy of this answer as it presupposed 
an asymmetry that did not in fact exist and as it seemed to neglect the manner in which 
these actions are responsive to reasons, hence, rationality. I took up this theme in the 
subsequent chapters, first arguing that reasons (both in their role of justifying and 
motivating) are facts. I then argued that acting for a reason was a matter of being aware of 
that reason, and then forming a goal, choosing to act and acting in response to that reason. 
I used this notion of acting for a reason to clarify the notion of rationality. A rational action, 
in the paradigm or non-error case, is an action which an agent does for a reason which is a 
complete reason for that action. In an error case, when an agent mistakenly takes a reason 
to obtain which does not obtain, then they qualify as rational on the basis of the similarity 
between their case and the paradigm case. 
I will bring these elements together in this chapter to argue that if rationality 
demands tensed and first-personal beliefs, in place of tenseless and non-first-personal 
beliefs, then this must be because the former involve an awareness of facts that the latter 
do not. Both tenseless and non-first-personal beliefs can be involved in acting for reasons, 
what distinguishes them from tensed and first-personal beliefs in the eyes of rationality is 
simply the reasons they are an awareness of. It follows from this that the tenseless theory 
of time is wrong, as it denies that tensed beliefs capture facts not captured by tenseless 
beliefs. This shows that my argument does require a realist and pluralist notion of facts, 
but this is a view that I will show to be independently plausible. 
 
6.1 The Argument from Action 
 
My first argument against the tenseless theory of time concerns rational actions and 
runs as follows: 
 
P1 In some cases an agent must have a tensed belief in order to act rationally, and no 
tenseless belief can satisfy this requirement. 
106 
 
P2 In some cases an agent must have a first-personal belief in order to act rationally, and 
no non-first-personal belief can fulfil this requirement. 
P3 The reasons that motivate actions (m-reasons) and the reasons that justify actions (j-
reasons) are facts. 
P4 In non-error cases of rational action if an agent is required to have a belief and another 
belief cannot satisfy that requirement, then the former must be an awareness of a j-reason 
that the latter is not. 
C1/P5 If there are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
tensed belief and a tenseless belief cannot satisfy that requirement, then the former must be 
an awareness of a j-reason that the latter is not. (From P4.) 
C2/P6 If there are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
first-personal belief and a non-first-personal belief cannot satisfy that requirement, then the 
former must be an awareness of a j-reason that the latter is not. (From P4.) 
C3/P7 If there are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
tensed belief and a tenseless belief cannot satisfy that requirement, then the former must be 
an awareness of a fact that the latter is not. (From P3 & P5.) 
C4/P8 If there are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
first-personal belief and a non-first-personal belief cannot satisfy that requirement, then the 
former must be an awareness of a fact that the latter is not. (From P3 & P6.) 
P9 There are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
tensed belief and no tenseless belief can fulfil that requirement. 
P10 There are non-error cases of rational action in which an agent is required to have a 
first-personal belief and no non-first-personal belief can fulfil that requirement. 
C5/P11 Agents are aware of facts in tensed beliefs that they are not aware of in any 
tenseless beliefs. (From P7 & P9.) 
C6 Agents are aware of facts in first-personal beliefs that they are not aware of in any non-
first-personal beliefs. (From P8 & P10.) 
P12 According to the tenseless theory of time there are no facts captured by tensed beliefs 
that cannot be captured by tenseless ones. 
C7 The tenseless theory of time is wrong. (From P11 & P12.) 
 
I shall refer to this as the argument from action. I will now set about justifying the 
premises that I take to need external support, namely, P1-4, P9, P10 and P12, the other 
premises gain their support from one or more of these. 
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P12 comes straight forwardly from the definition of the tenseless theory that was 
given in Chapter One, and the manner in which beliefs are characterized. A tensed belief 
will be a belief an agent has when they are disposed to honestly express or affirm tensed 
uses of language.1 It is therefore natural to take the beliefs and the language to share 
contents and to capture the same facts.2 Therefore, if tensed beliefs capture facts that 
tenseless ones do not, then tensed language captures facts that tenseless language does not. 
The definition of the tenseless theory is that it denies that tensed language captures facts 
that tenseless language does not, and therefore, we arrive at P12. 
P1 and P2 come from Chapter Two. There we saw that Perry’s argument for the 
essential indexical has showed that some actions require their agent to have tensed beliefs. 
A consideration of this, and Mellor’s arguments, led to the conclusion that the tensed 
beliefs were essential specifically for some rational actions. That is, if an agent is going to 
act rationally and in a timely fashion, then they must have a tensed belief. For instance, 
one must believe that ‘it is now 1pm’ [or something similar and tensed, for example, ‘it is 
1pm’], if one is going to act rationally to fulfil one’s goal of listening to the 1 o’clock news. 
The agent might have tenseless beliefs such as ‘I must turn on the radio to hear the 1pm 
news’, and ‘I must turn on the radio at 1pm’ all morning, but they must gain a tensed belief 
in order to act rationally at 1pm, no tenseless belief can fulfil this role; P1. 
Chapter Two also showed that analogous remarks apply for a first-personal 
indexical. An agent must have a first-personal belief if they are going to act rationally, and 
for considerations that apply to them in particular. For instance, if I am going to collect my 
order I must believe ‘I have ticket 114’ [or something similar and first-personal], no non-
first-personal belief can fulfil this role, for example, the belief ‘F.P. has ticket 114’ will not 
as I might not know that I am F.P.; P2. 
The discussion of Chapter Three showed that reasons are facts. More specifically, 
it was shown that the reasons that make an action appropriate or justified are facts, and, 
that the reasons that an agent acts for are facts. It is the fact that cycling gives me pleasure 
that justifies and motivates me to go cycling on a particular occasion. This gives us P3. 
 
                                                 
1
 There will be complexities, but the plausibility of functionalism about mental states supports the 
plausibility of this idea. 
2
 My argument shows that one must be aware of facts in tensed beliefs that one is not in tenseless ones, it 
appears moreover, that an awareness of these facts can be shared and passed on, and given the association of 
these beliefs and tensed language, it is plausible that these facts are captured by tensed language and not by 
tenseless language. 
108 
 
 
6.2 Justification of P9 & P10 
 
P9 and P10 say that there are non-error cases of rational action which require 
tensed and first-personal beliefs. My reason for taking these premises to be correct is that 
denying them leaves one in an unacceptable position. 
A great majority of our actions are timely actions and/or actions done for reasons 
specific to ourselves. That is, a great many of our actions fall within the scope of Perry’s 
essential indexical arguments. (I have argued in Chapter Two that all of Perry’s examples, 
so those concerning ‘here’, ‘this’ or ‘you’ beliefs too, can be interpreted as concerning 
tensed and/or first-personal beliefs, and it seems few of our actions escape all of his 
arguments.) To deny P9 and P10 would thus entail that a great majority of our actions are 
error cases. 
As reasons are facts, saying that the great majority of our actions are error cases 
implies that they are cases in which we are mistaken about what facts obtain. It would 
follow that people were generally mistaken in their world view. This is something that the 
tenseless theory has been careful to deny, firstly by saying that tensed beliefs are reducible 
to tenseless ones, and then by saying that they have tenseless truth-conditions. The thought 
that these comments appear to encourage is that we are not mistaken about the world; our 
tensed characterisations get the tenseless content right, they just have a peculiar form. But, 
this response is no longer open to the tenseless theorist; if they avoid my argument by 
insisting that most of our actions are error cases, then this means the content of our tensed 
(and first-personal) beliefs is mistaken. If, as it seems, the content of our perceptual beliefs 
are all present tensed,3 it follows that all of our perceptual beliefs are mistaken; they all get 
the world wrong. This mistake would thus infect all of our empirical data, and hence even 
the sciences – commonly a tenseless theorists preserve – would be shown to be built on 
error. Whilst I am ready to admit that we do not get everything right, error on this scale is 
surely unacceptable. 
Moreover, the tensed and/or first-personal beliefs are required for the actions at 
issue to be rational actions. This means that the reasons that they are an awareness of, or 
would be if these were not error cases, are reasons that are essential for the actions, that is, 
are reasons required to justify the actions. It follows that if all of these actions are error 
                                                 
3
 E.g. Le Poidevin:2007 p.78. 
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cases, then they are without reasons that would be essential for justifying those actions. In 
other words, all of these actions would be without reasons, and hence unreasonable actions. 
The rationality of an action in a paradigm case is reliant on the agent’s awareness 
of a reason for that action, and their acting for that reason. The demand for the belief is a 
demand for an awareness of a reason for that action; it is a demand for an awareness of any 
reason for that action. It follows that if an agent must have a particular belief, then they 
must be aware of a particular reason, and hence, that this reason must be the only reason 
for the action at hand (as any reason would do, so if only one reason will do, then that one 
reason is all of the reasons there are). The error case differs from the non-error case, as it is 
recognized that the agent is not aware of a reason for their action. However, such cases are 
recognized as rational on the basis of the fact that if the beliefs of the agent were true, that 
is, if the reason the agent took to obtain were to obtain, then it would have been a reason 
for their action. It follows that the demand for a belief in the error case is a demand for a 
belief which were its object to obtain, that object would be a reason for the action. 
Therefore, so long as the cases in which a tensed or first-personal belief is required are 
rational actions, then, the objects of those beliefs must either be the only reasons for those 
actions, or else, they would be were they to obtain (and if they don’t obtain then there are 
no reasons for those actions). Hence, if all these cases are error cases, then none of the 
reasons for these actions obtain, and hence all of the actions are unreasonable. Not only 
does this sound wrong, but it also implies that we ought to be acting quite differently to the 
ways we do act, but it is quite incomprehensible to fathom what such a radical change in 
people’s actions ought to be. If I shouldn’t turn the radio on at 1pm, or go to the meeting at 
2pm, or buy milk when I run out or any of these mundane everyday actions, I am lost to 
imagine what I ought to do. (One couldn’t avoid these consequences by denying that the 
actions at issue were rational actions, because it is not possible for the majority of our 
actions to be irrational.4) 
In short, I take it that P9 and P10 must be correct, as to deny them is to insist that 
the great majority of our actions are unreasonable. Further, it would be to suggest that the 
great majority of our world view is mistaken. I do not think that these consequences are 
acceptable, and hence, P9 and P10 must be. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Davidson:2001g, Kim:1988 p.392-393, and Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.242. 
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6.3 Justification of P4 
 
Beliefs were introduced into the discussion of reasons and rationality on the 
grounds that an agent must be aware of a reason in order to be able to act for that reason. 
In short, they were introduced solely on the grounds that they were a form of awareness of 
a reason. This grounds P4, as if beliefs are only required to provide the awareness of 
reasons in paradigm cases of rational action, then, given two beliefs are both states of 
awareness, if one is required in place of the other it must be that the one concerns a reason 
that the other does not. 
We saw in Chapters Four and Five that a paradigm case of rational action will 
involve an agent being aware of a reason (or several) for an action, and then choosing to 
perform that action for that reason, adopting the goal of making that action, and acting. We 
thus have the four components, belief, choice, desire and action. In error cases of rational 
action we have the same four components, though the belief is mistaken and involves an 
agent taking a reason to obtain that in fact does not. 
If one wanted to deny P4 they might argue that two beliefs can involve an 
awareness of the same reason, but, that one is required by rationality in place of the other 
because only one of these beliefs enables the agent to act for that reason. That is, an 
opponent of P4 might try to argue that only some beliefs can combine with desires, choices 
and actions in the right way to enable an agent to act for a reason. However, this is highly 
implausible. Because the notion of belief we are working with is an umbrella one, all the 
beliefs are alike modes of awareness. This denial would hence have to mean that an agent 
could be aware of a reason, but, that if they are aware of it in one way rather than another 
then it would be impossible for them to act for that reason. I do not deny that a person can 
be aware of something in two cases and fail to recognize it to be the same thing, but, it 
appears that this is plausible on the grounds that different aspects of the item are presented 
(for example, the rear rather than the front of a house). In the current context, that which is 
presented differently is a fact, but there is no sense in which a fact can be presented via 
different aspects, that would simply be to present different facts (for example, being close 
to the rear of a house is different from being close to the front of a house). In short, we are 
simply left with my conclusion that different facts are presented in first-personal and/or 
tensed beliefs to those which we are presented within non-first-personal and/or tenseless 
beliefs, which would already be to accept the denial of the tenseless theory. Further, such 
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misrecognition appears to be at best likely, not impossible, so it could not ground the idea 
that tensed and/or first personal beliefs were necessary.5 
Moreover, it is clear that an agent’s beliefs can vary independently of the other 
three components For example, I can believe that walking gives me pleasure, and can 
choose not to walk, desire not to walk and not go walking for this reason (perhaps I feel in 
need of some self-discipline). Alternatively I might choose to go walking, desire to go 
walking and go walking for this reason. Moreover, I might believe that walking gives me 
pleasure, and choose to cycle, desire to cycle and go cycling. That is, I can choose to go 
cycling because walking gives me pleasure. We can make this case appear plausible by 
adding in some other beliefs to the effect that people who gain pleasure from walking gain 
pleasure from cycling. However, we needn’t do so. If we do not, then the agent will be 
acting irrationally, the fact that one gains pleasure from walking is not a reason to go 
cycling. This makes it hard to understand such a case, as we generally try to understand 
people by assuming them to be rational, but, this does not show that the case is impossible. 
The requirement that we take other agents to be rational in order to understand them is a 
proportional requirement, we must take another to be rational in a good proportion of cases, 
but we needn’t take them to be rational in every case. It is clear we can understand others 
well enough to pick out their occasional irrational actions as irrational on the basis of a 
background of their rational actions. 
Acting for a reason, or a fact one takes to be a reason, has a certain phenomenology, 
or at least, an agent can normally tell you when that is what they are doing. In the 
terminology of Chapter Three, one might say having an m-reason has a certain 
phenomenology, whether or not that m-reason is also a j-reason. This can enable one to 
know when another is acting for a reason and hence when they are acting irrationally. If I 
cannot make sense of another’s actions I might ask them what their reasons for performing 
those actions were. It might turn out that the facts they refer to are not j-reasons for those 
actions at all, and I might hence judge them to be irrational. But, crucially, it is not 
necessary that I conclude that the person did not in fact decide or desire to act. It is clear 
people are sometimes wrong about what a particular fact justifies, what it is a j-reason for. 
                                                 
5
 I do not believe it makes sense to talk of the mode of presentation of a proposition, but if it does it is of no 
relevance, as it is the propositional content that counts, as the propositional content is the reason. Therefore, 
so long as one can grasp the content of a proposition, that is grasp a fact at all in a belief, then this is all that 
is of import to acting rationally. (Cf. Kaplan:1989a who speaks of mode of presentation of a proposition, 
something discussed by others too, e.g. Salmon:2006, Braun:2006 and Soames:2002 as discussed by e.g. 
Schiffer:2006 & 2003 ch.1.) 
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If we can talk about being more or less off target in this respect, then each of these are as 
possible as the other, even if they are not equally common. 
Specifically, in the present case, it is possible that Mike believes he will gain 
pleasure from attending his departmental meeting at 2:05pm, that is, he is aware of a 
reason to attend the meeting. And, that at 2pm he forms the belief ‘I must leave my office 
now if I am to attend the meeting’, and for these reasons he chooses to leave his office and 
desires to leave his office, and leaves his office. In this case Mike acts rationally. But, it is 
also possible that the case is changed so that at 2pm, instead of forming the belief ‘I must 
leave my office now to attend the meeting’, Mike forms the belief ‘I must leave the office 
at 2pm to attend the meeting’, and on the basis of these facts he chooses to leave and 
desires to leave and does leave. If he does this latter he will be acting irrationally, because, 
as Perry emphasizes, he might not know that it is 2pm at the time he forms his belief and 
acts.6 As the argument from action will have it, it follows that the only difference between 
the two cases can be that in the former Mike is aware of a reason that he is not in the latter, 
and hence, the tensed and tenseless beliefs must concern different facts. 
Similarly for Tom. He might believe ‘My stopping will be good for people’s health 
(as I am making a mess)’, thus being aware of a reason to stop, and hence choosing to stop 
and desiring to stop and stopping. In so acting he would be acting rationally. However, he 
might form the belief ‘Tom’s stopping will be good for people’s health (as Tom is making 
a mess)’, hence choosing and desiring to stop, and stopping. If he acts in this latter manner 
he will be acting irrationally, as he might not know that he is Tom. Again it follows that 
the only difference between the two cases can be that the former belief concerns a reason 
that the latter does not, and hence each is an awareness of different facts. 
These cases are not as alien as one might think. I suspect that we all know people 
who upon being told that someone will be fired/sent away/etc. react as if it were 
themselves who were being fired/sent away/etc. Of course these people appear to be acting 
irrationally, “you do not know that it is you they were talking about”, we say to them. In 
saying this we acknowledge that we take their actions to be irrational, not non-rational. 
(There is no need to insert a first-personal judgment between the reasons and actions, but 
                                                 
6
 The point here is not that it is irrational because it is too much a matter of chance or luck (compare 
discussion of Gettier cases in epistemology), rather, the point is that one needs a further belief, hence reason, 
to suddenly spring into action at a particular time because the tenseless beliefs are too independent of the 
action, they are true when one ought to leave, but also when one needn’t leave yet or ought to apologize for 
not attending. 
113 
 
even if one did, the judgment would be irrational, and therefore equally as telling as the 
action.)7 
In regard to the case of first-personal and tensed beliefs, it is worth considering that 
the examples of the essential indexical are often introduced as specific cases, e.g. we need 
a tensed belief when we must act at a specific time. This might lead one to think that there 
are cases of rational actions in which an agent does not need a tensed belief. For example, 
when they do not need to act at a specific time or when they have a reason to do something 
at any time at all. If this is right, it shows that tensed beliefs are not required simply in 
order for a person to act rationally full stop. That is, this would show that beliefs other than 
tensed ones can combine with choices and desires and actions in the relevant way in 
rational cases. Again it follows that if tensed beliefs are required in one instance rather 
than any other belief, it must be because of the reasons they are an awareness of. Similarly, 
the need for first-personal beliefs appears to arise in cases where it is oneself in particular 
who has a reason to act. So if there are cases in which this is not so, cases in which anyone 
or everyone ought to act, then these will be cases where first-personal beliefs are not 
required for rational actions, and where non-first-personal beliefs combine with desires, 
beliefs and actions in the right way. So it must be the content of these beliefs that are of 
import. 
It is worth noting that, in thinking of an action as done for a reason, that is, being 
chosen and desired etc., we are not thinking of the action as being caused by that reason, or 
caused in a specific way.8 It follows that it is inappropriate to say that only beliefs with a 
particular causal shape can combine with choices, desires and actions in the right way. 
Rather, if we are able to say that the agent forms goals and choices on the basis of what 
they believe, then, as this is the primary way in which we talk of acting for a reason, we 
can also say that if there are any causal requirements then these must also have been met. 
It can be appropriate to take an agent’s movements to be simply non-rational, that 
is, such that it is inappropriate to judge them in terms of rationality at all. Breathing is an 
example, or, being manipulated by a super scientist might be a rather different example. 
                                                 
7
 To this degree it appears one can have, and therefore act on, Davidsonian primary reason which rationalizes 
(in Davidson’s sense) their action and is third personal and tenseless, and which involves only true beliefs 
and appropriate desires, and yet act irrationally (Davidson:2001a & 2001c ). If this is right, then Davidson’s 
theory appears to have left something lacking and it is not obvious how one could plug this gap, as simply 
insisting primary reasons must be first-personal and tensed appears to be an ad hoc manoeuvre which thus 
requires further justification. 
8
 Cf. Chapter Four. 
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However, these cases are clearly different to the ones I just described as irrational. There 
the agent has their action as a goal, and they choose to perform that action on the basis of a 
fact they are aware of (which as it happens is no j-reason for the action that they perform). 
These conditions are lacking in the examples of non-rational actions I outlined, and it 
appears to be this very lack which renders them non-rational. 
To deny P4 my opponent must say that tenseless and non-first-personal beliefs 
cannot combine with choices, desires, and actions in the way beliefs do when one acts for 
a reason. I am ready to accept that there are numerous beliefs which do not commonly 
combine in this way, but I take this simply to stem from the fact that such a combination 
would be irrational and people are not generally irrational. I take these cases to be 
irrational because the beliefs concern facts (or would be facts) that are not reasons for the 
actions at issue. A thought defended in Chapter Five. The arguments of Perry and Mellor 
show that such combinations are not common, but, they do not deny their possibility. 
Rather, the fact that people sometimes do act irrationally by acting for facts which are not 
j-reasons shows that certain awkward combinations are possible. Further, the fact that 
there might be rational actions which do not require tensed or first-personal beliefs shows 
that even these uncommon combinations are possible. The notions of belief, desire, choice 
and action, as they have been introduced in this discussion, are focused on the ways they 
can be combined. They have been defined in terms of these roles, and nothing about this, 
nor common practice, implies an impossibility of their combination when the contents, or 
meaning [as my opponent might have it] of the beliefs alter. Moreover, a state that cannot 
be combined with desire and choice etc. in this way, for that very reason no longer looks 
like a state of belief. Thus P4 is vindicated. 
 
6.4 Facts 
 
So far I have spoken a great deal of facts; they are reasons and are where the reality 
of tense lies. However, I have said very little about what exactly a fact is. In this section I 
will say something to address this. I will do this by looking back at my arguments and 
discussions and what they presuppose facts to be like. I have used ‘fact’ in a loose 
everyday way. It will turn out that my use can be taken to coincide with the idea that facts 
are an ontologically fundamental kind, but that it is not committed to such an ontology (my 
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facts could simply be, for example, particulars instantiating modes, bundles of tropes 
containing specific tropes, or, particulars standing in specific resemblance relations9).  
Three aspects of my use of facts stand out. The primary role facts have played so 
far is in providing a form of realism or objectivity. Facts are aspects of the world; they are 
what we consider in acting and are in contrast to the intentional and intensional states 
through which we make these considerations. Secondly, my arguments presuppose (or I 
might say entail) that there is a plurality of facts. The fact that I like cycling is different 
from the fact that my knee is injured, and it is because they are different that they can 
provide different reasons (the former being a reason to go cycling, the latter a reason not 
to). Thirdly, it appears from my discussion that facts can be general, negative, disjunctive, 
and conjunctive, for example, it appears that my reason for going to the shop might be the 
fact that there is no milk anywhere in my house. I will argue all three of these aspects are 
unproblematic. 
My view of facts is realist in two senses. Firstly, it supposes that facts exist, and 
secondly, it supposes that facts are objective, that is, they are mind independent. I assume 
that both of these claims are acceptable, and I will say little to defend them from sceptical 
attacks. I should, however, clarify the objectivity claim. When I say that facts are mind 
independent, I do not mean that were there no minds all the facts would remain the same, 
as some fact such as the fact that I feel happy plausibly involve the existence of minds. 
However, these mind involving facts remain objective insofar as no one need recognize or 
consider them for them to obtain. This objectivity was brought to the fore by my 
examination of reasons, where it was shown that reasons, as facts, were starkly contrasted 
with beliefs as presentations of these facts.10 This last comment makes clear that I also 
                                                 
9
 Cf, respectively, Lowe:2006a, Campbell:1990, Rodriguez-Pereyra:2002. 
10
 It is worth noting that the arguments given to show that reasons were not beliefs are equally applicable to 
the more general claim that reasons are not merely representational entities, no representation of a car 
approaching me is a reason for me to move, rather, the fact of the car approaching is the reason. Thus facts 
are strongly objective. This perhaps gets more complicated when one considers propositions. Dancy:2000 
ch.5.3 for example says that propositions could not be reasons, rather reasons must be the sort of things that 
make propositions true, they must be facts. Alvarez:2010a ch.2.2, conversely, says that reasons are true 
propositions. However, Alvarez identifies true propositions with facts, and to this extent, it appears that 
Alvarez would accept that true propositions are their own truth-makers, and the disagreement between her 
and Dancy appears to be primarily terminological rather than ontological; Alvarez thinks of propositions 
more highly than Dancy, rather than thinking of facts less highly. I confess I find a view that identifies facts 
and true propositions confusing, as it appears to entail that true propositions are their own truth-makers (cf. 
Lowe:1998 p.234). If instead true propositions and their truth-makers are distinguished, then reasons lie with 
the truth-makers not the propositions, and thus here too is where facts lie. Alvarez:2010a ch.2.2 does argue 
that reasons must be propositions as they can be premises in arguments and can stand in entailment relations, 
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assume that facts can be objects of awareness; we can come to know a fact obtains. Again, 
I assume this is plausible, and will not address sceptical concerns to the contrary. 
Armstrong11 has defended an ontology according to which states of affairs are 
ontologically fundamental (therefore real and objective). A state of affairs is a complex 
constituted by a particular object and a property, or n objects and an n-ary relation, where 
these properties and relations are considered to be universals (that is, they are repeatable 
and identical in each repetition). Armstrong’s states of affairs appear to coincide nicely 
with my facts. Just as I recognize it to be a fact that the road is slippery, Armstrong would 
take the road’s being slippery to be a state of affairs; a complex of the particular road and 
the property of slipperyness.12 With this in mind I will show how my notion of facts is 
plausible, by assimilating it to Armstrong’s notion of a state of affairs. 
If one is going to adopt a states of affairs ontology, one must say something about 
how a state of affairs is composed; how should a particular and a property be related when 
the particular instantiates the property? The state of affairs of a ball being red does not 
simply require the existence of the ball and the property of redness, as it is clear that both 
the ball and redness can exist and the ball not be red (for example, if the ball is yellow and 
a bat is red). One must say then, that the property and the particular are related in some 
way. However, difficulties arise when we consider this relation (let us call it ‘R’). For 
example, it is not sufficient to simply take R to be a third ingredient to the state of affairs 
alongside the ball and the property of redness, because it appears that the ball, R, and the 
property redness can all exist when the ball is not red. Plausibly, all three exist when the 
ball is yellow and the bat is red, redness exists in the bat, the ball exists, and R exists in the 
ball being yellow (as the relation between the ball and yellowness). If one tries to deal with 
this problem by postulating a further relation, R2, to hold between R and the ball and 
                                                                                                                                                   
but this argument strikes me as overly quick. If facts were distinct from true propositions, then there would 
be some form of necessity relation between facts, that was reflected in the entailment relation between 
propositions, and it is plausible that this relation can play the role of entailment, and that the fact represented 
can be taken as the reason. 
11
 Armstrong:1997. Armstrong is taking his lead from Wittgenstein:2001a and Russell:1968. Skyrms:1981 
follows this lead and adopts an ontology of states of affairs or facts (in the technical sense, rather than in my 
open sense), but his position differs from Armstrong’s. Simons:1992 again follows this lead, but does not 
adopt an ontology of facts. 
12
 Armstrong certainly speaks in this manner, though we should be careful here, as Armstrong does not want 
to be committed to objects or properties being of a specific form, it could, for example, turn out that the only 
real objects are the fundamental particles of physics, and the only real properties and relations, are the 
properties and relations that these objects instantiate. However, this needn’t entail that there are not 
macroscopic things or qualities, macroscopic states of affairs, merely that these would strictly speaking be 
complexes of the more fundamental states of affairs, and so this does not affect my argument. 
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redness, then clearly the same issues simply arise again, and so on for infinity. Such an 
infinity of relations appears to be unacceptable, and to this extent the state of affairs of the 
ball being red is thrown into doubt. (This is of course a variant of Bradley’s regress.13) 
Armstrong’s theory, however, can avoid this difficulty, because for Armstrong14 
the relation between, for example, the ball and the property redness, is a relation that could 
not occur without relating those two, and therefore, we needn’t postulate a further 
ingredient to relate this relation and the ball and redness. The constituents of the state of 
affairs, we can say, are internally related. Armstrong says this about the relation, because 
he takes the state of affairs of the ball being red to be ontologically prior to the ball or the 
property of redness, as the latter are abstractions from the former (though the ball can/will 
possess other properties, and other particulars can/will be red).15 
A second problem for a states of affairs ontology, directly relates to my assumption 
that there is a plurality of facts, as it has been argued that a states of affairs ontology is 
implausible, as it entails that all states of affairs are identical. The argument I have in mind 
has become known as the slingshot argument, and can be presented as follows:16 
 
P0. Jill is sad, and, Henry is happy. 
P1. The state of affairs that Henry is happy is identical to the state of affairs that Henry is 
happy. 
P2. A statement such as occurs in P1, if true, cannot be falsified by replacing the 
embedded sentences (e.g. Henry is happy) by logically equivalent sentences. 
P3. A statement such as occurs in P1 cannot be falsified by replacing a referring term in it 
by a co-referring term. 
                                                 
13
 cf. Bradley:1897 bk.I.ch.II. 
14
 Armstrong:1997 ch.8 especially p.118. 
15
 This leads Lowe:2006a p.168 to think that Armstrong’s theory must be inadequate, as he cannot explain 
the contingency of the relations between particulars and properties (because the particulars are defined by 
their properties). However, Armstrong:2004 p.81 does perhaps hint at an answer to this worry, when he says 
that although the relations between particulars and properties are in some sense necessary (they couldn’t 
occur without being so related) it is nonetheless the case that these particulars and properties are contingent, 
and it could be that different but similar ones obtained instead. 
16
 The name ‘slingshot argument’, originates with Barwise & Perry:1981, but the argument appears to be 
originally attributed to Frege:1980. Neal:1995 doubts the validity of this attribution. If the attribution is fair 
then the form of the argument given by Frege differs widely from the form of the argument as I will give it 
here, Neal:1995 considers a variety of forms. I am tacking my presentation largely from Searle:1995 
appendix to ch.9, Mellor:1999 p.114, and Lowe:1998 p.229-30 ftnt.2.  
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P4. The sentence ‘Henry is happy’ is logically equivalent to the sentence ‘the unique x 
such that (x is identical with Jill) is identical to the unique x such that (x is identical to Jill 
and Henry is happy)’. (Given P0.) 
P5. The sentence ‘Jill is sad’ is logically equivalent to the sentence ‘the unique x such that 
(x is identical with Jill) is identical to the unique x such that (x is identical to Jill and Jill is 
sad)’. (Given P0.) 
P6/C1. The state of affairs that Henry is happy is identical to the state of affairs that the 
unique x such that (x is identical with Jill) is identical to the unique x such that (x is 
identical to Jill and Henry is happy). (From P1, P2 & P4.) 
P7/C2. The unique x such that (x is identical to Jill and Henry is happy) is identical to the 
unique x such that (x is identical to Jill and Jill is sad). (From P4 & P5.) 
P8/C3. The state of affairs that Henry is happy is identical to the state of affairs that the 
unique x such that (x is identical with Jill) is identical to the unique x such that (x is 
identical to Jill and Jill is sad). (From P3, P6 & P7.) 
C4. The state of affairs that Henry is happy is identical to the state of affairs that Jill is sad. 
(From P2, P5, & P8.) 
 
P0 simply assumed any two true sentences, and as such it is clear that the sentence ‘Jill is 
happy’ could be exchanged for any other true sentence to show, in C4, the identity of the 
state of affairs that Henry is happy, with any other state of affairs. Likewise, one could 
swap the sentence ‘Henry is happy’ for any other true sentence, and so, we could argue 
that any two states of affairs are identical. 
One way of responding to the slingshot argument is through denying the move 
from C2 and C3. One can do this if one adopts Russell’s theory of descriptions according 
to which definite descriptions do not refer.17 If this is right, it follows that the definite 
descriptions the unique x such that (x is identical to Jill and Henry is happy) and the 
unique x such that (x is identical to Jill and Jill is sad) do not refer. If they do not refer, 
then P3 does not apply to them, and hence, we cannot get to C3.18 An alternative way to 
deal with the slingshot is to question either P2 or P3. Mellor19 denies P3, though he is 
careful to point out that this doesn’t entail the falsity of the plausible idea, P3*, a statement 
such as occurs in P1 cannot be falsified by replacing a term in it that refers to a fact by a 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Russell:1905, 1919 ch.XVI, and, 1968 lect.VI. I will say more about this in the next chapter. 
18
 Cf. Neal:1995 and Lowe:2002 p.172-3. 
19
 Mellor:1999 ch.9.5. 
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co-referring term. However, if P3 were replaced by P3*, the slingshot argument wouldn’t 
work. Searle20 instead denies P2. The power of these responses lies in the fact that P2 and 
P3 are difficult to justify, whilst the conclusion C4 appears obviously false, and hence, it is 
more plausible to deny C4, and deny P2 or P3, than to accept all three. 
Armstrong21 offers two types of identity criteria for states of affairs. Firstly, he says 
that different states of affairs can be distinguished by their constituents. So states of affairs 
that are constituted by different particulars, or different universals, will be different states 
of affairs. Secondly, Armstrong accepts that we can often distinguish between states of 
affairs empirically, such that, two states of affairs which are not necessarily concurrent are 
not identical. For example, although the state of affairs of Bill loving Bess, has the same 
constituents as the state of affairs of Bess loving Bill, unfortunately, it is possible for one 
of these states of affairs to occur whilst the other does not, and therefore it is clear that the 
two are distinct states of affairs.22 This last example also highlights that for Armstrong a 
state of affairs cannot only be identified by its constituents, but more specifically, by the 
manner in which these constituents are structured, Bill loving Bess forming a different 
structure from Bess loving Bill. 
Armstrong’s states of affairs are thus far adequate to play the role of my facts, they 
are realist and there is a plurality of them. This raises the question of how Armstrong deals 
with negative, general, disjunctive, and conjunctive states of affairs, and whether this is 
adequate to my concerns. 
The conjunctive case is perhaps the easiest to deal with. Armstrong23 denies that 
there are conjunctive states of affairs, the state of affairs of a ball being red and round, is 
nothing over and above the state of affairs of the ball being red and the state of affairs of 
the ball being round. This is perfectly acceptable for my notion of fact, which doesn’t 
require a conjunction to be anything over and above the conjuncts. Plausibly one is not 
rationally required to do something because of x and y, rather than because of x and 
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 Searle:1995 appendix to ch.9 (see also, Barwise & Perry:1981). Olson:1987 ch.4 considers variants of both. 
21
 Armstrong:1997 ch.8.6. 
22
 Armstrong thinks that this empirical criterion is insufficient on its own, as there might be necessarily 
concurrent states of affairs. Armstrong thinks that the constitutive identity criterion is sufficient on its own, 
however, Lowe:1998 ch.11.5 raises doubts about this. I think that by combining these two criteria we go 
some way to alleviating these doubts. Further, as I am not wedded to Armstrong’s ontology, I can borrow 
Lowe’s own criteria for individuating states of affairs (by which he means something ontologically innocent, 
as I do with my facts). 
23
 Armstrong:1997 p.134, see also, Armstrong:2004. 
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because of y (or because one believes x and y, rather than because one believes x and 
believes y). 
Armstrong 24  also denies that there are disjunctive states of affairs. Here it is 
perhaps useful to note his use of the truth-maker relation, because he says that a statement 
such as ‘the ball is red or it is round’ is made true by either the state of affairs of the ball 
being red, or the state of affairs of it being round, or by both, and therefore needs no 
special disjunctive fact as truth-maker. This might raise trouble for my use of facts, if I am 
to say that a rational action might require an agent to have a disjunctive belief, in place of a 
belief in one or the other, or both disjuncts. Because such a case would appear to show that 
the disjunctive belief must get at a fact that the combination of disjuncts cannot, perhaps 
hence a disjunctive fact. However, such a potentially problematic case is not possible. If it 
is rational for me to believe ‘either Jack or Bob are at the gallery’, and therefore to form a 
goal of going there, then it is equally rational for me to believe simply ‘Jack is at the 
gallery’ and therefore form the goal of going, or to believe ‘Bob is at the gallery’ and 
therefore form the goal of going, or to believe ‘Jack and Bob are at the gallery’, and 
therefore form the goal of going. This is because the disjunction can only be a reason if 
each of the disjuncts alone would be a reason.25 As non-disjunctive beliefs can step in for 
disjunctive ones, we needn’t suppose that disjunctive beliefs get at facts that the non-
disjunctive ones do not, nor hence posit disjunctive facts. 
One might worry that there could be a case in which it is rational to act on a 
disjunctive belief, but not on either disjunct, if one knows one or the other disjuncts to 
obtain but not which one obtains. However, this simply puts matters back a step, so we 
must consider the evidence for the disjunction, and unless this evidence must also be 
disjunctive, then, one can simply refer to these non-disjunctive evidential beliefs (and 
hence facts) in place of the disjunctive one. (Given that plausibly, at root, our evidence is 
non-disjunctive, as we do not see or experience disjunctions, then we can always step back 
from a disjunctive belief to non-disjunctive beliefs.) For example, I might believe that ‘one 
of my friends is at the gallery’, and also believe that ‘I have two friends, Bob and Jack’. I 
could therefore believe ‘either Bob or Jack are at the gallery’, and therefore form the goal 
of going there. But, plausibly, this disjunctive belief gives me a reason to form that goal, 
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 Armstrong:1997 p.134, see also, Armstrong:2004. 
25
 Perhaps there is a case in which the disjuncts provide different reasons, e.g. I believe either Jack is at the 
coffee shop or at the gallery, and hence form the goal of going to the gallery. I am not sure that this is a valid 
case, but even if one insists that it is, it can still only be plausible if one of the disjuncts would provide a 
reason for my action. 
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only because the non-disjunctive beliefs on which it was based gave me a reason (in this 
case my believing that one of my friends is at the gallery already makes my goal of going 
there rational). So again, it is plausible that rationality will never require an agent to have a 
disjunctive belief in place of a non-disjunctive one, nor hence, need we suppose that 
disjunctive beliefs get at facts that non-disjunctive ones do not, nor hence, that there are 
disjunctive facts. 
We should note, however, that in the preceding paragraph my opponent is really 
cheating. Because they are considering what beliefs an agent might rationally arrive at, and 
supposing they can only rationally arrive at the disjunctive belief, not a specific one. But, 
really this is a completely different issue to the one at hand, which is a matter of what 
beliefs an agent must have in order to act rationally. For example, it could be that an agent 
must believe Jack is in the gallery to act rationally, perhaps in telling someone where he is. 
If the agent cannot rationally have arrived at the belief that Jack is in the gallery because 
they lack sufficient evidence for that belief, then this does not alter the demand the action 
makes on the agent. It simply means that if the agent performs the act of telling someone 
where Jack is they are irrational at some stage, either in the formation of their specific 
belief, or, in their acting without the specific belief. However, it in no way follows from 
the fact that they cannot form the belief rationally, that an action cannot demand that belief. 
We can distinguish several types of general beliefs. For example, I might believe 
‘there is something such that it is my apple, and whatever is my apple is equal to that thing, 
and it is red’, ‘some apples are red’ or ‘all apples are red’.26 It is easiest to treat these cases 
separately. 
Armstrong does believe in general states of affairs, specifically, in totality states of 
affairs. Suppose that there are only two apples, the state of affairs that all the apples are red, 
will be a state of affairs over and above the state of affairs of the first apple, a1, being red, 
and the state of affairs of the second apple, a2, being red. (Armstrong supports this idea by 
noting that these two apples could exist and be red, but there also exist a further green 
apple, in which case there would not be a state of affairs of all the apples being red, even 
though there remained the state of affairs of a1 being red, and the state of affairs of a2 
being red.) In relation to such general facts Armstrong speaks of a totalling relation, which 
in our example binds all the apples, specifically, the totalling relation holds between the 
mereological whole composed of all the apples, taken as a particular, and the property 
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 Of course, there is a sense in which the first of these three is really just a combination of the latter two, but 
I think there is some worth in discussing it separately. 
122 
 
being an apple.27 The truth-maker for all apples being red, will hence involve a1 being red 
and a2 being red, and the totality state of affairs that these are all the apples. In my terms 
then, we can readily say that the belief that all the apples are red gets at a different state of 
affairs to the belief that a1 and a2 are red. Armstrong believes in totality states of affairs, 
so, I can readily admit that totality beliefs, beliefs concerning all the so-and-sos as all of 
the so-and-sos, capture different facts from non-totalling beliefs. Therefore, I can freely 
admit that rationality requires totalling beliefs in place of beliefs concerning each and 
every individual in the total. 
For Armstrong the belief that some apples are red will be made true by any state of 
affairs of an apple being red. For example, if a1 is red, this state of affairs will make it true 
that some apples are red, even if a2 is green and a1 and a2 are all the apples. To this extent 
Armstrong does not think there is a general state of affairs of some apples being red. We 
thus arrive at a potential difficulty for my position, if rationality can require an agent to 
have a some-belief (e.g. ‘some apples are red’) in place of any particular belief (e.g. ‘a1 is 
red’), then this would imply that the some-belief captures a fact not captured by any of the 
specific beliefs, perhaps hence a special some-fact. If I must admit that there are some-
facts, and Armstrong does not admit that there are some-states of affairs, then my facts 
cannot be identified with his states of affairs and I cannot simply adopt his ontology. The 
problem is similar to the disjunctive case, and so too is the solution. Such potentially 
problematic cases cannot arise, because if it were the case that some apple being red was a 
reason to act, plausibly, a1’s being red would also be a reason (or a2’s would). So it will 
not be the case that rationality requires a some-belief rather than a particular belief that 
would fall under this general one. For example, suppose I have reason to collect something 
red, and I know that some apples are red, and all the apples are in my room, then I could 
rationally form the goal of going to my room. However, I could equally rationally form 
this goal if I know that a1 is red, rather than merely that some apple is red. Rationality will 
not demand a some-belief in place of any specific belief, therefore, it needn’t be the case 
that there are some-facts over and above any specific facts. 
My concern with the third type of general belief is a concern whether the general 
belief ‘there is something such that it is my apple, and whatever is my apple is equal to that 
thing, and it is red’ and my specific belief ‘a1 is red’, supposing a1 to be my only apple. 
Now, it is clear that according to Armstrong’s theory there will be a difference in the states 
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 Armstrong:1997 ch.13, see also Armstrong:2004 ch.6. 
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of affairs these two beliefs pick out. The latter belief picks out a state of affairs composed 
by a1 and redness. The former belief arguably picks this state of affairs out too, but, it also 
picks out more besides. Specifically, it picks out a totality of all the things which have the 
property of being my apple.28 It follows that Armstrong can readily admit that the general 
belief captures something that the (supposed) specific belief does not, without postulating 
a specific type of states of affairs to account for this. I can readily say the same about the 
case of the facts at issue, and so can again coincide my view and Armstrong’s. 
This brings us finally to the case of negative beliefs, and hence negative facts. To a 
large extent Armstrong29 denies the existence of negative states of affairs, however, he 
believes that the totality states of affairs alluded to above are a form of negative state of 
affairs because they involve an element of ‘and nothing more’. Armstrong believes that 
with totality states of affairs we have all the states of affairs that are needed to provide 
truth-makers for negative statements. For example, the statement that there are no green 
apples will be made true by the state of affairs of a1 being red, and the state of affairs of a2 
being red, and the totality state of affairs that those are all the apples. At first blush it thus 
seems that without having a (strictly) negative state of affairs, Armstrong can nevertheless 
have a unique state of affairs to provide a truth-maker for a negative belief. However, this 
does not offer me a ready solution for dealing with a rational requirement for negative 
beliefs. The problem here becomes apparent when we think of the truth-maker that 
Armstrong might offer for the belief that there are no yellow apples. Presumably, 
Armstrong would give this belief the very same truth-maker as he gave the belief that there 
are no green apples, e.g. the states of affairs of a1 being red, a2 being red and the totality 
state of affairs that a1 and a2 are all the apples. But, it is plausible that rationality can 
demand an agent to have one of these beliefs in place of the other, and hence, that they 
ought to capture different facts. Thus, my facts and Armstrong’s states of affairs appear to 
part company. However, there is more of relevance to the beliefs than these truth-makers. 
For example, the fact that there are no green apples could also be made true by a set of 
states of affairs including the totality of the green objects, and the states of affairs that none 
of them are apples (the state of affairs that the first green object is a car, the state of affairs 
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 Armstrong:2004 p.72-3  recognizes that in such totality states of affairs reference will be made to 
potentially worrying – because overly abundant –  properties such as being my apple. However, he thinks 
they are harmless because they needn’t be anything over and above more familiar properties. 
29
 Armstrong:1997  ch.8.7, see also Armstrong:2004 ch.5. 
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that the second green object is a tree…etc) 30 . These states of affairs will not be of 
relevance to the belief that no apples are yellow, though this belief will be relevant to 
another set of states of affairs, i.e. the totality state of affairs of all the yellow objects, and, 
the states of affairs of those things not being apples. With these extra states of affairs in 
mind, then we do appear to have enough positive states of affairs to provide the reasons 
captured by negative beliefs that agents rationally act on; the belief that no apples are red 
will be linked to states of affairs that the belief that no apples are yellow is not linked to, 
and vice versa. Nonetheless, this suggestion also relies on it being plausible that rationality 
will not demand an agent to have a negative belief in place of a positive belief which 
captures the truth-makers just discussed. That is, it cannot be the case that rationality 
demands an agent to believe ‘there are no yellow apples’ in place of believing ‘a1 is red, 
a2 is red and a1 and a2 are all the apples’, or ‘y1 is a banana, y2 is the sun, and y1 and y2 
are all the yellow things’. If rationality were to make such a demand this would imply, via 
the argument from action, that the former belief captured a fact not captured by the latter 
two, perhaps a negative fact. However, fortunately such a demand appears unwarranted, 
because the positive states of affairs appear to provide all the reasons of the negative ones. 
It therefore appears that I needn’t posit any negative facts, and that the states of affairs that 
Armstrong considers as truth-makers for negative beliefs are plausibly all the states of 
affairs that are required to provide reasons in the cases at hand. 
In short, Armstrong takes states of affairs to be real, objective, and to form a 
plurality. He argues that there are totality states of affairs, but otherwise there are not 
general, negative, disjunctive or conjunctive states of affairs (at least these are no addition 
of being over the ‘logically’ simple states of affairs). Armstrong supports this view on the 
grounds that the states of affairs he posits are adequate to provide truth-makers for all 
truths. My facts can be identified with Armstrong’s states of affairs, as these are also 
sufficient to provide all the reasons one might need for rational actions. 
                                                 
30
 So when I say the states of affairs that none of them are apples, this should not be taken as a negative, 
rather we need only think of the various positive states of affairs composed of green objects and properties of 
being a ball, being a cabbage etc. (The same can be said for the other cases below.) (I am not sure that this is 
reliant on the fact that being a cabbage excludes being an apple, on the fact that nothing can be both an apple 
and a cabbage. However, if it does, it relates to a proposal that has been put forward that instead of some 
negative facts, we could make do with positive facts which exclude these negative ones (cf. Demos:1917). 
Armstrong:2004 ch.5.2.1 considers such a view, but finds it insufficient as it depends too much on the 
contingent nature of reality for whether or not all negatives are actually excluded, something which is not 
obvious, though plausibly there are enough exclusions for the types of cases that lead to this footnote (cf. 
Molnar:2000 and Rodriguez-Pereyra:2006).) 
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In discussing Armstrong’s position, it became clear that my notion of facts does not 
require that there are any conjunctive or disjunctive facts, and that it can also do away with 
negative and general facts, if it adopts totality facts. Other than these specifics concerning 
the types of facts that obtain, there is little to limit my notion of facts to one of a variety of 
ontologies. A pure trope theory will be realist and objective, and will distinguish a number 
of different facts, as would a nominalist ontology that adopts only particulars (not 
properties) and a multi-category ontology. 
The crucial limiting factor in fitting my facts to an ontology thus appears to be the 
types of facts I take to exist. Armstrong is not the only ontologist to posit fundamental 
entities of a slightly negative kind, Russell for example at times posits negative facts and 
general facts, and Martin posits absences.31 To this extent it appears to be plausible that my 
facts could be fitted to either Russell’s or Martin’s ontologies, though I will not defend this 
idea. Moreover, there is nothing essential to a pure trope, resemblance nominalist or multi-
category ontology that prevents them from adopting something analogous to Armstrong’s 
totality state of affairs, and the need for truth-makers for negative truths provides an 
independent reason for positing them.32 
My facts are then, realist, and plural, and involve totality facts. As such they can be 
neatly fitted to Armstrong’s ontology of states of affairs. Being so fitted they avoid the 
problems of Bradley’s regress and the slingshot argument. Further, being so fitted they 
gain the support that Armstrong’s states of affairs have, namely of providing truth-makers 
for all truths. Nonetheless, this notion of fact could doubtlessly also be accommodated into 
a variety of other ontological systems, should one wish. 
                                                 
31
 Respectively, Russell:1968 lect.III & V, Martin:1996, see also Beall:2000 (and similarly Barwise & 
Perry:1983), who offers a rather different proposal offering negative facts without real negativity by instead 
positing simply positive facts of different polarities (though perhaps for this reason his proposal is dubious).  
32
 An alternative would be to deny that there are negative facts. One could do this by either arguing that 
negative beliefs are never rationally required, or by suggesting that when they are this is because rather than 
acting as an awareness of reasons, they act as an awareness that there are no reasons. So, for example, when I 
believe that there is no milk in the fridge, I am not aware of a negative fact, but, I am aware that I have no 
reasons to look in the fridge for milk. This implies that I was wrong to say that beliefs are only required in 
order to act as a mode of awareness of reasons, now one should say that they can also be required to provide 
an awareness of a lack of reasons, where this lack needn’t be a reason nor hence a fact. But it is clear that this 
is irrelevant to the cases at hand, as knowing there are no reasons is being concerned with negatives, not 
positives, but the tense and first-personal cases arise for positives. I must believe ‘I am F.P.’, or ‘2pm is now’, 
where these are positive beliefs. Further, it is implausible to think that tense and the first-personal are 
required just to provide an awareness that reasons do not obtain, because such a denial of reasons could be 
done tenselessly if all reasons were tenseless. If I can get rid of negative facts, I can also get rid of totality 
ones, as they can be interpreted as negative ones ‘all the apples are red’ is akin to ‘it is not the case that there 
are any apples which are green or yellow or …’. 
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Summary 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the tenseless theory of time is wrong. I argued 
this by making use of the conclusions of previous chapters. Tensed beliefs are required for 
rational actions, and they cannot be replaced by tenseless beliefs in this role. However, the 
role of beliefs in rational actions is simply to provide an awareness of reasons, that is, facts. 
It follows that tensed and tenseless beliefs must involve an awareness of different facts, 
and hence, the tenseless theory is wrong. This is the argument from action. 
The argument from action makes clear what is demanded of my theory of facts. It 
must be realist, it must allow for there to be a plurality of facts, and, perhaps it must 
recognize the existence of totality facts. All of these demands are met by identifying my 
facts with Armstrong’s states of affairs, though they could plausibly also be met by other 
ontological theories. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-INDEXICAL CASES 
 
In the last chapter I argued that the need for tensed and first-personal beliefs in 
rational actions entails that these beliefs get at facts not got at by other beliefs: the 
argument from action. In this chapter I will show how my argument differs from issues of 
cognitive significance, such as Frege’s Puzzle1. Frege’s Puzzle, for instance, can show that 
a tensed and a tenseless belief must differ in cognitive content, and hence that they must be 
different beliefs. But my argument goes further by showing that this difference in beliefs 
relates to a difference in the actions that they make rational, and hence, to a difference in 
the facts that they concern. This discussion indicates that one might be able to apply a 
version of my argument to other beliefs. If rationality demands one belief in place of 
another then the two beliefs must involve an awareness of different reasons and hence 
facts. I will show that my argument from action is applicable to other cases, but that this is 
unproblematic as it simply fits with a common practice of explaining a difference in 
cognitive significance in terms of a difference in descriptive content. However, unlike the 
case with tensed and first-personal beliefs, the case of proper names etc. tells us little about 
our ontology, as any required facts are of a familiar form. 
In the course of this discussion it will appear that the argument from rationality 
presupposes a fine grained notion of actions, though I will show that it does not. 
 
7.1 Cognitive Significance 
 
What I shall refer to as Frege’s puzzle2, is a puzzle raised by Frege3 concerning the 
cognitive significance of proper names. It is generally trivial and uninformative to be told 
that “Dodgson is Dodgson”, but it is often informative to be told that “Dodgson is Carroll”. 
If one identified the meaning of a name simply with its referent, then assuming these 
identity statements are both true, the names ‘Dodgson’ and ‘Carroll’ would have the same 
meaning (I will call this the Millian view, as Mill offered a view like it in regard to 
names4). If one identified the cognitive significance of an utterance with its meaning, then 
it would follow that on the Millian view the two identity statements would have the same 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Frege:1980. 
2
 Following, e.g. Salmon:1986. 
3
 Frege:1980. 
4
 Cf. Mill:1884, the name is not my own, e.g. Lycan:2008 (though Mill also uses the term ‘name’ to refer to a 
number of expressions besides proper names). 
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cognitive significance, which Frege’s Puzzle shows that they do not. The implication of 
the puzzle is thus that either the meaning of a name is not simply its referent, or, the 
cognitive significance of a name is not simply its meaning. 
Very similar puzzles can also be shown to arise for expressions other than names. 
For example, although the two definite descriptions the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’, 
and the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’, denote the same person, namely 
Carroll (and hence Dodgson), it is generally trivial to be told that “the author of ‘Euclid 
and his Rivals’ is the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’” but it is informative to be told that 
“the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ is the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland’”. If one took the meaning of a definite description to be its denotation, and 
the meaning of an expression to give its cognitive significance, then one would expect 
these two utterances to share cognitive significance. But as one generally appears trivial 
whilst the other does not, then they do not share cognitive significance.5 
These puzzles immediately link with a second puzzle. If co-referring or co-
denoting expressions can have different cognitive significance, then utterances describing 
beliefs ought to pay heed to this fact, and to this end inter-substitution of co-referring/co-
denoting expressions often fails in such utterances. For example, if Jo does not know that 
Carroll and Dodgson are the same person, then Jo might believe that Carroll is making a 
mess, but not that Dodgson is. Jo believes Dodgson to be dark haired and careful man from 
when she was introduced to him at work, she believes Carroll to be blond and scruffy from 
when she met him at a party where he was in fancy-dress. So whilst it is true to say “Jo 
believes that Carroll is making a mess” it is false that “Jo believes that Dodgson is making 
a mess”. Explaining why substitution fails in these cases is the puzzle of substitution, an 
issue raised by Frege6 and exercised by Russell7 and many since8. I will refer to both 
puzzles together as the puzzles of cognitive significance. (I said that substitution usually 
fails in utterances describing beliefs, because there is a way of understanding such 
utterances according to which failure does not occur. There are so called de re beliefs, 
when we might say that, for example, Jo believes of the person that is Dodgson (and 
Carroll) that he is making a mess. This is taken by most to be a different case and I will not 
                                                 
5
 Again a similar puzzle arises for indexicals, as it is possible to find “this is that” informative, even if the 
two demonstratives pick out the same object, and despite the thought that it is generally trivial to be told that 
something is self-identical. (Cf. Perry:1977.) 
6
 Frege:1980. 
7
 Russell:1905 &  1968. 
8
 E.g. Quine:1956. 
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focus on it here. Though Perry’s argument shows that de re beliefs do not do away with the 
essential indexicals9.) 
The problem of the essential indexical as raised by Perry could be seen as a further 
puzzle of cognitive significance, for example, if I am F.P., and I can fail to know that I am, 
then it appears that the two expressions ‘I’ and ‘F.P.’ will have different cognitive 
significance for me. Moreover, if I must believe “I am making a mess” rather than “F.P. is 
making a mess”, then perhaps this is because the two beliefs have different cognitive 
significance for me. Similarly, even if it is now 2pm, I might not know that, and so ‘now’ 
and ‘2pm’ will have different cognitive significance for me.  
If one was an ardent Millian then one might take the puzzles of cognitive 
significance to show that many apparently co-referring names in fact do not co-refer, 
Carroll is not Dodgson, and this is why “Dodgson is Dodgson” is trivial but “Dodgson is 
Carroll” is not trivial (but in fact false). Similarly one might insist that many apparently 
co-denoting definite descriptions do not co-denote. This would be a rather implausible 
conclusion to draw; the examples I have already given imply that a person can have two 
names and yet another can fail to know this. Similarly, a person can fulfil more than one 
definite description. 
In short, the puzzles of cognitive significance appear not to warrant the conclusion 
that a person cannot have two names. Noting the link between the puzzles of cognitive 
significance and the case of the essential indexical might hence lead one to say that we 
ought not to be led by this latter case to conclude that my belief ‘I am making a mess’ [or 
my 2pm belief ‘I must leave now’] concerns different facts from my belief ‘F.P. is making 
a mess’ [or ‘I must leave at 2pm’]. However, it is important to notice that the argument 
from action goes far beyond an issue of cognitive significance. The point of my discussion 
of reasons and rationality is to show that it is not enough to explain the essential role of 
indexical beliefs to say that they have a different cognitive significance to non-indexical 
ones. Rather, a rational demand for an indexical belief must be a demand for a belief 
which is an awareness of a particular fact. Undoubtedly such a belief will also have a 
different cognitive significance, but if indexical beliefs and non-indexical beliefs merely 
differed in their cognitive significance, then rationality would not require one in place of 
the other. Therefore, we should not equate the argument from action with the puzzles of 
cognitive significance. 
                                                 
9
 Perry:1979. 
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7.2 The Application of the Argument from Action to Non-indexical Cases 
 
With the puzzles of cognitive significance in mind, one might wonder if the 
argument from action can be applied to other cases. That is, if two co-referring names, for 
example, can have different cognitive significance, then, might an agent be rational to act 
on a belief involving one name and not on a belief involving a co-referring one? 
Before considering this question I should say something of the assumptions of my 
discussion. In addressing the above question I will spend some time looking at theories of 
meaning or semantics. These theories clearly tell one primarily about language and uses of 
language, about sentences and utterances, whilst my argument concerns beliefs. However, 
I have characterised beliefs partly in terms of a propensity to accept or assent to certain 
utterances or sentences. It follows, that if utterances/sentences differ in meaning, then the 
associated beliefs will also differ. Further, that if grasping the meaning of an 
utterance/sentence involves grasping certain facts, then those facts must also be grasped in 
the corresponding beliefs. Therefore, a discussion about semantics will aid a discussion of 
beliefs. Further, whilst one might be hesitant to simply identify cognitive significance and 
meaning, it appears plausible that utterances/sentences with different meaning will have 
different cognitive significances, so a focus on semantics is again legitimate. 
Suppose that a person has two names, ‘Harry’ and ‘Will’. Further, suppose that 
although I am familiar with both names I do not know that they denote the same person. If 
I am told that Harry is in danger, then I might form the belief ‘Harry is in danger’, hence 
being aware of a reason to help Harry. In such a case it seems to be rational for me to form 
the goal giving desire to help Harry, but, it does not appear to be rational for me to form 
the goal giving desire to help Will, as for all I know Will is perfectly safe. Alternatively, if 
I formed the belief ‘Will is in danger’, then it would appear rational for me to adopt the 
goal of helping Will, but not necessarily of helping Harry. It thus seems as if rationality 
can demand a particular name involving belief in place of a different co-referential name 
involving belief. It follows that the argument from action ought to apply in this case too. 
Similar considerations arise for the case of definite descriptions. It is possible that 
one person both fixed my car last summer, and, lives next door to me now. Further it is 
possible that I do not know that one person satisfies both of these definite descriptions. If 
this is the case then it would seem that there is something irrational in my forming an 
intention to help the person who lives next door to me now, on forming the belief ‘the 
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person who fixed my car last summer is in danger’. Conversely, it seems irrational of me 
to adopt the goal of helping the person who fixed my car last summer, on the basis of 
forming the belief ‘the person who lives next door to me now is in danger’. Again, it 
appears that rationality might demand one definite description involving belief in place of 
another co-denoting definite description involving belief. Therefore, the argument from 
action ought also to apply in this case.10 
This places a certain demand on the argument from action. Rational action, as I 
have defended it, concerns actions one chooses to perform for a reason for that action. 
Belief’s sole role in this is to provide an awareness of the reason at issue. Similarly, the 
goal an agent has in a rational action is simply to perform that action. The belief must be 
an awareness of a fact which is a reason to perform the act which one has as a goal. It 
follows that my belief ‘Harry is in danger’ must be an awareness of a different fact from 
my belief ‘Will is in danger’, because the former, unlike the latter, can combine with my 
desire to help Harry in a rational action. Conversely, it appears [though I will subsequently 
deny this] that the actions I adopt as goals in desiring to help Harry and desiring to help 
Will must also be different, as the former, unlike the latter, can combine with my belief 
‘Harry is in danger’ in a rational action. More generally, if two beliefs involving different 
co-referring names can play different roles in rational actions, then they must concern 
different facts. It also appears two desires involving different co-referring names can play 
different roles in rational actions, then they must concern different actions. Further, if two 
beliefs involving different co-denoting definite descriptions can play different roles in 
rational actions, then they must concern different facts, and, if two desires involving two 
different co-denoting definite descriptions can play different roles in rational actions, then 
                                                 
10
 However, I am not sure it makes sense to say an agent must have a belief involving one demonstrative 
rather than another. Still, there is scope for me to address this case as I address the cases of names and 
descriptions below. According to many theories of demonstratives an agent must recognize the referent of a 
demonstrative to be playing a particular role in a context in order to understand the use of the demonstrative. 
It follows that one will have to recognize different things in understanding different demonstratives. In short, 
the different demonstratives will involve capturing different facts, even if these facts are not part of the truth-
evaluable content of the utterances at issue (e.g. the fact that x is the most salient thing in context y, is a 
different fact from the fact that x is the most salient thing in context z, if the two contexts y and z are 
different). For example, some say you must recognize the referent as the thing demonstrated (e.g. 
Kaplan:1989a, Reimer:1991a, perhaps, Salmon:2002), others say that you must recognize it as the most 
salient thing in the context (e.g. Wettstein:1984, Reimer:1991b), or as the object of the speakers intention in 
the context (e.g. Kaplan:1989b, Bach:1992a & 1992b), or as the thing in a particular spatiotemporal relation 
to the speaker in the context (e.g. McGinn:1981)(these distinctions are not necessarily exclusive of one 
another, and are rather rough, with some proponents falling into more than one group, and proponents within 
one group differing in detail). Thus the argument from action is vindicated in the case of demonstratives. 
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apparently they must concern different actions. In the following sections of this chapter I 
will argue that this is quite plausible, I will first address the case with beliefs and facts, and 
subsequently that with desires and actions. 
 
7.3 Co-Reference & Distinct Facts: Names & Definite Descriptions 
 
Frege’s11 answer to the puzzles of cognitive significance was to turn to the mode of 
presentation of the referent, which he termed the sense of the expression. Each referring 
expression was to have a sense as well as a referent. The sense of a sentence containing 
such referring expressions would be composed by the sense of these expressions and 
would give the thought captured by this sentence; where this thought may be considered as 
the proposition expressed by the sentence. The complete sentence itself will refer to either 
The True, or The False, unless it is embedded within a further sentence, in which case it 
will refer to its usual (i.e. unembeded) sense. 
Suppose that the sense expressed by the name ‘Charles Dodgson’ was the author of 
‘Euclid and his Rivals’, and that that expressed by ‘Lewis Carroll’ was the author of 
‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’. These were the guises under which the names 
presented their referents. Then, the thought expressed by an utterance of ‘Charles Dodgson 
studied at oxford’, would be the thought ‘the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ studied at 
oxford’. It would therefore be quite distinct from the thought expressed by ‘Lewis Carroll 
studied at Oxford’, which would be the thought ‘the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland’ studied at Oxford’. Nevertheless, the two sentences would designate the 
same referent, namely The True, and the names composing those two sentences would also 
designate the same referent, specifically, the man who wrote both ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ 
and ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’. Thus Frege’s puzzle of identity is answered as 
although the utterances “Carroll is Carroll” and “Carroll is Dodgson” share truth-value and 
referent, they nevertheless differ in meaning, as they have different senses as their 
component expressions have different senses, and therefore they will differ in cognitive 
significance. 
In describing beliefs we embed one sentence within another, for example, the 
sentence ‘Carroll is making a mess’ stands alone as a complete expression with a truth-
value, however, it is emended in another sentence when we say “Jo believes that Carroll  is 
                                                 
11
 E.g. Frege:1980. 
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making a mess”. When a sentence is thus embedded Frege says that it refers to the sense it 
would have if it was not embedded. Because of this although the two sentences ‘Carroll is 
making a mess’ and ‘Dodgson is making a mess’ will share truth-value and referent when 
they are not embedded, when they are embedded, their referents become their usual sense. 
Unembeded these two sentences have different senses, and therefore, once embedded they 
have different referents. Thus it is clear that we shouldn’t expect to be able to substitute the 
name ‘Carroll’ occurring within one, for the name ‘Dodgson’ occurring within the other. 
The puzzle of substitution is avoided. 
Frege’s solution applies in a similar way to the case of definite descriptions. The 
definite description the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’, will have the same 
denotation as the definite description the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’, but the two will 
have different senses. In fact, in this case it is plausible to assume that the former definite 
description, insofar as it captures the sense of the name ‘Carroll’, will share a sense with 
that name, that is, the definite description and the name alike will present Carroll as the 
author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’. 
Russell12 offers a different solution to the puzzles of cognitive significance based 
on an analysis of definite descriptions such as the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland’. He takes an utterance using a definite description to make a number of 
claims. For example, “The author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’ is making a 
mess” means that, at least one thing authored ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’, at most 
one thing authored ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’, and whatever authored ‘Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland’ is making a mess. For Russell, definite descriptions thus have 
the logical form – even if not a surface grammatical form – of quantified sentences in 
which the definite description does not appear.13 Thus for Russell definite descriptions do 
not refer, though they do denote whatever object uniquely fulfils the description. This 
enables us to see that co-denoting definite descriptions will mean quite different things. 
For example, “The author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ is making a mess” will mean, there is 
at least one thing that wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’, there is at most one thing that wrote 
‘Euclid and his Rivals’, and whatever wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ is making a mess. So 
although the definite descriptions co-denote, they have quite different meanings, and hence 
cognitive significance. 
                                                 
12
 E.g. Russell:1905, 1919 ch.XVI, and, 1968 lect.VI. 
13
 This enables Russell to deal with a number of other puzzles, such as how to make sense of non-referring 
names, or non-denoting definite descriptions (cf. Russell:1905). 
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Russell argues that all apparently referring expressions (except for the indexicals 
‘this’ or ‘that’ and ‘I’) are in fact disguised or abbreviated definite descriptions.14 Because 
of this, Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions can also deal with the problems of 
cognitive significance as they arise concerning names. For example, the name ‘Carroll’ 
will in fact express a definite description which denotes Carroll, perhaps ‘the author of 
‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’’. 15  The name ‘Dodgson’ will express a different 
definite description though one that also denotes Carroll, perhaps ‘the author of ‘Euclid 
and his Rivals’’. Therefore, despite sharing a denotation, the two names will mean quite 
different things. 
I will refer to Frege’s and Russell’s theories as descriptive theories. They are 
theories of the way words refer, or, in Russell’s case, denote. Both of these theories 
encourage the view that sentences containing different co-referring/denoting names can be 
expected to capture different facts. This is because the different senses, or definite 
descriptions, associated with different names, capture different facts, as for example, the 
fact that someone wrote ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’, is quite distinct from the fact 
that someone wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’. Using Russell’s analysis of definite 
descriptions16 it is clear that, for example, “Carroll is in Oxford” and “Dodgson is in 
Oxford” capture different facts. The former will (we are supposing) capture the fact that 
someone both wrote ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’ and is in Oxford, whilst the latter 
will capture the fact that someone both wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ and is in Oxford. To 
this degree the argument from action is thus vindicated (notice that Frege’s and Russell’s 
theories have independent support, so utilising them to support the argument from action is 
not an ad hoc manoeuvre). 
However, both Frege’s and Russell’s theories have come under attack, most 
noticeably from Kripke.17 Kripke criticized Frege’s and Russell’s views, arguing: K1, that 
a person needn’t be able to associate a definite description with a name to be able to refer 
                                                 
14
 E.g. Russell:1919 ch.XVI, and, 1968 lect.II, for ‘this’ anyway, perhaps Russell changes his mind about ‘I’, 
e.g. Russell:1910 and 1995. 
15
 It is hard to find one description that could be a name or its sense, for this reason some have offered a view 
according to which names correspond to clusters of definite descriptions (cf. Searle:1958 and 
Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.79). 
16
 Russell’s theory of definite descriptions has been criticized quite independently from the idea that names 
are abbreviated definite descriptions, for example, by Strawson:1950 and Donnellan:1966, who both insist 
that definite descriptions can refer. However, Kripke:1977 has defended Russell’s analysis, arguing that it 
captures the semantic nature of definite descriptions, which is distinct from pragmatic fact that such 
descriptions can be used by speakers to refer. For more recent discussion see Neal:1990 ch.3. 
17
 Cf. Kripke:1981, see also Marcus:1961. 
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with it; K2, that being able to associate a definite description with a name is not sufficient 
to enable someone to refer with it; and finally, K3, that definite descriptions and names 
have different logical shapes, that is, they act differently in modal contexts.18 
Kripke gives argument K1 by considering a case in which a person appears to be 
able to use a name meaningfully, despite not knowing anything uniquely individuating of 
the person. The example Kripke gives concerns Richard Feynman. Many people can use 
his name and know something about who they are referring to, for example, that he was an 
American physicist, however, many people know little more than this about him. Crucially, 
they do not appear to know enough about him to distinguish him from Gell-Mann, another 
famous American physicist. Yet despite this, it is clear these people can talk meaningfully 
about Feynman by using his name. It appears to follow that the name is not associated with 
a definite description for these individuals, and therefore this cannot be the mechanism 
through which the name refers/denotes.  
Kripke gives argument K2 by considering a case in which a person associates a 
definite description with a name, but the description applies to someone other than the 
referent of the name. Kripke invites us to imagine that Godel, whom is commonly taken to 
have been the first person to have proven Incompleteness (a definite description), in fact 
copied the proof from little known Schmidt. In such a case it would seem that we all still 
refer to Godel in using his name, even if Schmidt is the person who is captured by the 
definite description associated with the name. More generally it seems that we can be 
mistaken about the things we refer to with names. It thus appears that associating a definite 
description with a name is not sufficient for referring/denoting with that name, contra 
Frege and Russell. 
Kripke gives argument K3 by distinguishing between rigid designators and non-
rigid designators, where the former, unlike the latter, pick out the same individual in all 
possible worlds. For example, although Dodgson wrote ‘Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland’, it is true to say “It is possible that Dodgson was not the author of ‘Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland’” whereas it is false to say “It is possible that Dodgson was not 
Dodgson”. This is because the name Dodgson picks out the same person in every possible 
world. However, a definite description, such as the author of ‘Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland’, will pick out different individuals in different possible worlds. For example, 
in a world where Dodgson did not write that book, but instead Orwell did, then the definite 
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 Kripke:1981. 
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description will pick out Orwell not Dodgson. In short, names appear to be rigid 
designators, whilst definite descriptions appear to be non-rigid designators, so it makes 
little sense to suppose the latter can give the meaning of the former.19 A second aspect of 
this problem for the descriptive theories, is that if they were correct then an utterance such 
as “if Dodgson exists then they wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’” would be necessarily true 
and a priori, because it would mean something like if the author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ 
exists then they wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’, which is necessarily true, and knowable a 
priori. But, in fact, the utterance “if Dodgson exists then they wrote ‘Euclid and his 
Rivals’” appears to be neither necessary nor knowable a priori. I’ll call this K3i. 
Despite their strong appearance, Kripke’s criticisms against the descriptive theories 
have all been responded to, largely by arguing that Kripke focused (as perhaps Russell and 
Frege encouraged) on the wrong descriptions. 
It has been argued that, contra to K1, there will always be a definite description of 
the referent of a name available to a speaker. For example, users of the name ‘Feynmann’, 
can associate with this name the definite description the person named ‘Feynmann’, or the 
description the person who is the causal origin of the information that I associate with the 
name ‘Feynmann’.20 Such definite descriptions, or ones like them, will concern Feynmann, 
and will always be available to users of his name.21 Jackson22 has in fact argued for the 
necessary availability of descriptions from data used by Kripke himself. In K3 Kripke 
makes use of our ability to judge what a name refers to in different possible worlds, 
Jackson argues that this ability itself reveals that users of a name have in mind a stock of 
properties that they associate with bearer of the name and that they utilises to make these 
                                                 
19
 There is an awkwardness in applying this argument to certain interpretations of Frege. For Frege speaks of 
the sense of an expression as the mode of presentation of its referent, and although he says that this might be 
captured by a definite description, one might wonder whether the object presented is an essential part of the 
mode of presentation. In fact, Evans:1982 has argued that it ought to be thought of as such. I will not discuss 
this issue further here, save to say that, even if the referent is taken to be an essential ingredient to the mode 
of presentation, it is still plausible that different modes of presentation give different facts because they give 
different facts about the referent. 
20
 Cf. Bach:1981, Loar:1980, and Geurts:1997. 
21
 Kripke’s own theory is that a name refers through a causal link back to a baptism in which the name is 
given to the referent. This causal link is what is being made use of in descriptions of these types. 
22
 Jackson:1998b. This is criticized by Soames:2005a & 2005b for being too powerful, however, 
Jackson:2007 responds accepting its potency, but denying this undermines it.  
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decisions.23 A disjunction of such properties could be used to form a definite description 
capturing the referent of a name.24 
K2 is in part responded to by the response to K1, as there it is shown that a speaker 
will always be able to associate an accurate definite description with a name that they use. 
All that is required is then to distinguish this accurate description from other descriptions a 
speaker might associate with a name. If the description at issue is of the form indicated by 
Jackson, then this distinction is accomplished, as only the (disjunctive) definite description 
that a speaker takes to pick out a referent when considering different possible worlds need 
be taken as that which plays a crucial role in determining the referent/denotation of a name. 
Kripke himself notes that some definite descriptions are rigid designators, for 
example, the definite description the positive square root of four will denote two in every 
possible world. More generally, other definite descriptions can be rigidified by including a 
modifier such as ‘actually’, for example, the actual author of ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ will 
pick out Dodgson in every possible world (as whatever world we consider, it remains the 
case that in the actual world Dodgson was the author).25 It follows that insisting that names 
are rigid designators needn’t rule out definite descriptions from providing the meaning of 
names (all that it does appear to rule out is non-rigid definite descriptions providing the 
meaning of a rigid name). Dummett26 instead emphasizes a point noted by Russell27, that a 
definite description can be interpreted to take wide scope in modal contexts. For example, 
we can interpret “It is possible that Carroll didn’t visit Oxford” in two ways. If we take the 
description to have narrow scope the utterance means something like it is possible that 
exactly one thing wrote Euclid and his rivals and it did not visit Oxford. In this 
interpretation the utterance will be true if and only if there is a possible world in which 
someone authored ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ and did not visit Oxford (whether or not Carroll 
was the author in that world). In essence, the definite description will act akin to a non-
rigid designator. However, if we interpret the utterance in such a way that the definite 
description has wide scope we end up with something like, there is exactly one thing which 
                                                 
23
 Cf. Plantinga:1978b who takes the descriptive content to capture the essence of the referent of a name. 
24
 Kripke:1981 p.44 is careful to stress that possible worlds are stipulated not discovered, meaning that we 
needn’t identify a referent in a possible world via its properties. However, this does not really seem to 
undermine Jackson’s point, which could be put in terms of our willingness to stipulate a world in which a 
referent has certain qualities, but not one in which they lack those qualities.  
25
 Alternatively one could use something like Kaplan’s dthat operator, see Kaplan:1970. 
26
 Dummett:1973 p.110-151.  
27
 Russell:1905 was also clearly aware of this distinction of scope, and made use of it, even if not directly as 
is required here. 
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wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’ and it is possible that that thing did not visit Oxford. This 
will only be the case in worlds in which Carroll did not visit Oxford (whether or not he 
wrote ‘Euclid and his Rivals’) and hence will give us the results Kripke desired.28 
Closing the gap between definite descriptions and rigid designators in this way 
undermines several aspects of K3. However, more must be said to deal with the apparent 
descriptivist conclusion that, for example, “if Carroll exists then they wrote ‘Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland’” will be necessarily true and knowable a priori, that is, K3i. 
The lesson from the response to K1, is that the descriptions that give the meaning 
of names will not be of a form like the author of ‘Euclid and his rivals’. In fact, bearing in 
mind what has been said about rigidity, we might take the description associated with the 
name ‘Carroll’ to be more like the person actually referred to by the name ‘Carroll’. The 
supposed problematic sentences raised in K3i would thus be of the form ‘If Carroll exists 
then they are the person actually referred to by the name ‘Carroll’’. This sentence is, 
according to the descriptivist29 and the worry of K3i, a necessary sentence that a language 
user would be able to know a priori. However, this sentence is plausibly both necessary 
and a priori. The rigidifying nature of ‘actually’ means that if Carroll has been, as he has, 
actually referred to by the name ‘Carroll’, then it is necessary that he has. There is no 
counterfactual situation, no possible world, the consideration of which will show that in 
the actual world Carroll has not been so referred to. The idea that this can be known a 
priori might be less obvious, one might wonder, for example, how Carroll’s mother can 
have known he would be called ‘Carroll’ the first time she used his name. But, I take it that 
this, if anything, simply shows that the description being considered cannot have been the 
meaning of the name when it was first used. This could be because until first used, that is 
until first introduced into the language, the name simply lacked a meaning. Alternatively, 
                                                 
28
 Soames:1998 has argued against this use of scope, on the grounds that it does not work in particular 
complex cases, e.g. in some propositional attitude contexts, however, it is not clear that a more complicated 
rule than the simple ‘names take wide scope in modal contexts’ cannot be offered to account for such cases. 
Soames:2005b p.423 later admits this possibility, however, he thinks that the earlier problems associated 
with K1 will still raise trouble for the descriptivist. Jackson:2007 p.26  responds to Soames’ argument by 
suggesting that there are a variety of complications involved in propositional attitude reports which must be 
taken into consideration (though Jackson is primarily concerned with description rigidified by ‘actually’ 
rather than with talk of scope). 
29
 I am assuming simple descriptivist theories like Frege’s and Russell’s, there is of course scope to say that 
descriptions fix reference or denotation but to insist that they are not to be considered in determining the 
truth-value of a sentence, this being determined by the referent/denotation. (Recanati:1993 divides these two 
roles.) 
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one might take it that we are simply dealing with the wrong description.30 If Jackson is 
right, then there will be another description available, and further, if it plays the role of 
defining the modal nature of the name (picking out its referent in different possible worlds), 
then it must be that the object fits this description of necessity.31 
In this way I take it that descriptive theories, or variants thereof, can be made 
plausible despite attacks such as Kripke’s. If a descriptive theory of some sort is correct, 
then this means different names will have different information associated with them, that 
is, they will capture different facts. As, for example, the fact that Carroll is actually called 
‘Carroll’ is a different fact from the fact that he is actually called ‘Dodgson’. To this extent 
the argument from action is vindicated, even if rationality can demand one name involving 
belief in place of another different co-referring/co-denoting name involving belief. 
Nevertheless, a defence of the argument from action does not require the adoption 
of a descriptive theory of names, because such a theory is not the only theory that supports 
the idea that sentences differing only over their containing different co-referring/denoting 
names – and hence related name involving beliefs – will capture different facts. Rather, 
many theories make use of this to account for the puzzles of cognitive significance. 
Besides the idea that the descriptive/informational content is part of the meaning of a 
sentence in the sense intended by descriptive theories, one might instead say it is part of 
the semantic content but plays a different role32, or one might say it is part of the pragmatic 
content. 
For example, Soames33, in defending a non-descriptive theory, suggests that whilst 
co-referring names34 will have the same semantic content, namely their referent, one name 
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 It could even be that the name has different descriptions associated with it by different speakers, though 
this would of course put pressure on the notion of meaning (cf. Jackson:1998b p.214-15). 
31
 A more detailed discussion of the issues of a prioricity and necessity can be found in discussions of two-
dimensional semantics, which allow for contingent a priori beliefs, and necessary a posteriori beliefs, by 
distinguishing two dimensions of meaning, for example, one which gives the referent of a term in a possible 
world considered as counterfactual, and one that gives the referent of a term in a possible world considered 
as actual. Cf. Davies & Humberstone:1980, and Jackson:1998a ch.2. Jackson utilizes two-dimensional 
semantics within a descriptive theory of meaning, though the two needn’t coincide (e.g. Chalmers:2006 
makes it clear that he is not committed to descriptivism by his brand of two-dimensional semantics, and 
Davies & Humberstone:1980 and Kaplan:1989a do not apply their two-dimensional framework to proper 
names). 
32
 E.g. D’Cruz:2000 and Evans:1973. 
33
 Soames:2002 ch.2. In a different way see Recanati:1993, who, although he associates a description with a 
name, does not intend the description to play quite those roles envisioned by Frege and Russell, as he takes 
the description to fix the referent of a name but not to enter into the proposition expressed. Even if the 
description is removed from the propositional content, as Recanati does, this does not undermine my position, 
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will often be used rather than another co-referring one, as they will express different 
information, different descriptive content. In saying this Soames takes himself to be 
furthering, if also correcting, the thoughts of Kripke, however, I will not go into this non-
descriptivist theory in detail here. 
One important difference between Soames’ theory and the descriptive theories 
discussed is that Soames takes the difference in information captured by different co-
referring names to be in some sense context sensitive.35 This might lead one to worry 
whether it can fulfil the role I need. However, this difference in descriptive content is 
introduced in part to deal with the puzzles of cognitive significance, and it is precisely 
when one takes two names to have a different cognitive significance that one might take 
the argument from action to apply to the case of name involving beliefs. It follows, that 
even if Soames does not think that a difference in descriptive content will always arise for 
co-referring names, he will take it to arise in all cases where the argument from action 
takes it to. 
More generally, one might be tempted to think that co-referring names share a 
semantic value, but that the puzzles of cognitive significance can be explained simply by 
individuals associating different information with different co-referring names, because 
they are ignorant of the co-reference. 36  If one adopted this approach to cognitive 
significance then this simple theory ought also to accommodate the argument from action. 
Because, this simple theory already implies that the agent will be capturing different 
descriptive content, facts, when having beliefs involving different co-referring names. (I 
                                                                                                                                                   
because all I require is that an individual is aware of different facts, whether or not these fall within the scope 
of the proposition expressed or the truth-conditions of the utterance. 
34
 At least, names lacking descriptive content, unlike names such as ‘Durham University’. 
35
 Again, my concern is with beliefs rather than with utterances, however, it is plausible to think that if 
utterances would carry different information in a particular context, then associated beliefs would too. 
Soames’ talk of different information being conveyed is in part reliant on the epistemic state of the listeners, 
something which appears to be absent in the case of beliefs. However, I think there is a sense in which, in 
talking of another’s beliefs we place ourselves in a context, and in this way there is scope to find a surrogate 
for Soames’ listener in the belief case. More generally, as we can imagine an individual deliberately using 
one name rather than another in a situation, we can also imagine him having one belief rather than another. 
36
 E.g. such an idea is explicit in McMullen:1985, and I take it also to be implicit in form in ideas given by 
Perry himself in more recent work e.g. Perry:1997, 1998, and 2006. In these works Perry talks about storing 
information in different files, files plausibly differing between uses of names and uses of the first-personal 
indexical, even if the names and the indexical are co-referential. Thus my believing ‘Carroll is making a 
mess’ will entail me associating the individual making mess with being a philosopher, whereas my believing 
‘Dodgson is making a mess’ will not involve me taking the mess maker to be a philosopher, but instead with 
me taking them to be a mathematician, even though the thoughts, unbeknownst to me, concern the same 
person. These consequences also appear to follow from Alward:2009’s position despite his moving away 
from Perry’s talk of files, and instead talking of teams of cognitive relations. 
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admit the exact way this further content is involved is here left unclear, but, it is clear that 
it must be involved in a strong way as it effects cognitive significance; the further facts 
impinge upon the persons conscious states of awareness.) 
Thus, it is plausible to think that beliefs involving different co-denoting definite 
descriptions will capture different facts. Because the beliefs will, in accord with Russell’s 
theory of descriptions,37 pick out different facts as being the case.38 In part because of this, 
it is also plausible to think that beliefs involving different co-referring or co-denoting 
names will capture different facts in a way that vindicates the argument from action. This 
follows straightforwardly if one adopts a descriptive theory of names, which is a view with 
independent plausibility, and a view that continues to hold supporters. However, even if 
one does not adopt a descriptive theory, this needn’t damn the argument from action, as is 
revealed by Soames’ theory and a temptation to explain cognitive significance in terms of 
information associated with an expression. 
 
7.4 Natural Kind Terms & the Argument from Action 
 
As it is possible that the argument from action applies to beliefs involving co-
referring/denoting names and definite descriptions, it is also plausible that it can apply to 
beliefs involving co-denoting/referring natural kind terms. For example, it could be that 
the terms ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ both denote the natural kind water, but that an individual can 
fail to know this, and the terms can have different cognitive significance for such an 
individual. It would appear to be rational for a person like this, upon forming the belief 
that drinking water is good for their health, to adopt the goal of drinking water. But, it 
would be irrational of them, upon forming that belief, to adopt the goal of drinking H2O, 
because for all they know this is a highly poisonous substance used by chemists. 
                                                 
37
 It is worth noting, that various criticisms of Russell’s theory often still presuppose the idea that different 
definite-description involving beliefs will capture different facts. This is shown, for example, in the case of 
Strawson:1950 by the fact that that the use of the definite description to refer presupposes the ability to 
recognize the referent as fulfilling the criteria stated by the description, that is, to recognize that it is the case 
that, for example, Carroll is referred to by the name ‘Carroll’. Similarly, Donnellan:1966 thinks that although 
the referent needn’t fulfil the criteria associated with the definite description (language users might be wrong 
about the world), the referent should nonetheless be taken to fulfil the criteria, or be recognized as being 
taken to. 
38
 Cf. Chisholm:1970 especially p.21-22 for a different argument that they are distinct facts, on the grounds 
that they entail different counterfactuals. 
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It follows that the argument from action could also apply to beliefs involving 
different co-denoting kind terms, and hence, that in order to make the argument from 
action plausible it must be plausible that such beliefs can capture different facts. I will not 
defend this idea in great detail, save to note that the discussion of kind terms overlaps the 
discussion of names, with many of the same issues arising alike in both fields, and in fact, 
with many writers covering the two cases side by side.39 
The puzzles of cognitive significance can be recast using kind terms, for example, 
it is often trivial to be told “water is water”, but informative to be told “water is H2O”. 
One can suggest that kind terms do not refer, but that they denote as names do, by being 
disguised definite descriptions. If this idea is correct, it can account for the puzzles of 
cognitive significance.40 Nonetheless, to make this idea plausible, it must be detailed in 
such a way as to account for Kripke’s criticisms, which can also be recast using kind terms. 
But again, as Kripke’s worries can be met in the case of names, they can be met for the 
case of kind terms, for example, water might be associated with the rigidified definite 
description the stuff actually referred to as ‘water’. 
Nevertheless, introducing these issues to natural kind terms too raises a further 
problem for the descriptivist approach. According to descriptivism, an expression 
refers/denotes by being associated with a definite description. But this of course raises the 
question of how the terms in the definite description themselves refer/denote. It could be 
that they also refer/denote via associated definite descriptions, however, we cannot carry 
on with this pattern (for the reference of the terms of these further descriptions, and so on), 
otherwise we would be launched on an infinite regress or around in a circle,41 apparently 
entailing the referent/denotation of a term could never be established.42 
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 This is clear in many of the works cited in the previous section, however, Soames:2002 does believe that 
the case of names and kind terms must be treated differently. 
40
 The puzzle of substitution perhaps goes beyond the other puzzles, and arguably requires more to be said, 
but it is the other puzzles that are of my primary concern. 
41
 It is important to note that we are here concerned with a theory of reference/denotation, which appears to 
render the regress or circle vicious. Some people have defended a form of linguistic wholism according to 
which the meaning of each expression is dependent upon the meaning of every other (cf. Wittgenstein:2001b 
pt.I sect.199, Quine:1951, and Davidson:2001e). But it appears that wholism works on the assumption that 
all words are equal, so that a definition tells you as much about the definians as about the definiendum. 
However, the descriptive theory of reference appears to place words on a hierarchy, you must understand the 
associated description, before, or independently of, understanding the expression whose sense it provides. If I 
am wrong about this, and descriptivism doesn’t entail a hiarachical approach to language, then wholism 
might provide a response to the worry I’m outlining in the text here. 
42
 E.g., Devitt:1996 p.159, as discussed by Jackson:1998b. Part of Devitt’s point is that, if we have to accept 
a form of reference which is not descriptive, then it is better to apply this to names and natural kind terms too. 
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One way to answer this worry is to suggest that there are a number of terms whose 
reference/denotation are not fixed by definite descriptions. Chalmers43 defends an idea like 
this, speaking of semantically neutral or qualitative terms. These are terms for which the 
two-dimensions (reference to possible worlds as counterfactual, and as actual) would 
provide no difference in reference/denotation. Chalmers gives as examples the terms: ‘and’, 
‘philosopher’, ‘friend’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘cause’.44 
An alternative response is provided by Jackson, who argues that descriptivism 
needn’t suppose that the associated descriptions are linguistic.45 Rather than saying that the 
reference/denotation of a term is fixed by a description, Jackson speaks of it being fixed by 
the language user associating properties with the term. The referent/denotation is the object 
that possesses these qualities. This makes it clear that the way that these qualities are 
thought of, the way that they refer/denote, can be quite distinct from the way that the term 
refers/denotes. For Jackson, the descriptive theory is a theory of language, of the meaning 
of words like ‘water’, and there is no need to suppose that such words, which have their 
meaning given to them in part by practice, will refer in the same way as the components of 
thought, which appear not to have their meaning given to them by practice. Thus there is 
no infinite regress. 
It is plausible to think that a difference in associated properties, in this sense, is 
sufficient to give a difference in captured facts, as is my concern, because the fact that an 
object has one property, is different from the fact that it has another one. Further, although 
Jackson thus draws a distinction between thought and language, and my primary concern 
is with thought, this does not undermine my use of the descriptive theory. My concern is 
that, for example, the thoughts ‘Carroll is in Oxford’ and ‘Dodgson is in Oxford’, capture 
different facts. I am concerned to defend this idea by arguing that the utterances “Carroll is 
in Oxford” and “Dodgson is in Oxford” capture different facts, and by arguing that this 
shows that the two thoughts must capture different facts, because the thoughts are 
recognized in part with a propensity to accept or make such utterances. This is in no way 
reliant on supposing that the thoughts are linguistic. 
I do not mean to assert that natural kind terms and names ought to be treated as the 
same in all respects, but I hope to have made it clear that it is plausible to think that beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                   
But, the possibility of necessary a posterior truths, and contingent a priori truths, and the explanation of this 
via two-dimensional semantics, arguably gives a reason for differentiating such cases.  
43
 Chalmers:2004 & 2006. 
44
 Chalmers:2004 p.191. 
45
 Jackson:1998b. 
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involving different co-denoting natural kind terms will capture different facts, just as those 
concerning different co-denoting names will.46 
 
7.5 Actions 
 
Above we saw that an agent might act rationally whilst believing ‘Harry is in 
danger’ and having the goal of helping Harry, but not in believing ‘Will is in danger’ and 
having the goal of helping Harry, even if Will is Harry. According to the argument from 
action, it must follow from this that the two beliefs pick out different facts, and I have just 
defended this idea. Similarly, an agent can act rationally in believing ‘my neighbour is in 
danger’ and forming the goal of helping their neighbour, but not act rationally in believing 
‘my mechanic is in danger’ and forming the goal of helping their neighbour, even if their 
neighbour is their mechanic. Again, according to the argument from action, it must follow 
from this that the two beliefs pick out different facts, and I have also defended this idea. 
The reason that the argument from action had these implications is that rationality will 
only demand one belief in place of another in a rational action if the two beliefs pick out 
different reasons, hence facts. 
We also saw that an agent can act rationally when they believe ‘Harry is in danger’ 
and form the goal of helping Harry, but not when they believe ‘Harry is in danger’ and 
form the goal of helping Will. Similarly, when they believe ‘my mechanic is in danger’ 
and form the goal of helping their mechanic they can be rational, but not when they believe 
‘my mechanic is in danger’ and form the goal of helping their neighbour. One might 
suppose that the sole requirement on a goal giving desire in a rational action was that the 
goal was to perform an action which was justified by the reason the agent was aware of in 
their belief. If this was the case, then it would seem to follow that as the former beliefs in 
the two cases just outlined concern the same reasons, it must be that the two goals in each 
case concerned different actions, otherwise rationality wouldn’t differentiate between them 
in this way. In this section I will argue that this is mistaken, the goal giving desire of an 
action is subject to rational requirements besides those of having as goal an action for 
which the reason the agent is aware of in their belief is a reason. Before arguing this I will 
say something about the individuation of actions. 
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 And so on for non-natural kind terms too, if need be. 
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The individuation of actions has divided authors, some believe that there are only 
very coarse grained distinctions, unifiers, others believe that there are very fine grained 
distinctions, multipliers.47 Adopting Anscombe’s48 lead we might consider the following 
case: Bart is moving his arm up and down, he is thereby working the arm of a pump and 
pumping water to a house, the water has been poisoned, and so Bart is also thereby 
poisoning the people in the house, and thereby killing those people. The question of action 
individuation I am here concerned with is how many actions Bart is performing in this case. 
One might argue that Bart is only performing one action, perhaps moving his 
arm.49 The circumstances in which this action occurs are such that: Bart thereby also 
pumps water, as he is at a pump; and Bart poisons, as the pump is connected to a poisoned 
water supply which is being drunk; and Bart Kills, because the people drinking the water 
supply end up dead as a result. However, Bart doesn’t need to do anything besides moving 
his arm in order to pump, poison and kill, it just happens that the circumstances are such 
that in moving his arm he is pumping, poisoning and killing, and therefore these are all one 
action of Bart’s.50 
However, one might argue that the arm moving, pumping, poisoning and killing 
are all different actions. This is because different things appear to be true of each. For 
example, it is true to say that Bart kills by poisoning, but false to say that Bart poisons by 
killing, and odd to say that Bart poisons by poisoning. The ‘by’ relation appears to be 
asymmetric and irreflexive, but no asymmetric or irreflexive relation can hold between a 
thing and itself.51 It also appears that these actions stand in different causal relations, for 
example, it seems that Bart’s pumping caused water to flow, but it seems false to say that 
Bart’s killing caused water to flow.52 
A second type of consideration also supports the multipliers’ idea that Bart, as 
described, is performing numerous actions, namely, the actions appear to happen at 
different times. In the most clear case, killing involves someone dying, so it appears that 
Bart cannot have killed anyone until they die, however, it might be that the people Bart 
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 E.g. respectively, Anscombe:2000 and Davidson:2001a, and,  Goldman:1971 and Thomson:1971a. 
48
 Anscombe:2000 sect.23 p.3.  
49
 I will not here go into the issue of what should be taken as the so called basic action, that is, whether it is a 
mental event, act of the will, contraction of the muscles, etc. focusing instead on whether, for example, 
pumping and killing are the same actions. (Cf. Hornsby:1980 ch.1 & 2, Hornsby:1982, Hornsby:1983, 
Lowe:1981, Lowe:1983, and, Alvarez & Hyman:1998. 
50
 Cf. Anscombe:2000 and Davisdon:2001a. 
51
 Cf. Goldman:1971, Thomson:1971b, Hornsby:1980 ch.1, and, Mackie:1997. 
52
 Cf. Goldman:1971, Thomson:1971b, and, Botting:2010. 
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Kills do not die until after he stops moving his arm or pumping. Therefore pumping and 
arm moving are not occurring when killing is, and thus they must be distinct actions from 
killing. 
Unifiers can respond to these arguments for taking Bart to be doing numerous 
actions. In the first case one might argue that in saying “Bart poisons by killing”, one is not 
picking out a relation between two actions, because ‘killing’ does not pick out a specific 
action, as it is not a referring/denoting expression (unlike ‘the killing Bart performs in 
1957’ or ‘Intention-gate’). 53  Nevertheless, there remains the implication that Bart’s 
fulfilling the one action type, for example, poisoning, is different from his fulfilling the 
other action type, and if fulfilling an action type is embodying an action token, and 
embodying an action token is acting, then we still have the implication that the actions are 
distinct. 
One might respond to the multipliers’ causal argument by distinguishing between a 
context in which one describes causal relations, and a context in which one provides an 
explanation in terms of causes. We would expect the former context to be extensional, so 
any expression referring to c could replace the ‘c’ in “c caused e”, without changing the 
truth-value of the sentence. However, we would not expect the explanatory context to be 
extensional. This would enable one to say that when considering “Bart’s killing caused 
water to flow”, we must bear the context in mind. If we take the context to be one in which 
we are simply picking out causal relations then this sentence is strictly true, but, the 
sentence would provide a poor explanation, and so in the explanatory context would not 
play the same role as “Bart’s pumping caused water to flow”. It is because “Bart’s killing 
caused water to flow” would provide a poor explanation, that it would be an odd thing to 
say, but, this does not mean that it is false. The distinction between contexts thus enables 
the unifier to insist that Bart only performs one action, and to provide an error theory for 
the multipliers temptation to see, for example, “Bart’s killing caused water to flow” as 
false, but “Bart’s pumping caused water to flow” as true. Nevertheless, a multiplier might 
worry that even when one is aware that they are in an extensional context, “Bart’s killing 
caused water to flow” still sounds wrong.54 
                                                 
53
 Cf. Hornsby:1980 ch.1. 
54
 Cf. Botting:2010. Anscombe:1979 offers a different response to the multiplier’s causal argument, but 
Botting:2010 gives grounds for thinking this is insufficient (e.g. because it presupposes a certain ontology of 
events as particulars, which is itself questionable). 
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The unifier might respond to the argument from temporality by distinguishing 
between, for instance, when an act becomes recognizably an act of killing, and, when that 
act occurs. If no one dies for a day after Bart stopped pumping, we would not say that Bart 
was killing for that day. Thus, it doesn’t appear that we need to think of the act of killing 
as having this drawn out duration, nor hence, that we should not identify it with the act of 
pumping, or of moving his arm. What happens at the event of Bart’s victim dying, is not 
that Bart stops killing, but, that it becomes clear that Bart’s act of pumping was in fact an 
act of killing. At this later time we are able to describe the act as an act of killing, 
something we were not able to do before the death, but, nonetheless, the act of killing 
happened when the pumping did, and so sometime before the death.55 
However, the multiplier is also able to respond to the unifiers’ argument that the 
agent only does one thing. Botting56 points out that we might say that someone is doing 
something when they are not moving, for example, one might be said to be printing despite 
being sat at their computer motionless waiting for their printer to finish. In such a case it 
therefore appears that the agent’s doing in selecting the print option on their computer, is 
quite distinct from their doing in printing, as the former is over before the latter. This 
means that the unifier speaks too quickly when they say, for example, that Bart needn’t do 
anything further in order to poison, than he does to move his arm, because it is no longer 
clear that an agent must, so to speak, be in motion in order to be doing. Some cases differ 
from the printing case, for example, we are unwilling to say Bart is doing anything for the 
time in which the poison he has spread is taking effect on his victims. However, it needn’t 
follow from this that Bart is not at this time acting or killing, as the multiplier may suggest, 
because the phenomena might have a different explanation. For example, it might be that 
we do not say that Bart is doing over this period because he as insufficient control over the 
spread of the poison, not because the killing, which is one of his actions, isn’t occurring at 
this time.57 In short, an unwillingness to describe an agent as doing, or even acting at a 
time, needn’t entail that one of their actions is not occurring at that time, as it might simply 
follow from the nature of the action instead. 
So much to say that, besides there being good reasons to adopt a coarse grained 
approach to action individuation, there are also reasons to adopt a fine grained approach, 
and it is not clear that one is foolish to adopt the latter. If one did adopt the fine grained or 
                                                 
55
 Cf. Anscombe:1979 and Bennett:1973. 
56
 Botting:2010. 
57
 Cf. Botting:2010. 
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multipliers approach, then it might plausibly follow that the action one had as goal in 
desiring to help their mechanic was distinct from the action they had as goal in desiring to 
help their neighbour. Further, it is possible, especially if one adopts a descriptive theory of 
names as outlined above, that the action one had as goal when one desired to help Will, 
was different from that which one had as goal when one desired to help Harry. It seems 
fine to say one helped Harry by helping Will, or one’s mechanic by helping one’s 
neighbour, but questionable to say that one helped Will by helping Will, or one’s mechanic 
by helping one’s mechanic. If this were right, then the argument from action would be 
vindicated.58 
Nevertheless, as already suggested, I think there is an alternative way to vindicate 
the argument from action. I am only pressed to suppose that the goal of helping one’s 
mechanic, and the goal of helping one’s neighbour, concern different actions, so long as 
we suppose that the sole requirement on a desire giving goal in a rational action, is that it 
concern the reasonable action. But, this supposition can be denied. A desire giving goal 
must meet this requirement, but, it must also meet a further requirement if the action is to 
be rational. 
In Chapter Three I pointed out that desires can be responsive to reasons, one can 
have a desire for a reason (I can want to go cycling because I gain pleasure from cycling). I 
now contend that in order to act rationally, the agent’s goal giving desire in the action must 
be appropriately responsive to the reason they perform the action for. Specifically, the 
reason they perform the action for must also be the reason for which they form the goal 
giving desire that is their state of motivation in acting. This does not mean that the agent 
must choose to have that desire, as a desire’s responsiveness to reasons is different from an 
action’s responsiveness to reasons.59 
                                                 
58
 Goldman:1971’s theory of actions would be sufficiently fine grained to fit this notion. However, one must 
be careful in how one accounts for this. For Goldman an action is simply an agent instantiating an action type 
at a time. It follows that the same action occurs so long as the same agent and action type occur at the same 
time. For Goldman so long as we see the properties of being a mechanic or being a neighbour as applied to 
the agent, we are dealing with the same action. However, Goldman does think that action types are very 
finely individuated, so the action type of a strolling by a mechanic and the action type of a strolling by a 
neighbour, will be different action types.  
59
 To this degree I draw a distinction between the belief and the desire in an action. The desire must be 
appropriately responsive to reasons, but, the belief needn’t be. Nonetheless, this does appear to be quite an 
appropriate distinction to draw. An agent can act rationally despite having a false belief, and plausibly 
despite having a belief that they did not have sufficient reason to adopt. We can separate the episode of 
acting from the episode of forming one’s beliefs. However, the origin of the desire which is the state of 
motivation in an action arguably has a much closer relation to the rationality of the action. If one’s state of 
motivation is irrational, then one’s action is, as to act just is to be motivated. 
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It follows that I can admit that (although I am not convinced this is the correct 
thing to say) in desiring to help one’s mechanic and in desiring to help one’s neighbour, 
one has the same action as goal, and yet, a rational action for which the first desire is the 
state of motivation must be responsive to different reasons to one for which the second 
desire is the state of motivation. An agent is rational to believe ‘my mechanic is in danger’ 
and to form the goal of helping their mechanic, and act to help their mechanic for the 
reason they are aware of in this belief. The belief that ‘my mechanic is in danger’ captures 
a fact which is a reason to form the desire to help their mechanic and a reason to act to 
help their mechanic. However, an agent is not rational to believe ‘my mechanic is in 
danger’ and to form the goal of helping their neighbour, and to act to help their neighbour 
for the reason they are aware of in this belief. This is because the belief that ‘my mechanic 
is in danger’ captures a fact which is not a reason to form the desire to help their neighbour 
even if it is a reason to act to help their neighbour. 
That the desire to help one’s mechanic is different from the desire to help one’s 
neighbour is quite plausible, even if they are the same person. In fact, were this denied, 
then the very worry I am trying to deal with in this section appears to evaporate. It is 
therefore quite possible there will be different reasons for the two desires. Moreover, it is 
plausible that there are different reasons for the two just as is implied by the case at hand. 
If I do not know that my mechanic is my neighbour, then it is rational to be brought by an 
awareness of the fact that my mechanic is in danger, to form the goal of helping my 
mechanic, but, not to form the goal of helping my neighbour. This is because even if the 
desires concern the same actions, the desires are more fine grained than the actions, and 
are receptive to the distinction between the fact that someone is a mechanic and in danger, 
and the fact that someone is a neighbour and in danger.  My preceding discussion of 
descriptive theories of names shows how this can also account for the difference in roles of 
the two desires, to help Will and to help Harry. Different facts will be associated with the 
names ‘Will’ and ‘Harry’, and the two desires will be responsive to these different facts, 
being as fine grained as the beliefs that involve those names are. 
I can thus account for why the desire to help Harry might play a different role in 
the rationality of an action, than the desire to help Will, even if Will is Harry, and similarly, 
why a desire to help my mechanic might play a different role to a desire to help my 
neighbour, even if my mechanic is my neighbour. The quick response to this is that the 
actions one adopts as goals in these two desires are different. This response relies on 
adopting a fine grained theory of action individuation, a view which has some independent 
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plausibility. A further and distinct response notes that the goal giving desire, as one’s state 
of being motivated in acting, must itself be appropriately responsive to reasons. An agent 
must desire for the reasons they act for when they act rationally. Desires admit of fine 
grained individuation (even if actions do not), and thus actions involving different goal 
giving desires may differ in their rationality and hence responsiveness to reasons. 
The discussion of this and the preceding few sections shouldn’t cover over an 
important point. Perry’s arguments concern essential indexicals, not essential names or 
definite descriptions or kind terms. The interpretation of another agent’s action as rational 
does not appear to demand the attribution to that agent of a particular non-indexical belief 
in place of any other non-indexical beliefs. However, it can demand the attribution of an 
indexical belief in place of any non-indexical belief. It remains the case that there is a 
special indexical/non-indexical asymmetry. 
 
Summary 
 
The argument from action goes beyond issues of cognitive significance as whilst 
one might try [though I suspect unsatisfactorily] to explain a difference in cognitive 
significance without reference to a difference in the facts one is aware of, one cannot 
respond to the argument from action in this way. 
The argument from action will have implications for all cases in which a rational 
action requires one belief in place of another. In all such cases the beliefs must involve an 
awareness of different facts. That the argument is correct to say this about a variety of 
cases is shown by the fact that definite descriptions pick out different facts, even if they 
denote the same individual, and also by the plausibility of the descriptive theory of names 
and natural kind terms, or at least, by any theory that accounts for a difference in cognitive 
significance between co-referring names or kind terms, through taking different facts to be 
associated with the different names or kind terms. 
If the role of goal giving desires in rational actions is understood to be simply that 
the goal adopted is the action performed, then the argument from action also implies that 
one must adopt a fine grained approach to action individuation, an approach with 
independent plausibility. However, it appears that the goal giving desire must meet further 
requirements. As the state of motivation in acting the desire must also be responsive to the 
reasons one acts for. As such, the argument from action only in fact requires a fine grained 
approach to desire individuation. 
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The argument from action is plausible in its implications and numerous 
applications besides its application to the case of the tenseless theory of time, and therefore, 
its application in this latter case also stands as appropriate. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ARGUMENT FROM APPROPRIATE 
EMOTIONS 
 
In the last chapter I argued that the tenseless theory of time was incorrect, as the 
demand for tensed beliefs in rational actions proved the reality of facts picked out by those 
beliefs and not picked out by any tenseless beliefs. This argument rested on the argument 
for the essential indexical and on the nature of rational action. 
In this chapter I will examine the nature of emotions, or a sub-species thereof, and 
their appropriateness. I will defend a cognitive view of emotions according to which an 
emotion involves a belief. I will argue that such emotions are appropriate or inappropriate 
on the basis of the reasons that those emotions are felt for, those reasons being given by 
the cognitive component of the emotion, the cognitive component being an awareness of 
the reason the emotion is felt for. 
On the basis of Prior’s thank goodness argument I will show that an emotion can 
be appropriate when it is felt for a reason captured by a tensed belief, and inappropriate 
when felt for a reason captured by any tenseless belief. This will enable me to argue in a 
manner analogous to the last chapter, that the tensed belief must capture a reason, that is 
fact, not captured by any tenseless belief, and hence, that the tenseless theory of time is 
mistaken. 
 
8.1 A Cognitive Theory of Emotions 
 
James1 said that emotions were the feelings of bodily changes which resulted from 
a perception of the exciting fact. For example, when I see a bull charge towards me, this 
causes my heart rate to rise, adrenalin to flow, etc. I will feel these physiological changes, 
and these feelings will be my emotion of fear.  
However, this view that emotions are simple2 feelings suffers from a number of 
criticisms. Cannon3 has argued that physiological data does not support James’s claim, as 
one can have, for example, the physiological effects associated with fear, rising heart rate 
etc. and not have the emotion of fear. 
                                                 
1
 James:1884. 
2
 By ‘simple feeling’ I mean a feeling devoid of cognitive content, and therefore, I am excluding from these 
comments theories such as Greenspan:2004a’s, de Sousa:1987’s, or Goldie:2004’s in which one might want 
to say that an emotion was a feeling with a cognitive content. 
3
 Cannon:1917. 
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Separating the feeling and a particular physiology does not help the view that 
emotions are simple feelings. Feelings are not fine grained enough to distinguish the 
myriad of emotions that people have, for example, feelings of embarrassment and of 
shame can coincide. Furthermore, emotions can go unfelt, as when one does not realize 
that one was angry on a past occasion until one looks back and reconsiders it. Or, as when 
one has an emotion for a number of years, perhaps anger at a childhood slight, but one 
only has feelings of that emotion during particular episodes within that time.4 
Identifying emotions instead with actions, or dispositions to act, that is, adopting a 
behaviourism about the emotions,5 fairs little better. Behaviourism here suffers many of 
the criticisms of behaviourism about other mental states. It is not clear exactly what 
behaviour ought to be associated with a particular emotion, because people can feel an 
emotion but refrain from acting in typical ways because of certain other beliefs and desires 
that they have, for example, they may not want to show their anger. Moreover, it is clear 
that one does not generally know about their emotions through observing, either directly or 
indirectly, their own behaviour. It is plausible that there is a link between emotions and 
behaviour, but it is implausible that emotions simply are behaviour.6 
Solomon7 points out that one can know what emotion one would likely feel in a 
particular scenario, not because one knows how one would feel, nor because one knows 
how one would behave, but because of the details of the scenario and the judgments one 
knows one would make about it. For example, if one knows that one would take a scenario 
to be awkward but not one’s responsibility, then one will expect oneself to be embarrassed 
but not ashamed. One can know about one’s emotions through knowledge of what one is, 
or would be, aware of. 
We saw in Chapter One that MacBeath criticized Mellor for failing to acknowledge 
that people are emotional about things. For example, Prior is relieved that the exams are 
over, Mellor is grateful that MacBeath offered him an improved solution to Prior’s puzzle, 
and so on. It is clear that emotions have cognitive content, that is, they involve a state of 
awareness, a belief.8 This shows that emotions are not simple feelings. It also enables one 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Solomon:1993 ch.4. 
5
 Cf. Ryle:1949 ch.4. 
6
 Cf. Solomon:1993 ch.4, more generally, Lowe:2000 ch.3. 
7
 Solomon:1993 p.98, at this time Solomon was keen to defend the idea that an emotion is a judgement, 
however, later Solomon shifts to the view that emotions essentially involve judgments, even if they also have 
other aspects, such as feelings, e.g. Solomon:2003. 
8
 A number of writers have defended the idea that emotions have cognitive content, though not all of these 
writers are happy to speak in terms of belief as providing that cognitive content. I will say something of this 
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to account for why there would be a link between particular emotions and particular types 
of behaviour, because there is a link between particular beliefs and particular types of 
behaviour.  
Recognizing that emotions have a cognitive component also nicely fits the fact that 
there are fine-grained distinctions between types of emotions, because there are fine-
grained distinctions amongst types of beliefs. Moreover, there are plausible identifications 
between types of the former and types of the latter sort. For example, in fear one will 
believe something to be dangerous, in relief one will believe a discomfort has ended, in 
shame one will judge a discomfort to be their responsibility, and so on.9 
This view is also supported by considering uses of emotion language. When an 
individual says, for example, “I am very angry with you”, one is informed of their emotion. 
But, very often the appropriate way to respond to this is not to react as if one has been 
informed of another’s feelings, e.g. “Poor you, that must be uncomfortable”, nor as if one 
has been informed of another’s behaviour “Thanks, in that case I’ll avoid you for a while”. 
Rather, one ought to respond to the utterance as informing one of a belief the speaker has 
about them, e.g. that one has done something wrong, “I’m sorry, it was an accident”.10 
Emotions, therefore, are not simple feelings or patterns of behaviour, but instead 
have a cognitive component, in having an emotion one believes something to be the case. 
 
8.2 Objections to a Cognitive Theory of Emotions Rebutted 
 
Despite the increasing popularity of a cognitive theory of emotions, the view has 
been criticized, and a consideration of these objections will clarify the view I am proposing. 
Solomon11 once defended the view that an emotion could be identified with its 
cognitive component, so that feelings were mere ornamentations to emotions but no proper 
part of them. However, if this view is correct it is not clear how there can be a difference 
between having an emotion, and having the same belief without having the emotion, as 
one surely can. For example, how I can dispassionately be aware that someone has died, 
                                                                                                                                                   
below. (Cf. Solomon:1993, Greenspan:1988, Calhoun:2003, and de Sousa:2004.) In making these comments, 
I am no longer using ‘belief’ as an umbrella term. 
9
 Cf. e.g. Solomon:1993 ch.5, Greenspan:1988, and Taylor:1975. 
10
 Cf. Pitcher:1965 (who cites Bedford:1957 and Urmson:1952). 
11
 Solomon:1993. 
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without grieving that they have died, though plausibly a belief that someone has died is a 
paradigmatic example of the cognitive component of grief.12 
The obvious and I believe correct response to this criticism, is to accept that 
emotions are not merely cognitive but are more complex.13 For the reasons given in the 
last section it is wrong to say simply that an emotion must be a belief and a particular 
feeling, or belief and a particular pattern of behaviour. Nevertheless, it appears that an 
emotion, as opposed to a pure belief will have close links to, or often will simply be in part 
constituted by feelings. Plausibly it will also have close links to certain forms of behaviour, 
facial expressions etc. I will not try to detail this relation; suffice to say that the cognitive 
view of emotions should not be understood to be that an emotion is no more than a 
belief.14 
It appears that someone might be scared and not believe that they are in danger, 
and therefore, that it is wrong to identify the emotion of fear with the belief one is in 
danger. For example, someone on a high balcony might appear to be scared even though 
they say that they believe that they are not in danger because they believe the rail is strong, 
and no one will push them etc.15 
The force of this criticism against the cognitive theory is removed by the 
peculiarity of the situation at hand. Most often when someone is fearful, if they come to 
believe that they are not in danger, then they will lose their fear. For example, if I step out 
onto a road to cross it and glimpse a car out of the corner of my eye, then I will become 
afraid. But when I look more closely, and see that the car is stationary, the fear will pass 
and I will continue in my stride. We should therefore expect there to be something peculiar 
in a situation in which someone professes to know they are in no danger, yet appears to be 
fearful. One is thus encouraged not to treat the case simply at face value, nor hence to see 
it as a straight forward counter example to the cognitive theory. 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Shaffer:1983. 
13
 Solomon:1988 actually argues in response that the notion of pure belief [or for Solomon, ‘judgment’] is in 
fact unclear, insofar as, there appears to be something at fault in, or pathological about, a belief that one has, 
for example, been wronged, which lacks relations to, or elements of feeling. I think this is interesting, but it 
does not – as Solomon acknowledges – undermine the response I have given. 
14
 If one were to insist that an emotion was a feeling with a cognitive content, then, given the appropriate 
nature of this intentionality, that is a willingness to see it as a propositional attitude, I would be happy to 
speak of this feeling as a belief, given an umbrella use of the term ‘belief’ as a mode of awareness (cf. 
Chapter Three). 
15
 Cf. Pitcher:1965, Deigh:2010, Greenspan:1988 ch.1, Calhoun:2003, and, de Sousa:2004. 
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For example, it might be that the individual accepts that there is good evidence that 
they are safe and they do not want to appear sceptical of their friend’s assertions that they 
are safe, and therefore they say that they believe that they are safe. Nevertheless, the 
individual does actually harbour a belief that they are in danger, they passed the building 
when it was in construction and they saw the workmen hurrying, they know building 
inspectors can be susceptible to bribes, even if this isn’t very common etc. Perhaps if 
pushed the individual would admit that in fact they believe there is a chance they will fall, 
but even if not, the appearance of fear, the persons unwilling to approach the edge, and the 
peculiarity of the situation is already evidence that such a belief might be at play. 
Alternatively, it might be that the person really does believe themselves to be safe, but that 
they are not in fact scared. Perhaps they are simply experiencing physiological effects 
related to fear or a feeling related to fear as the result of some sort of pathology. A 
pathology indicated by the peculiarity of the case. Finally, it could be that the person holds 
contradictory beliefs, both taking themselves to be in danger, and taking themselves not to 
be in danger. Accusing an individual of self-contradiction is not something that should or 
even could often be appropriate, but, as already noted, the case at issue is a rare one, and 
moreover, it is a case in which the individual concerned appears to be irrational. 
The idea that emotions are cognitive has also been criticized on the grounds that 
animals and infants can have emotions, but it is not clear that they can have complex 
cognitive states. For example, it appears animals and infants can be scared, but not so clear 
that they can believe that they are in danger. The problem being that danger is a complex 
concept, and therefore not one we would readily attribute to animals and infants.16 
However, it is quite plausible that animals and infants do have a less rich emotional 
life than more mature humans.17 Furthermore, it is plausible that to the degree that animals 
and infants have emotions they have them about something, they are cognitive. The cat is 
scared of the dog. It might be that we ought therefore to say that fear doesn’t simply 
involve the belief that one is in danger, but could also involve a more simple belief such as 
‘pain is imminent’.18 Alternatively, it might be that we ought to say that fear concerns 
danger, but that animals and infants have a variety of emotions which are related to and 
perhaps predecessors to fear. These earlier emotions being more simple and involving 
more simple beliefs, such as ‘that causes pain’. I will not decide between these options, but 
                                                 
16
 Cf. Deigh:2010. 
17
 Cf. Greenspan:2004b, Solomon:2003, and, de Sousa:2004. 
18
 Deigh himself supposes something like this (2010 p.31). 
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on either account it remains the case that emotions are cognitive states and that, for 
example, fear remains a concern with harm. 
Robinson19 has criticised the cognitive view of emotions through a consideration of 
the startle response. Robinson believes that startle is an example of an emotion. It gives 
rise to changes in facial expressions, as are closely linked with emotions, it is also related 
to fear and shock which are characteristic emotions. Startle, however, is not cognitive, it 
doesn’t involve the agent having a belief about what startled them, from which it appears 
to follow that emotions needn’t be cognitive. 
I believe that startle is not an emotion20 but is rather a more primitive brute reaction 
to the environment. Nevertheless, I will not defend this idea, rather, I will limit my 
discussion to emotions that are more apparently cognitive. I will not define this group of 
emotions, suffice to say clear examples are relief, gratitude, anxiety, grief, anger, fear, 
embarrassment, contempt and shame. These examples are all linked in a manner similar to 
that which Anscombe21 links all actions. That is, they are emotions for which people can 
give reasons as to why they have them, or why someone would be justified in having them. 
They are emotions that inform one of the person’s beliefs and values. If startle is an 
emotion and it is not cognitive, that does not entail that all emotions ought to be thought of 
in that manner, and nor does it undermine the points raised above in favour of thinking of 
some emotions as cognitive.22 From now on I shall be concerned with just this class of 
cognitive emotions, and I will simply use the term ‘emotion’ to refer to members of this 
class unless otherwise indicated. 
The cognitive theory of emotions that I propose is therefore not the view that all 
emotions are simply beliefs. Rather, by ‘emotions’ I mean to pick out a class of cognitive 
emotions, which may or may not be the class of all emotions. Further, these emotions will 
be something more than mere beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Robinson:1995. 
20
 Cf. Solomon:1998. 
21
 Cf. Anscombe:2000 chap.2. 
22
 It should be noted that Robinson does not take herself to have proven that no emotions involve a cognitive 
element, merely that not all do. 
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8.3 The Appropriateness of Emotions 
 
For some time it was thought that emotions and rationality were entirely distinct. 
Hume23 for example declared that reason will always be the slave of the emotions, because 
the emotions could not be compelled or judged by the standards of rationality. However, 
more recently24  room has been made to consider the rationality or appropriateness of 
emotions. This trend has taken two broad forms, one considering the practical value of an 
emotion, and one considering the rationality of an emotion’s cognitive component.25 
That emotions can be rational or justified, is evinced by our everyday practices. For 
example, it is inappropriate to get angry at someone for being nice to you, or to be 
extremely grateful to someone for being just a little bit nice to you. In fact, that emotions 
can be appropriate or rational has been offered as evidence that emotions are not simply 
feelings, as simple feelings, such as headaches or itches, are not rational or appropriate 
(even if they can be expected effects of certain events).26 
One manner in which emotions have been judged, on occasion if not always, to be 
rational or appropriate, is in regard to their practical value. Damasio27 has argued that 
emotions play a vital role in reasoning. It is thought that they can provide a solution to the 
frame-problem by making certain facts salient to an agent in their reasoning, and therefore 
preventing them from being drawn into a potentially endless consideration of factors. 
Emotions have a rational value because they enable agents to act rationally without being 
drawn into endless reasoning. 
However, it is not clear that emotions do play this practical role. Evans,28  for 
example, has argued that before we can be sure that emotions provide a solution to the 
frame-problem, we need a clear account of what emotions are and how they play this role. 
Moreover, it is not clear that if emotions do play this role, that in letting them do so we are 
not passing over a different and better method for solving the problem, nor hence, that we 
should take emotions to be appropriate or rational because they fulfil this role. 
                                                 
23
 Hume:1985 bk.II pt.III sect III. 
24
 Though that is not to say the idea is new, Aristotle perhaps being an earlier example (cf. Aristotle:2001 
bk.IV). 
25
 Cf. Greenspan:2004a, she refers to the two types as emotions adaptiveness and appropriateness 
respectively. 
26
 E.g. Solomon:1993 ch.4, Pitcher:1965. 
27
 E.g. Damasio:1995. 
28
 Evans:2002. 
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Elster29 suggests a different manner in which emotions have practical value, that is, 
because they are the sole source for the maintenance of social norms. Social norms are 
non-outcome-orientated injunctions to behave in certain ways. They are distinct from 
social conventions, social norms being exemplified by the norm of wearing black at 
funerals, social conventions by the convention of driving on the left in the UK. My shame 
in my not wearing black at a funeral will be a response to another’s contempt for me not 
wearing black, and will in turn bring me to feel contempt for others who break the norm.30 
But Elster’s suggestion is implausible. It is not clear what social norms could be in 
play in all cases of appropriate emotions. For example, no social norm appears to be 
supported by my being relieved that my headache has ended, nor ought I to be ashamed if I 
am not relieved it has ended, nor ought another experience contempt towards me because I 
am not relieved. I have not worn bright colours to a funeral, and this is not because I have 
experienced contempt as a result of doing so (I haven’t done so), but because I was told as 
a child that I ought not to. In short, there are clearly other ways than the experience of 
emotions to pass on social norms. Furthermore, if emotions did play the role of 
maintaining social norms, this would only make the emotions appropriate if the social 
norms themselves were. And plausibly, if the norms are appropriate, then the 
appropriateness of the emotions stems from them, not from the role of emotions 
maintaining them. If I am ashamed having worn bright colours to a funeral, I will not be 
ashamed because of having experienced contempt, that is, I will not be ashamed of 
experiencing contempt, but of my wearing the bright clothes. My act, not the contempt 
would be the object of my emotion. If the norm of not wearing bright colours is 
appropriate, then plausibly my act of wearing them is inappropriate, and it is my shame’s 
having this act as object that makes it appropriate.31 
The practical value of emotions needn’t rest solely on general claims such as those 
concerning the frame-problem or social norms, instead we might make more specific cases. 
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 A different social practical advantage of emotions, might be taken to arise from the idea that expressions 
associated with emotions aid social cohesion (cf. Robinson:1995 attributes such an idea to Paul Ekman). But, 
given that emotions and behaviour needn’t be covariant, then this appears to be implausible. 
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 Even if one insisted the contempt triggered this shame, it is not clear that it is the only thing that could 
have done so, furthermore, that contempt itself must either have been triggered or not, at some stage we must 
reach an emotion not triggered by another one, and here plausibly the justification of the emotion would stem 
from its object, that is the inappropriateness of the act. 
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For example, the discomfort of anticipating a pain might encourage one to act so as to 
prevent the pain coming around, and in turn be an aid to the survival of the agent.32 
But there are a number of general problems with taking the rationality or 
appropriateness of an emotion to rest on its practical value. It is not clear that emotions are 
always of practical value.33 In a case such as the anticipation one, it might well be that, for 
example, anticipation makes an agent nervous, and therefore perform less well, and 
therefore, actually places the agent at greater risk. It is not clear that an emotion such as 
grief plays a practical role at all, after all, a concern for death or loss is already to be found 
in emotions such as fear, or in sensations such as pain. 
Furthermore, these points make it clear that we are not generally certain of whether 
a particular emotion, or even emotions in general, will be of practical value to an agent, 
and yet we are generally certain of whether an emotion is appropriate or not. If I do not 
know whether or not grief is advantageous, my certainty that grieving a death that is yet to 
come is inappropriate cannot be a judgment of the practical value of the emotion. The 
appropriateness at issue in our everyday consideration of emotions as rational or 
appropriate therefore cannot be a matter of the practicality of those emotions, even if they 
do have practical value.34 
Cockburn35 has noted that if someone is angry because they believe that someone 
has slighted them, then this anger is inappropriate if in fact the person has done no such 
thing. Or if someone is extremely angry at another who has only done them a very minor 
injustice, then again this anger is inappropriate. These examples of anger remain 
inappropriate even it turns out that they were practically fortuitous to the emotional 
individuals. A celebrity might make their living from being an overly angry character, but 
that does not mean that their exaggerated emotions are appropriate. These points lend 
weight to the idea that the appropriateness at issue is not a matter of practical value. 
Cockburn presses this idea further by pointing out that there is something worrying, I 
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would say sinister, in the idea that our emotions are purely or ultimately to be valued in 
terms of their practical worth.36 As if it is right to grieve a loved one simply because that 
brings practical advantages to one. 
The cognitive element of emotions raises scope for a rather different manner in 
which emotions can be considered as appropriate or not, a manner in which emotions 
themselves are responsive to rational concerns not merely characters within them. (Hume37 
denied that emotions had a cognitive component, and therefore this approach could not 
have been open to him.) Beliefs can be appropriate or inappropriate, and therefore, if 
emotions involve beliefs this evaluation should also apply to them. The appropriateness of 
a belief is grounded in its origin. An appropriate belief will have an appropriate origin, that 
is, one which is likely to entail the truth of the belief.38 For example, if I believe that it is 
raining because I witness the rain, then my belief is appropriate, whereas, if I believe that it 
is raining because I dream that it is, my belief is not appropriate. Emotions then are 
appropriate or not according to whether the beliefs they involve are appropriate or not. If I 
am angry because someone has slighted me, I will believe that someone has slighted me. If 
this belief would be appropriate, then, so the theory goes, the anger would be too. 
It is plausible that we can speak of the appropriateness of emotions in terms of the 
appropriateness of the beliefs they involve. However, it is wrong to think that this is the 
only or fundamental manner in which we so speak, because emotions can be appropriate or 
not independently of whether or not the beliefs they involve are appropriate. If I learn that 
a loved one will die on a particular date in the distant future, it is inappropriate for me to at 
that time grieve their death. That is, it is inappropriate to have grief where the belief 
element involved is the belief ‘x will die at t’ or the tenseless belief ‘x dies at t’. Such grief 
would be inappropriate despite the belief it involves being true and appropriate. Similarly, 
if I am in danger it is appropriate to be scared, but it is not appropriate to be scared of that 
danger afterwards, that is, it is appropriate to have fear involving the belief ‘I could fall off 
this balcony which would cause me great harm’, but not involving the belief ‘I could have 
fallen of that balcony which would have caused me great harm’, despite both beliefs being 
true and appropriate. Alternatively, if my friend wrongs me in a minor way it is 
appropriate for me to be a little bit angry, but it is not appropriate for me to be extremely 
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 E.g. Audi:2004. My argument is not reliant on this view of the appropriateness of beliefs, and would work 
equally well if one wanted to say, for example, that appropriate beliefs just are true beliefs. 
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angry, yet, plausibly both emotions would involve the same belief, namely, ‘my friends 
refusing my invitation was a slight against me’. Some things Pitcher says suggest the 
thought that extreme anger and mild anger will involve different beliefs, for example, ‘I 
was badly wronged’ and ‘I was slightly wronged’ respectively. 39  But I find this 
implausible, it is clear people can get extremely angry about what they know is a trivial 
matter. Moreover, their anger can calm, and nothing about the belief involved changes in 
this calming. 
The appropriateness of emotions therefore does not reduce simply to the 
appropriateness of the beliefs they involve.40 But this perhaps ought to be expected, as 
emotions are more than just the beliefs they involve, it is fitting therefore that there is 
something more to their appropriateness. In short, it is fitting that there is something that 
makes it appropriate to have an emotion on an occasion, not merely to have the simple 
belief which would capture its cognitive component. 
As already intimated above, emotions are had for reasons, I am angry because 
someone has wronged me.41 I give their wronging me as a reason for me to be angry, and 
further, their wronging me makes it reasonable for me to be angry. If an emotion is had for 
a reason that is a reason that justifies that emotion, then that emotion will be in that regard 
appropriate, it will be reasonable. In the terminology of Chapter Three we might say that if 
the m-reason for my emotion is a j-reason for that emotion, then the emotion is appropriate. 
This is a form of appropriateness distinct from either the practical value of the emotion or 
the appropriateness of the belief involved as just discussed. Furthermore, this form of 
appropriateness is fit to fulfil the roles unfulfilled by the previous forms. For example, it is 
appropriate of me to be angry when my friend slights me by refusing my invitation, 
because this is a j-reason for my being angry. However, this is not a j-reason to be 
extremely angry, and therefore, extreme anger would be inappropriate. 
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 Greenspan (e.g. 1988) says that the appropriateness of an emotion will not be identical with the 
appropriateness of the belief it involves. Her reason for saying this is that the belief will often have to meet 
higher standards to be appropriate than the emotion does. However, this difference in level changes little of 
relevance to my argument. 
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 I am not the only person to speak of reasons in regard of the appropriateness of emotions, but discussions 
often conflate these reasons with reasons to form the belief involved in the emotion, they leave little room for 
the belief to be appropriate and the emotion inappropriate, and therefore, they fall under my discussion of 
equating the appropriateness of the emotion with the appropriateness of the belief involved (cf. Pitcher:1965, 
Taylor:1975, Goldie:2004, Solomon:1993). 
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Thus we can see that there are number of different manners in which one might 
judge an emotion to be appropriate. The two most popular types of way of doing this, in 
respect of the practical value of the emotion and in respect of the appropriateness of the 
belief involved in the emotion, cannot exhaust the field. We must recognize a third 
measure, namely, whether the emotions are had for reasons that justify those emotions. 
 
8.4 The Reasonableness of Emotions 
 
In the previous section we saw that emotions can be identified as appropriate or not 
simply in regard to the reasons that they are had for. In this section I will consider what 
these reasons are, and how they are related to the emotions. 
It is clear that the reason an emotion is had for, its m-reason, is given by the 
cognitive component of the emotion. When I feel relief because – for the reason that – my 
headache is over, the cognitive component of my relief will be the belief ‘my headache is 
over’. Similarly, when I am scared because I might fall off the balcony which would cause 
me harm, the cognitive component of my emotion will be the belief ‘I might fall off this 
balcony which would cause me harm’, and so on. Conversely, when I have grief whose 
cognitive component is the belief ‘my grandmother has died’, the reason for which I grieve 
is that my grandmother has died. And so on. 
Solomon42 has suggested that the cognitive component of an emotion picks out a 
subjective object, where this is something other than a fact, or a state of the world. For 
Solomon, when I am relieved because my headache is over my relief does not concern the 
fact that my headache is over, rather, it concerns a subjective object.43 Moreover, this 
subjective object can exist even if the fact does not, that is, even if my headache is not over. 
However, it clear that Solomon is wrong. If my headache is not over I ought not to 
be relieved that it is, furthermore, if I know that my headache is not over I will not be 
relieved that it is. I do not take this subjective object to be a j-reason for my emotion, and 
therefore I do not adopt this subjective object as an m-reason. (The arguments here mirror 
arguments of Chapter Three, though I take Solomon’s subjective object to be something 
different from a mental state.) 
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 Solomon believes that the emotion will be triggered by something objective, but that objective thing 
needn’t be anything to do with the fact that my headache is over. 
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Facts are j-reasons for emotions, and subjective objects are not. I ought only to be 
relieved that my headache is over if it is, to grieve a death if there has been a death, fear a 
danger if there is a danger, and so on. Further, we are aware of this, and therefore, we often 
have these j-reasons as m-reasons. If I learn there was no death, I will stop grieving 
whether or not a subjective object persists. If I learn there is no danger, I will stop feeling 
scared whether or not a subjective object persists, and so on. Moreover, it must be the case 
that some emotions are had for reasons that justify them, and therefore, that sometimes our 
m-reasons for our emotions are j-reasons for them, and are hence facts. 
Solomon44 recognizes that it appears that the cognitive component picks out facts, 
but he motivates the idea that it picks out subjective objects by considering error cases, for 
example, when I mistakenly believe that I am in danger and am resultantly scared. 
However, with the arguments of Chapter Three in mind we can see our way clear of this 
muddle. If I mistakenly believe that I am in danger, this belief is the cognitive component 
of an emotion of fear, and, I am not in danger, then it needn’t follow that my m-reason for 
my fear was some subjective object. Rather, it could simply be that I had no m-reason for 
my emotion. Furthermore, it appears that in such a case I will not have an m-reason, 
because if I learn that I am not in danger I will believe that I oughtn’t to have been scared, 
that is, I will admit that I had no reason to be scared and merely mistakenly believed that I 
did (even if a subjective object persists). The emotion is an attitude towards a non-existent, 
i.e. my danger, this is not in itself unusual as we have all sorts of attitudes towards non-
existents, and it reveals that the m-reason is a non-existent, that is, that I have no m-reason. 
Solomon is not the only person to suggest that the cognitive components of 
emotions pick out something less than facts. Rather, this is a common45 response to a 
criticism I considered above against the cognitive theory of emotions. The criticism 
concerns the idea that someone might, for example, appear to be scared even though they 
appear to believe that they are in no danger. I will refer to this as the criticism from 
irrationality. One pattern of response to the criticism of irrationality is to suggest that the 
cognitive component of the emotion does not simply pick out facts. I am not sure the 
proponents of these views would want to speak in terms of subjective objects, an 
alternative way of putting matters might be to say that the emotions pick out facts but they 
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don’t take them to occur. For example, Greenspan46 says in response to the argument from 
irrationality, that the cognitive component of the emotion is the imagination that one is in 
danger. This imagination can persist even if one is not in danger, and even if one believes 
that one is not in danger. There is nothing irrational in imagining things to be one way and 
believing them to be another, so there is no problem. The case picked out by the criticism 
from irrationality merely concerns an individual imagining that they are in danger, and 
because of this being scared, even though they know that they are not in danger. 
But, now it is clear that the cognitive component of the emotion serves to pick out 
the reason the emotion is felt for, it is clear that one should not try to respond to the 
criticism from irrationality in this way. If the agent merely imagined that they were in 
danger, but believed that they were not in danger, then they would not take themselves to 
have a reason to be scared. (Either because the object of the emotion is merely subjective, 
or, because it is a fact, but one they don’t take to obtain.) This leaves us with difficulties, 
as it now appears the person both does not take themselves to have a reason to be scared 
(as the fear is a mere imagining) and does take themselves to have a reason (they are 
scared of falling). In order to resolve this conflict one ought to say either that the person 
does in fact believe themselves to have a reason to be scared, that is they do believe 
themselves to be in danger, or else, we ought to say that they are not experiencing a normal 
case of fear but are suffering some sort of pathology which is producing fear like 
symptoms.47 The move away from a simple cognition of facts in response to the criticism 
of irrationality therefore acts as no solution, merely shifting the problem to being one of a 
person both appearing to and appearing not to take themselves to have a reason to be 
emotional. In fact, having got to this stage, I suggest that this is the heart of the criticism 
from irrationality, and therefore no response which proposes that the cognitive component 
captures something less than a fact or that it does not take that fact to obtain, can be an 
adequate solution to the criticism of irrationality. But this is not a problem, as we have 
already seen these cases are unusual and plausibly do involve irrationality. 
The reasons that emotions are had for are facts. These facts are given by the 
cognitive component of the emotions; they are the contents of the beliefs emotions involve. 
The reason the emotion is had for just is the fact which is the content of the belief involved. 
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unwilling to say they are scared because they might fall. Normally when people are scared of something they 
are happy to say they are scared because of that thing, that thing is their reason. 
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The emotion will be reasonable, and therefore in this sense appropriate, if it is had for an 
m-reason which is a j-reason for that emotion. The j-reasons for an emotion are familiar, 
and are indicated by the belief types which distinguish emotion types. For example, a j-
reason to be scared will be a fact that one is in danger, a reason to be very angry will be a 
fact that one has been gravely insulted, a reason to grieve will be the fact that someone has 
died, and so on. 
The j-reasons for emotions will often be j-reasons to have the beliefs involved in 
the emotions. For example, the fact that my headache is over is a j-reason for me to believe 
that my headache is over, as well as being a j-reason for me to be relieved that my 
headache is over. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the j-reason for an emotion is not 
simply the j-reason for the belief involved in the emotion, because, as already noted, the j-
reason for the belief involved might not be a j-reason for the emotion. For example, if the 
m-reason one has an emotion for is not a j-reason to have that emotion, as when I am 
extremely angry at a slight injustice. Before closing this section, I will briefly consider 
some difficulties for the view that the j-reasons for emotions are facts. 
I have spoken of the j-reason for fear being the fact that there is danger, in more 
detailed moments I have spoken of the fact that it is possible one will be harmed. In short, 
my view implies there are facts of possibility. This might sound worrying, though it 
needn’t be. It is clear that there can be a fact of the matter whether or not something is 
possible; what is less clear is the nature that this factuality takes. However, my view is not 
committed to this factuality taking any particular form. It does not entail for example, that 
possible worlds exist, or that there is a property of possibleness. It could well be that the 
fact that x is possible in circumstance y, merely means that something similar to x has 
occurred in a circumstance similar to y. If this were how one wished to cash out 
possibility,48 then this would simply mean that the fact that I could fall off this balcony and 
suffer harm, is the fact that in a similar circumstance someone has fallen off a balcony and 
suffered harm, and, that this fact is a j-reason for me to be scared. It doesn’t follow from 
this that one would need to formulate the cognitive component of their fear in these latter 
terms, merely that if they did they would be scared for the same reason as if they 
formulated it in the former terms, and hence, that the appropriateness of the one fear would 
coincide with that of the other. 
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The cognitive component of an emotion is often characterized as an evaluation, and 
this suggests a problem linked to the one just raised. If the cognitive component of an 
emotion is an evaluation, and it picks out a fact, then the values must be factual. But, 
speaking in terms of evaluations is misleading, for example, there is little in the way of an 
evaluation in the belief that someone has died, or that my headache has ended, or that I am 
in danger. Be that as it may, I accept that the issue is not so clear in the case of all 
emotions, for example, one will be embarrassed because a situation is awkward, or angry 
because they have been wronged, or ashamed as they have done wrong. To describe an 
event as a wronging or a situation as awkward, does appear to be to evaluate the situation. 
Nevertheless, I am not committed to the values at issue taking a particular nature. I am not 
committed, for example, to there being a property of wrongness or awkwardness. It could 
be that a wronging is simply the causing of harm, where this could be physical, 
psychological or social, and plausibly, there can be a fact of the matter whether harm of 
this sort has occurred, even if these facts can be hard to fully define.49 Similarly, the 
awkwardness of a situation, could be a matter of the situations propensity to lead to harm, 
which is plausibly a factual matter. Thus, I am happy to believe that there is a fact of the 
matter whether someone has been wronged, or whether a situation is awkward. In order to 
have a counter example to my position, one would have to suppose that there was an 
emotion, the reason for which was not a matter of fact. But I am happy to be sceptical that 
such a case can arise, because I find it implausible that such an emotion would be had for a 
reason at all, because I find it implausible that there can be reasons that are not facts. For 
example, if there was no fact of the matter that something was good, because expressivism 
is correct and to say something is good is simply to express positivity, like cheering, then, 
it is not the case that something’s being good would be a reason. Alternatively, if a value 
was a merely subjective object, it is not clear it could really be a reason, as it is not clear it 
could really make anything justified, though of course the fact that one was in a subjective 
state could be a reason, but this would be a different matter. 
A different problem for the idea that the j-reasons for emotions are facts stems not 
from the idea that they are things of a merely subjective nature, but from the idea that they 
are provided by entities that are more simple than facts, for example, objects. One might 
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be led to believe that emotions can have reasons which are simple objects by considering 
love. It appears that one might simply love a person, rather than love any particular fact 
about them, “she drives me crazy, but I can’t help but love her”. Thus love is often singled 
out as quite unlike other emotions.50 However, love, in its peculiarity, is not generally 
regarded as reasonable or unreasonable. When someone simply loves a person rather than 
anything about them, it is right to say that they do not love that person for a reason, but 
they simply love them. Therefore, we needn’t identify the reason for their love simply with 
the love’s object, rather, we can accept that love is without reason. Moreover, this seems 
generally true of love. I can love someone’s smile, but I cannot love them because of their 
smile, as this would imply that were they to lose their smile, I would lose my love for them, 
and hence, that I did not love them after all. We therefore have good grounds for treating 
love as unlike the emotions I am concerned with, and as no counter example to the idea 
that the j-reasons for emotions are facts. 
 
8.5 Appropriateness and Tense 
 
At this stage I would like to return to Prior’s thank goodness argument, which I 
discussed in Chapter One. Prior suggested that when he said “Thank goodness that’s over”, 
he was expressing relief that the exams were over, not relief that they finished on the 15th 
of June 1954, or that they finished simultaneously with his utterance. Therefore, the 
utterances “that’s over” and “that ended on the 15th of June 1954” or “that ended 
simultaneously with this utterance” do not mean the same, even if they were all uttered at 
the same time. Following the discussion of this chapter we can say Prior’s relief that 
involved the belief ‘that’s over’, would be different from any relief he felt which involved 
the belief ‘that ended on the 15th of June 1954’ or ‘that ended simultaneously with this 
relief’. In this section I will push this distinction between what I shall refer to as the tensed 
and the tenseless emotions of relief a little further. I will also stress the distinction in regard 
to some other emotions. 
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169 
 
Prior not only denies that he has the tenseless emotions of relief; he actually says in 
reference to them: “Why should anyone thank goodness for that?”51 I take this to raise the 
issue not only that these tenseless emotions of relief would be odd, but further, that they 
would be inappropriate.52 It is appropriate to be relieved that a discomfort has ended, but, 
it is inappropriate to be relieved that a discomfort will end (even if it is appropriate to be 
relieved to learn that a discomfort will end, for example, be relieved when one’s 
discomfort at the prospect of endless discomfort ends). In a connected manner, it is 
inappropriate to have a tenseless emotion of relief, because in such tenseless relief one will 
not know whether or not the discomfort has ended. 
That a tenseless belief of the form ‘the discomfort ends at t’, a date tenseless belief, 
does not involve knowledge that the discomfort has ended is clear from the fact that one 
can hold this belief and know that the discomfort has not yet ended. An argument I gave in 
Chapter Two makes this clear in the case of a self-referential tenseless belief, for example, 
‘the discomfort ends before this belief’ (it does not matter to my argument whether we take 
the belief involved in a relief to refer to the relief or the belief so I will speak of the belief 
for simplicity). That is, one might be seeing the belief as a brain state on a computer screen, 
and pointing and saying of the belief seen that the discomfort ends before it. Unaware that 
it is a live image that one is seeing, one does not know whether or not the discomfort has 
ended. (One might think that we can only have images of past or present beliefs, and 
therefore the self-referential belief does involve knowledge that the discomfort has ended. 
However, the pattern of temporal orientation manifested in relief is quite different to that 
manifested in other emotions, and so this cannot be a general response to the matter at 
hand, as I will make clear shortly.) 
One might also be led to think that the tenseless emotions of relief are 
inappropriate as the reasons they pick out are not facts that make the relief appropriate. If a 
discomfort of mine has ended I have reason to feel relieved, and if it has not, I do not. I 
have reason to feel relieved quite independently of other factors, such as, that the sky is 
blue, that I believe the sky is blue, etc., or similarly, I would lack reason quite 
independently of these other factors. More specifically, I have or lack a reason to be 
relieved, whether or not I am relieved, and therefore, whether or not the relief I have is 
after the ending of my discomfort. It thus appears that the fact picked by the tenseless self-
referential belief is not a fact that makes my relief reasonable. Analogously, I have a 
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reason to be relieved if a discomfort has ended, and no reason to be relieved if a 
discomfort of mine has not ended. This is so quite independently of the date on which the 
discomfort ends. Therefore, the fact that the discomfort ends on a specific date is not a fact 
that makes it appropriate for me to be relieved. 
Relief such as Prior’s thus has a temporal aspect to it. It is appropriate to have a 
tensed relief that a discomfort has ended, but it is inappropriate to have a tensed relief that 
a discomfort will end, or a tenseless relief that a discomfort ends at a particular date or 
simultaneously with something else. That is, it is appropriate to have relief which involves 
a tensed belief such as ‘my discomfort has ended’, but inappropriate to have relief that 
involves a tensed belief such as ‘my discomfort will end’, or any tenseless belief. 
Relief is not unique in this respect; a number of other emotions also have temporal 
aspects. Grief, for example, is appropriate when it involves a tensed belief such as ‘x has 
died’, but not when it involves a tensed belief such as ‘x will die’, or a tenseless belief such 
as ‘x dies at t’, or ‘x dies simultaneously with y’. We might say that relief and grief are 
orientated towards the past in their temporal aspect, and we can say the same of gratitude 
and shame. However, fear and anxiety, for example, have a temporal aspect which is 
orientated towards the future. It is appropriate to be scared that one will be in danger, but 
not appropriate to be scared that one was in danger. It is appropriate to feel anxious that 
one will suffer harm, but not that one did suffer harm.53 This orientation towards the past 
and future needn’t rule out the role of the present, for example, it can be appropriate to fear 
when one is in danger and to feel relief that a discomfort is ending. 
We saw that in the case of relief, that no relief that involved a tenseless belief was 
appropriate. This followed from the fact that the tenseless relief didn’t involve an 
awareness of whether the discomfort was past or not (and also because of a consideration 
of the nature of the reasons involved). Analogously, we can see that the same holds in the 
case of the other temporally orientated emotions. For example, in the case of fear one can 
have the tenseless belief that ‘I am in danger at t’, and not know whether one is, will be, or, 
was in danger. One can also have the self-referential belief ‘I am in danger simultaneously 
with this belief’ and not know whether one is, will be, or, was in danger. This is made 
clear by considering someone viewing their belief as brain state on a computer screen. 
They may believe of the belief they see that they are in danger simultaneously with it, but 
not knowing whether the image is live or not, they don’t know whether the danger is future 
                                                 
53
 Which is not to say that one cannot be afraid or anxious about gaining the results of some tests that will tell 
one if one did suffer harm. But here the learning is future, and the object of concern. 
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present or past. If it is not possible to have an image of something future, then it remains 
clear that the person at issue would not know whether or not the danger was past, and 
therefore, that they wouldn’t know whether the fear was appropriate. 
Emotions can have a temporal orientation, and hence, can be such that they are 
only appropriate if they involve a tensed belief, not if they involve a tenseless one. Prior’s 
relief is a case in point, not only does he lack the tenseless emotions of relief, he is quite 
right to lack them. 
 
8.6 The Argument from Emotions 
 
In this section I will bring together what has been revealed about emotions in order 
to provide an argument against the tenseless theory of time. This argument will reflect 
what I take to be the core of Prior’s thank goodness argument. 
I have shown that whilst we can consider the practical value of an emotion, this is 
not generally what is of concern when one considers the appropriateness of the emotion. 
This led me to consider what is generally at issue in the appropriateness of an emotion. An 
emotion can be appropriate or not in respect of the belief that it involves, that is, in respect 
of whether or not the belief it involves is an appropriate belief. One might think of this in 
terms of the origin of the belief, whether it arose from a source which was liable to give 
rise to true beliefs. I showed that emotions must also be appropriate or not in a further 
respect, and that this was a matter of whether or not the emotion was had for a reason that 
justified that emotion. The reason an emotion is had for is simply the fact which is the 
content of the belief that the emotion involves. This fits our everyday practice of giving 
reasons for our emotions, or reasons which would justify being emotional. It also appears 
to provide us with all the resources necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of an 
emotion. 
I have also considered the pattern of appropriateness that arises in the case of some 
emotions. It was shown that there are a number of emotions of which it is true that that 
emotion can be appropriate when it involves a tensed belief, but cannot be appropriate 
when it involves a tenseless one. I referred to such emotions as emotions with a temporal 
aspect, and I will here refer to them simply as temporal emotions. 
The respect in which a temporal emotion is appropriate or not according to whether 
or not it involves a tensed belief, appears to be a matter of the reasonableness of the 
emotion. The fact that the exams are over is a j-reason for Prior to feel relieved, whist the 
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fact that they occur on the 15th of June 1954 and the fact that they finish before his relief 
are not reasons for him to feel relieved. Moreover, Prior’s relief would be inappropriate 
when it involved a tenseless belief, even if those tenseless beliefs were themselves 
appropriate, that is, they arose from a source liable to lead to true beliefs. (The schedule of 
the exams is set out in advance, and Prior knows from past experience, and maybe talking 
with some psychologist friends, that he will feel relief after the exams.) In addition, we do 
not know what the practical advantages of Prior’s relief are, or even whether or not it has 
any practical advantages, so it is clear that its practical value is not of concern here. 
Further, we can assume that the cases of relief based on the different beliefs would all be 
equally advantageous, and an asymmetry in their appropriateness would still exist. 
Our consideration of emotions thus shows that when Prior is relieved because the 
exams are over he is relieved for a reason picked out by his belief ‘the exams are over’. 
Further, this reason cannot be picked out by any of Prior’s tenseless beliefs, because, the 
relief would not be reasonable if it involved a tenseless belief. Because the reasons at issue 
are facts, it follows that Prior’s tensed belief picks out a fact not picked out by any 
tenseless belief. 
The tenseless theory is the view that tensed beliefs do not capture any facts not 
captured by tenseless beliefs. To deny this would be to imply that there can be facts that 
one must grasp to understand tensed language but which they must not grasp to understand 
tenseless language, but yet that these facts were not captured by the tensed language, 
which is implausible. Therefore, the nature of emotions entails that the tenseless theory of 
time is wrong. 
In order to undermine this argument the tenseless theory would have to find fault 
with this account of emotions, something which its coherence and fitting with everyday 
practice defies. Furthermore, it is very clear that Mellor’s reference to the brute fact that 
Prior’s relief comes after the end of the exams, and his insistence that the belief it involves 
has tenseless truth-makers, is not sufficient to upset this criticism. It is in no way obvious 
why the temporal location of the relief would require that it must involve a tensed belief in 
order to be appropriate. 
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CHAPTER NINE: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In the preceding chapters I have provided two arguments to show that the tenseless 
theory of time is mistaken. In this chapter I will consider a number of issues that are 
brought to the fore by these arguments. I will begin by showing how my treatment of 
Perry’s argument differs from many of those found in the literature. I will argue that 
although I draw conclusions from this argument which are not commonly drawn, this is a 
result of my emphasizing an aspect of Perry’s argument not often emphasized. I will also 
respond to some criticisms of Perry’s argument. 
I will then consider some of the problems raised by my conclusion, that is, by a 
recognition that first-personal and tensed beliefs/language pick out facts not picked out by 
non-first-personal and tenseless beliefs/language respectively. I will outline McTaggart’s 
paradox and the private language argument. I will not provide full solutions to these 
problems, but I will say something to take the sting out of their tails. 
 
9.1 The Problem of the Essential Indexical 
 
In presenting his argument Perry1 refers to the problem of the essential indexical, 
and I too have treated his argument as providing a problem. However, the problem that I 
consider is different from that which Perry and a number of subsequent writers have 
addressed. Perry raises his argument as a problem for what he calls the traditional view 
that belief is a relation to a proposition. The view that when I believe that JP is making a 
mess, I am in the believing relation to the proposition that JP is making a mess. 
According to the traditional view2 propositions have a particular nature, they have a 
determinate and unchanging truth-value. Further, two propositions are the same only if 
they share the same truth-value, they attribute the same properties or relations to the same 
objects, and, they involve the same concepts. The propositions that grass is green, and, 
that snow is white meet the first condition but fail the second two. The propositions that 
the home of the rules of golf is in Scotland, and, that St Andrews is in Scotland, meet the 
first two conditions but fail the third. 
                                                 
1
 Perry:1979. 
2
 Perry takes this view of propositions to be held by Frege, though Evans:1981 thinks that Perry is unfair in 
some of his treatment of Frege’s position (cf. Perry:1977). 
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The question Perry raises is: Q1, what proposition does an agent believe when they 
have an indexical belief? The argument for the essential indexical makes this problematic, 
as we know that in certain cases an agent can have all the non-indexical beliefs that one 
could have, and still fail to have a requisite indexical belief. This implies that they can 
have a belief relation to all of the propositions captured by non-indexical utterances, and 
not have one to a proposition expressed by an indexical utterance. For example, I can 
believe ‘FP is making a mess’ and ‘the only son of FHP is making a mess’, but not know ‘I 
am making a mess’ because I can fail to know ‘I am FP’ and ‘I am the only son of FHP’. 
Furthermore, when I believe ‘I am making a mess’ I believe something quite different to 
that which is believed by anyone else when they believe ‘I am making a mess’. 
This problem is not resolved by altering our notion of proposition either, for 
example, if we instead propose relativized propositions which are only true at a particular 
index3 such as the proposition that I am making a mess. A proposition only true at me 
when I am making a mess, and only true at someone else when they are making a mess. 
Such relativized propositions must not only be believed, but be believed true at an index, 
as I can believe the proposition that I am making a mess is true of JP, but not of me, if I 
believe that JP is making a mess but I am not. But it follows from this that I must believe 
that the proposition that I am making a mess is true at me, when I believe I am making a 
mess. Further, because I can fail to know that I am FP etc., I must believe ‘the proposition 
that I am making a mess is true at me’, a belief picking me out with a first-personal 
indexical, not any non-first-personal referring expression. Therefore, the essential 
indexical reappears and our problem is not removed. 
The problem is also not removed if we turn from talking of what might be termed 
de dicto beliefs, to talking of de re beliefs, beliefs in which an object stands in a special 
relation to the believer which enables them to refer to it without necessarily picking out 
anything particular about it. For example, when I see a person, and believe of that person 
that they are tall, without my having to note any individuating quality of the person.4 This 
move to de re beliefs does not solve the problem, as one is able to have a de re belief of 
                                                 
3
 It is quite common to think that propositions only have a truth-value relative to a possible world, so the 
proposition that FP is making a mess will be true in all those worlds where I make a mess, but not in any 
others. The indexes at issue here are thus ones within a world, for example, a context consisting of an agent, 
a time and a place. 
4
 There are a number of different accounts of de re beliefs some of which would involve one needing to 
know something particular about the referent, but most agree that it is one’s special relation to the referent, 
rather than the knowing of the quality, which distinguishes the de re from the de dicto (cf. Kaplan:1968). 
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oneself that one is making a mess, without believing ‘I am making a mess’. As Perry notes, 
I could see myself in a mirror making a mess, and believe of the person I see that they are 
making a mess, but fail to know that I am the person that I see. 
Perry proposes to solve the problem by differentiating the proposition believed 
from the belief state, so that two beliefs can be different despite picking out the same 
proposition, because they nonetheless manifest different belief states. The answer to Q1 is 
hence that an indexical belief will pick out the same proposition as a related non-indexical 
belief. When I believe ‘I am making a mess’ and ‘FP is making a mess’, my beliefs 
concern the same proposition, the proposition that FP is making a mess, though they 
manifest different belief states. When JP believes ‘I am making a mess’ he will be in a 
belief state of the same type as I am in when I believe ‘I am making a mess’, though his 
belief will pick out a different proposition from mine, namely the proposition that JP is 
making a mess. Moreover, the actions of an individual are responsive to the belief states 
they are in, rather than the propositions they believe, and therefore, I act differently when I 
have an indexical belief than when I have a non-indexical belief that picks out the same 
proposition.  
Perry’s reference to belief states therefore plays two roles, it shows how two beliefs 
that pick out the same proposition can have a different cognitive significance, and, can 
lead to different actions. Belief states thus answer a further question: Q2, how can 
indexical and non-indexical beliefs pick out the same facts and yet have different cognitive 
significance and lead to different actions? 
My question, however, differs from either Q1 or Q2, it is: Q3, how can an action be 
rational when it involves an indexical belief though not when it involves any non-indexical 
belief? I am led to Q3 by noting that Perry’s argument for the essential indexical shows not 
merely that indexical beliefs are essential for a particular doing of an agent, but 
specifically, for a particular rational action of the agent. It is clear that one can answer Q1 
and Q2 without answering Q3 because people can act irrationally. Moreover, one can give 
a story to meet Q1 and Q2 that pays no attention at all to the rationality of an action. 
Perry’s reference to belief states, even if it could answer Q1 and Q2, is no answer 
to Q3, as we have seen that rationality demands that a response to Q3 must involve 
recognizing that the indexical and non-indexical beliefs pick out different facts, and hence 
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different propositions5. This is not surprising given that I believe Perry was not concerned 
with Q3, nevertheless, Q3 derives from the argument for the essential indexical, and 
therefore Perry has failed to address this argument. Conversely, a proper answer to Q3 
does address Q1 and Q2. If indexical beliefs pick out different facts from non-indexical 
ones then the two will likely involve different propositions and inevitably have a different 
cognitive significance therefore leading to different actions. We needn’t answer Q2 
directly rather we dissolve the need to answer it by accounting for the data differently.6 
 
9.2 Other Responses to Perry’s Problem 
 
Many7 of those who have considered the argument for the essential indexical have 
focused, as Perry did, on Q1 and Q2 or the concerns they reflect, and these concerns are 
also reflected in many accounts of the semantics of indexicals. I find this unsurprising 
given the origins of the argument and the fact that the questions are very interesting in 
their own right. I will now briefly outline some of the other major responses that have been 
given, and will indicate how they meet Q1 and Q2, but fail to meet Q3. I will not attempt 
to consider all accounts that have been given of indexicals, I merely wish to make 
plausible the idea that discussions often fail to consider Q3, and thereby, to account for 
why my conclusions differ from many other responses to the argument for the essential 
indexical. 
Lewis8  answers Q1 by denying that beliefs are relations to propositions at all. 
Rather, when an agent has a belief they attribute a property to themselves. This enables 
Lewis to account, in part, for the argument for the essential indexical, because he takes 
properties to be more fine-grained than propositions. For Lewis propositions are sets of 
possible worlds, so the proposition that JP is making a mess, will be the set of all the 
worlds in which JP is making a mess, the proposition that FP is happy, will be the set of 
                                                 
5
 Plausibly at least, though I do not want to be committed to this idea, perhaps a single I-proposition picks 
out different facts for different people. 
6
 Perry expands upon this view in more recent work (e.g. 1997, 1998, and, 2006) in doing so he makes more 
propositions and facts relevant to the indexical beliefs, propositions concerning meaning and context, but it is 
clear that unless these are propositions that give facts non-indexical beliefs cannot capture, which they don’t, 
then they won’t be adequate to answer Q3. 
7
 There are of course exceptions. Perhaps most notable is Castaneda, whose work inspired Perry and who 
goes on to give a more detailed account of action (cf. Castaneda:1990 & 1992). Parfit:1987 is another 
counterexample. However, I have addressed these accounts, by defending a particular view of rational action 
in Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
8
 Lewis:1979, see also Lewis:2001 for details regarding possible worlds, propositions and properties. 
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worlds in which FP is happy, and so on. Properties, however, cut across worlds as well as 
between them. The property of redness, for example, is the set of all those entities, in all 
possible worlds, which are red. Lewis has an abundant view of properties, so that, for 
example, inhabiting a world in which JP is making a mess is a property. Because of this, 
there will be a property for each proposition, however, there will be more properties 
besides. 
According to Lewis, when I believe ‘Durham is in England’, I self-ascribe the 
property of living in a world in which Durham is in England. I narrow down the world I 
live in to being a world from this set. Similarly, when I believe ‘FP is making a mess’, I 
self-ascribe the property of living in a world in which FP9 is making a mess. These are 
beliefs that could easily be accounted for with reference to propositions. On the other hand, 
when I, FP, believe ‘I am making a mess’, I self-ascribe the property of making a mess. 
This property cannot be captured by a proposition (hence the problem for the traditional 
view). This difference in property self-ascribed accounts for why my first-personal belief 
and my third personal belief have a different cognitive significance and lead to different 
actions (i.e. Q2). 
Nevertheless, Lewis must say something more to account for the role of tensed 
beliefs, that is, to account for how my 2pm belief ‘it is 2pm now’ differs from any 
tenseless belief of mine, such as my belief ‘2pm is 2pm’. They cannot both simply be the 
self-ascription of the property of living in a world where 2pm is 2pm as they play different 
roles. Lewis accounts for this by saying that people are not continuants, but are in fact 
composed by time-slices each of which exists at only one time.10 When I know ‘it is 2pm 
now’, my 2pm time-slice self-ascribes the property of existing at 2pm, which is quite 
different from it self-ascribing the property of being a time-slice of a person that exists 
between 6pm 12/05/1946 and 11pm 9/2/2000. With these tools one can also account for the 
difference between my believing whilst in London that ‘London is here’ and my believing 
‘London is London’. In the former I self-ascribe the property of existing in London, in the 
latter I self-ascribe the property of existing in a world where London is London. 
                                                 
9
 Lewis believes that individuals exist in only one possible world, but that they have counterparts that are 
relevantly similar and that exist in different possible worlds, to this extent my presentation is misleading, it 
might be better to speak of self-ascribing the property of living in a world in which someone called ‘FP’ is 
making a mess. But this does not affect my argument, so for ease of presentation I write as I do in the main 
text. 
10
 Again I slightly misrepresent Lewis here, as he believes that time slices can have a duration, so long as 
they do not change in that time. However, again, this doesn’t alter my argument, so for simplicity I speak as I 
do. (Cf. Lewis:1983a, 1983b, and, 2001.). 
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In this way Lewis can answer Q1 and Q2, indexical beliefs will involve a relation 
to a property, not a proposition, and they will differ from non-indexical beliefs by differing 
in respect to these properties. Nevertheless, Lewis’s account does not provide an adequate 
answer to Q3. On Lewis’s account the set of entities that one is related to in a particular 
first-personal belief might be different to the set of entities one is related to in any non-
first-personal belief, but, these sets of entities are not reasons to act. Reasons to act are 
states of the actual world, facts. We know from Chapters Six and Eight that in order to 
answer Q3 Lewis must say that an indexical belief captures facts not captured by any non-
indexical belief. But this is not a result of Lewis’s position (thus Lewis’s answer to Q2 is 
that the beliefs involve different properties).11 I am a member of the set of entities that 
have the property of making a mess in virtue of the fact that I actually make a mess. My 
actually making a mess, is also part of that in virtue of which I am a member of the set of 
entities that inhabit a world in which FP is making a mess. There is a reason that the sets 
converge in the actual world. (One might want to say that facts, and reasons can concern 
possible worlds as well as the actual world, but this does not undermine my point, as once 
you have the states of all the possible worlds, that is everything that can be captured non-
first-personally, you also have all the states of all the entities in those worlds, that is, 
everything that can be captured first-personally.) 
Chisholm12 offers an account very similar to Lewis’s, except Chisholm does not 
posit time-slices of people, instead recognizing that tensed beliefs capture something about 
the world not captured by tenseless beliefs. In this way he can go part way towards an 
answer to Q3 (though he does not consider the role of rationality as I have). However, his 
account remains insufficient as he does not recognize that first- and non-first-personal 
beliefs must capture different facts. 
                                                 
11
 One should not get mislead by Lewis’s talk of properties, one does not merely have beliefs about 
properties (even if one believes through properties). For one thing, this interpretation of Lewis would render 
his view incoherent. Because we can know that there are some things which are not properties, but on this 
interpretation we can only know about properties. For example, my having a property cannot itself be a 
property, so that, for example, when I have the property of being happy, I also have the property of having 
the property of being happy, otherwise we are launched on a vicious Bradley style regress. But then I cannot 
have a belief about my having a property on this interpretation of Lewis, but this is surely absurd. (Similarly, 
it is no good to suppose that all of our beliefs are about our having properties, as we can also have beliefs 
about our beliefs.) 
12
 Chisholm:1981. I am inclined to agree with Chisholm that people do not exist through time by being made 
up of time slices, for arguments to this effect see, e.g., Lowe:1987a and 1998 chs.4 & 5. 
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Stalnaker13 responds to Perry’s argument for the essential indexical by saying that 
we can recognize there to be more propositions relevant to a belief than Perry appreciates 
and with which we can characterize the beliefs at issue. The propositions Perry recognizes 
can be thought of as functions from a possible world, to a truth-value (horizontal 
propositions). For example, the proposition that JP is making a mess, is a function that 
gives the value true for any argument which is a world in which JP is making a mess, and 
the value false for any other argument. However, Stalnaker suggests that we can recognize 
further propositions, which can be thought of as functions from pairs of possible worlds to 
truth-values, or as functions from possible worlds to horizontal propositions, so called 
diagonal propositions.14 For Stalnaker these diagonal propositions can characterise certain 
beliefs, for example, if I am willing to accept the utterance “FP is FP” but am unsure about 
the utterance “I am FP”, what I do not know is the diagonal proposition arising for the 
utterance “I am FP”, that is, the proposition that is true in a world if and only if the 
proposition expressed by the utterance “I am FP” in that world, is true in that world. This 
is different from the proposition expressed by “I am FP” in this or any other world, as can 
be seen by the fact that the proposition expressed by “I am FP” in this world, the 
proposition FP is FP, is true in all possible worlds. But had that utterance been made by 
me in a world in which ‘FP’ referred to someone else, to JP, it would be the proposition 
that FP is JP, which is false in all possible worlds. The diagonal proposition, on the other 
hand would be true in the actual world, but false in the possible world in which JP is 
known by the name ‘FP’. However, Stalnaker stresses that these diagonal propositions 
needn’t be thought of as a special variety of propositions, because they too could be the 
horizontal propositions of different utterances. 
Stalnaker thus tries to answer Q1 and Q2 by referring to a further set of 
propositions which are associated with the beliefs at issue.15 However, this is no answer to 
Q3, because, as with Lewis above, someone possessing all possible non-indexical 
knowledge would thereby know all of the facts [the states of our world, the reasons] that 
they could in an instance of indexical knowledge. In fact, Stalnaker16 appears to agree as 
much at a later date, at which time he emphasizes that what is crucial about an indexical 
                                                 
13
 Stalnaker:1981. 
14
 Stalnaker’s view is a form of two-dimensionalism, as I discussed in Chapter Seven. 
15
 I am not sure that this really works, because I don’t think it is clear that a diagonal proposition associated 
with a required indexical belief could not be the content of an appropriate non-indexical belief. 
16
 Stalnaker:1999. 
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belief is not so much what one knows in that belief, but one’s perspective upon that 
content. 
These failings are not surprising, as Perry, Lewis, Chisholm and Stalnaker did not 
try to address Q3, they did not consider the nature of rationality. But with Q3 in mind, they 
are quite obvious, one’s brain states, or the properties or propositions one is related to in a 
belief, to the extent that they can vary independently of the facts that one is aware of in 
those beliefs, are not relevant to the rationality of an action arising from those beliefs. The 
rationality of one’s action is concerned with its being an agential response to the world, it 
does not matter how one is composed. 
Evans17 meets the concerns of Q1 and Q2 in part through recognizing there to be 
more propositions than Perry was willing to accept, for example, in my first-personal 
beliefs I will be related to propositions that no one else can be related to.18 To this extent 
the comments I just made in regard to the other writers apply equally here. But Evans also 
emphasizes (perhaps more so than the others) the relations between beliefs and 
information and dispositions to act. These relations being in part constitutive of beliefs. 
That is, for example, my first-personal and third-personal beliefs just are differently 
responsive to sources of information and lead to different actions. 
This invites the idea that, for example, my belief ‘I am making a mess’ is essential 
for my action of stopping, because a belief which leads to this action just is an ‘I am 
making a mess’ belief.19 However, this cannot be correct, as I have already argued, I could 
instead act on a third-personal belief if I act irrationally. The point I wish to make clear 
here, and that I take to be a failing of Evans’, is that the ties he makes between beliefs and 
actions are plausible only for rational actions. A belief cannot be defined in terms of the 
actions it leads to, as it might lead to any action. Nevertheless a particular belief will fit 
only a specific set of rational actions. However, taking this association with rational 
actions to be partly constitutive of a belief does not account for why it and the rational 
actions fit together in this way, it does not answer Q3, at best it says that there is no 
explanation, “here our spade is turned”. But, not only is it fair to think that there ought to 
be an explanation here, I have already provided one, that is, the beliefs and rational actions 
co-vary in this way because a belief is an awareness of particular facts, and these facts are 
j-reasons for a particular set of rational actions. 
                                                 
17
 Evans:1982. 
18
 Which is not to say it is subjective (cf. Evans:1981). 
19
 I do not mean Evans would say something this simplistic. 
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9.3 Criticisms of Perry’s Argument Rebutted 
 
Some20 writers have responded to Perry’s argument by denying its cogency, and I 
will here briefly respond to these points. One popular criticism is that people might, and in 
fact do, for example young children and some politicians, refer to themselves using their 
own name, rather than with an indexical. From which it appears to follow an indexical is 
not essential for the rational actions Perry refers to. 
It is important to distinguish the cases here. A mature English speaker, even if they 
can speak of themselves in the third person, must have a first-personal belief in the cases 
Perry describes. If Perry knows what ‘I’ means he must believe ‘I am making a mess’ 
when he acts rationally, even if he might also believe ‘JP is making a mess’.21  This case 
alone is all I require to run the arguments I have. This case is very different from the case 
of a child who has an incomplete grasp of language, and therefore uses their own name 
first-personally “FP want sweetie”. Such a child does not know how to use ‘I’, and thus 
they do not use it. However, such a child is not irrational if they do not use ‘I’, to this 
extent they needn’t have an ‘I’ belief. But, given what we have learnt from the case of the 
mature adult, it is appropriate to say that the child simply uses their name in two different 
ways, in one way to pick out third-personal facts, in another way to pick out first-personal 
facts. In short the child simply speaks a different language, and therefore their case does 
nothing to undermine the case involving the mature English speaker (just as a monolingual 
German speaker does not). We might note that no one uses ‘2pm’ or some other substitute 
temporal reference in place of ‘now’. We should not take this to mean that they could not 
coin a phrase for this use. Rather it is clear that they could coin any phrase, no one lends 
itself in particular, which undermines the impression present in the name case, to suppose 
that the term we coin in place of ‘now’ would simply be used in its usual way to pick out 
the same facts. 
Perry’s argument has also been criticized on the grounds that it in fact concerns an 
opaque22 context.23 In short it can be appropriate to say “JP believes FP is messy” and 
                                                 
20
 E.g. McMullen:1985, Tiffany:2000, and to a lesser extent Boer & Lycan:1980 (e.g. p.460). 
21
 Note Perry doesn’t need to have a ‘JP is making a mess’ belief even if he knows what ‘JP’ means. This is 
most clear because he could know what ‘JP’ means and not know it was his name (if asked, he can pick out 
which one is JP in his class photo etc.). 
22
 Cf. Frege:1980, Quine:1956, Davidson:2001f, and, Kaplan:1968. 
23
 E.g. by Tiffany:2000. 
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inappropriate to say “JP believes OP is messy”, even though FP is OP. This is because the 
sentence ‘FP is messy’ is in the scope of a believes-that operator, and it is commonly 
thought that one cannot replace co-referring terms within the scope of such an operator. 
The implication being that we shouldn’t expect to provide the same explanation of Perry’s 
action by saying “Perry believes JP is making a mess” and by saying “Perry believes 
himself to be making a mess” because we know believes-that creates a strange context. 
I confess I do not know exactly how the above criticism is to be cashed out, but 
there are reasons opacity doesn’t undermine my argument and these are things it is 
valuable to make clear. The opacity of the context does not undermine the idea that the fact 
that it was appropriate for Perry to say “I came to believe that I was making a mess” and 
not to say “I came to believe that JP is making a mess” in order to explain his action, 
implies that he is picking out different beliefs in so speaking. That is, if it is appropriate for 
me to say “I believe FP is happy” and inappropriate for me to say “I believe OP is happy”, 
this can imply that if I were to say the latter I would pick out a different belief of mine than 
if I say the former, especially if I am familiar with both names but don’t know they co-
refer. This is made clear by Frege’s24 account of opaque contexts according to which a 
sentence has a different reference to usual when it is within the scope of a believes-that 
operator (as we saw in Chapter Seven). So even if the sentences ‘FP is happy’ and ‘OP is 
happy’ co-refer, the sentences ‘FP believes that FP is happy’ and ‘FP believes that OP is 
happy’ do not. In short, it is still correct to suppose that Perry’s first-personal belief is 
different from a third-personal one he has in that context. This difference in beliefs is all 
my argument requires, as we can now ask how these beliefs differ and why? And our 
answer will be one but not the other is associated with first-personal language and makes 
Perry’s action rational, because it captures facts the other does not. 
This difference in Perry’s beliefs is made clear by the fact that Perry is likely to say 
“I am making a mess” when he has a first-personal belief, and not when he has a third-
personal one, if he has forgotten he is JP for example.25 It is this aspect of the beliefs that I 
utilize in my notation of referring to beliefs within inverted commas. In this manner, when 
I say “Perry believes ‘I am making a mess’”, I do not create an opaque context. Because of 
this, we could present the argument for the essential indexical without referring to beliefs 
                                                 
24
 Frege:1980. 
25
 This doesn’t undermine the comments I made regarding Evans, rather there I recognized the likely 
covariance of beliefs and actions, the qualification was merely that the actions be rational, and most of our 
actions are, hence my current supposition (and probably Evans’s). 
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at all, for example, if one said to Perry when he realized what he was doing but before he 
managed to stop himself “What are you doing now?”, his response would have to involve 
[if he was being honest etc.] his uttering a first-personal indexical word. The question is 
then why his so speaking and his stopping coincide? And the answer is because they share 
content, and that content is a reason to say that and to stop.26 
 
9.4 McTaggart’s Paradox 
 
McTaggart’s Paradox, as I shall refer to it, is the most discussed criticism of the 
tensed theory of time. In this section I will present it, and show that there are a number of 
ways the tensed theory can respond to it. 
As we saw in Chapter One, McTaggart, instead of speaking of tense, spoke of the 
A- and B-series, and A- and B-characteristics. The A-series is the series running from the 
distant past to the far future, and A-characteristics are the characteristics of presentness, 
pastness, and futurity. The B-series is the series from earlier to later, and the B-
characteristics are earlier and later (or before and after). The latter captures tenseless time, 
the former tensed time. 
McTaggart27 argued as follows: P1, time requires change; P2, change requires the 
A-series; P3, the A-series is impossible; C1, therefore time is impossible. McTaggart 
provides little argument in support of P1. Whilst there is scope to question it28 I will not do 
so here as I believe the heart of the matter lies elsewhere. 
McTaggart took the constituents of times to be events, and his defence of P2 
assumes that if there is change, it must be the changing of events. He argues that events 
cannot change by coming into or out of existence as their order in the B-series is 
unchanging. Events also cannot change most of their properties or constituents; the sun 
rising at 4am, must occur at 4am and must be a rising of the sun, otherwise it is a different 
event. The only characteristics of an event that can change and that event remain the same 
event, are it’s A-characteristics, a sunrise can pass from the future into the past, and remain 
the same event. Thus McTaggart concludes change requires the A-series. 
                                                 
26
 Tiffany:2000 actually seems to suppose that if we asked Perry why he stopped, he would have to say 
“Because I believed I was making a mess”, not “I was making a mess”. This doesn’t undermine my response 
to the worries about opacity, moreover the arguments I gave in Chapter Three show that Tiffany is mistaken. 
27
 First in McTaggart:1908, and in a slightly expanded form in McTaggart:1927 ch.33.  
28
 Cf. Shoemaker:1969. 
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McTaggart notes that A1, the A-characteristics are incompatible. If an event is past, 
it is not also present or future, and if it is present it is not future or past, and if it is future it 
is not present or past. (Things can of course be extended in time, but if we make more fine 
grained distinctions McTaggart’s point seems right, for example, if the beginning of the 
war is past, it is not present or future. I’ll therefore, ignore temporal extension as a counter 
example in my discussion.) However, McTaggart believes that A2, every event must have 
all three characteristics, every event is past, present, and future. It must pass from being 
future to being present and then past (if there is a beginning or end of time some events 
might have only two characteristics but this changes little). Thus McTaggart believes that 
the A-series is self-contradictory, and hence impossible, P3. 
In considering how the tensed theory can respond to McTaggart’s paradox it is 
fruitful to bear in mind that it is often supposed that the tenseless theory can avoid the 
paradox but the tensed theory cannot [therefore the tenseless theory is right]. 29  The 
tenseless response to the paradox denies P2 and hence C1, concluding the B-series can 
exist but the A-series cannot. 
Russell30 provides a very different account of change to McTaggart’s. For Russell, 
it is things rather than events that change, for example, a tomato changes from green to red 
as it ripens. In short, a thing changes if it has a property at one time that it does not have at 
another time.31 
McTaggart considers such a response to his argument, but criticizes this account of 
change on two grounds. Firstly, it doesn’t appear to provide change, as the facts remain 
unchanging. Secondly, it does not account for why change does not occur in space in an 
analogous way, for example, when an object has a property at one place, but not at another 
place (imagine a poker partially in the fire, with one hot end and one cold end). 
However, McTaggart’s rebuttal is weak. His first point merely presupposes the 
account of change under consideration is wrong, and thus has no force. His second point, 
whilst interesting, can be met because there are asymmetries between time and space, for 
example, causation happens across time but not necessarily across space.32 
                                                 
29
 For example: Broad:1921 (though he later changed his mind adopting a tensed theory, e.g. Broad:1923), 
Blake:1925, Braithwaite:1928, Mellor:1998, Le Poidevin:1991, and Oaklander:2004 (especially 
‘McTaggart’s Paradox Defended’). 
30
 Russell:1996 sect.442. 
31
 Russell’s definition refers to the truth-values of propositions (Russell:1996 sect.442 p.469), however, one 
needn’t go into these complications (e.g. Le Poidevin:1998 p.16). 
32
 E.g. Le Poidevin:1991 and Bourne:2006. Lowe:1987b offers a rather different asymmetry; one’s 
spatiotemporal route must follow a particular temporal order, but not necessarily a particular spatial one. 
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The tenseless theory could thus adopt a Russellian account of change, and thereby 
deny P2. Nevertheless, it is also open to a tensed theory to adopt such a theory of change, 
but to insist upon P2. If one has independent reasons for thinking time is tensed then these 
are reasons for thinking that the references to time made in the Russellian definition of 
change must be references to a tensed time (or an A-series).33 
McTaggart’s defence of P3 assumes A1 and A2, however, A234 is clearly false, 
nothing is past, present and future. My sitting down to supper this evening is future, but 
not present or past. My writing this is present, but not future or past. My birth is past, but 
not future or present. Therefore, P3 ought to be denied. Moreover, this should be clear 
from the plausibility of the tenseless account of the truth-conditions of tensed sentences.  
According to this account a token of ‘e is present’ said at t is true if and only if e occurs at 
t, a token of ‘e is past’ said at t is true if and only if e is before t, and, a token of ‘e is 
future’ said at t is true if and only if e is after t.35 Therefore on the tenseless theory a token 
of ‘e is past, present and future’ said at t is true if and only if e is before, simultaneous with, 
and after t. As we are neglecting the temporal extension of e to make A1 plausible, these 
truth-conditions can never be fulfilled, so A2 is clearly false. 
It is worth noting that the ‘is’ in the ‘every event is past, present, and future’ of A2, 
is plausibly a present tensed one and hence implies simultaneity. 36  Not only is it 
implausible that something can have an A-characteristic timelessly or tenselessly, a 
timeless or tenseless ‘is’ would not lead to self-contradiction nor impossibility. For 
example, if we consider A3, red and green exclude one another, and A4, a tomato is red 
and green. A3 and A4 only contradict if the ‘is’ of A4 is present tensed. We can say 
tenselessly [perhaps timelessly] that “a tomato is red and green” quite truthfully, for 
example, if the tomato is green at time t1 and red at time t2.37 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mellor:1981a instead notes that objects are extended through space by having spatial parts, but they are not 
extended through time by having temporal parts (hence disagreeing with Lewis’s view mentioned above). 
33
 For a rather different, arguably tensed, account of change see Lowe:2006b. 
34
 Some deny A2 on the grounds that only the present exists, e.g. Bourne:2006, but I don’t think a denial of 
A2 entails presentism. 
35
 This accommodates both the token-reflexive and date accounts of the truth-conditions, as in order to be 
simultaneous with an utterance e must occur at the time of the utterance. 
36
 In saying this I disagree with those who criticize McTaggart for using a tenseless or timeless ‘is’ here (e.g. 
Broad:1938 pt.I ch.XXXV, Prior:1967 pt.I, sect.2). I take my lead from Smith, Q. (e.g. 1994b). 
37
 It is worth noting that my argument in the preceding paragraph does not assume the argument of this 
paragraph. 
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Denying A2, and hence P3, undermines McTaggart’s argument and prevents the 
paradox being a problem for the tensed theory of time. Nevertheless, I will say a little 
more in order to explain away the temptation to accept A2. 
McTaggart supports A2 with reference to his theory of change, according to which 
events pass from future to past. However, we have already seen that we needn’t accept 
McTaggart’s theory of change, furthermore, this theory of change does not entail an event 
is past, present, and future. At best it encourages one to say A6, an event is past, and was 
present and was earlier still future, or, will be past, is present, and was future, or, is future 
and will be present, and will subsequently be past. Any of the disjuncts of A6, and hence 
A6 itself, are compatible with A1. Just as we can truthfully say a tomato is green and will 
be red, without contradicting A3. 
Nonetheless, McTaggart does consider A6 and any of its disjuncts to be 
incompatible with A1. McTaggart argues for this conclusion as he thinks that his opponent 
might try to deny A2 replacing it instead with a disjunct of A6. “My birth is not past, 
present, and future, rather, it is past, was present, and was before that future.” McTaggart 
argues that this move from A2 to a disjunct of A6 is inadequate to remove conflict with A1, 
because, it is entails either a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. McTaggart says 
this because he takes saying, for example, “e will be past”, to be equivalent to saying “e is 
past in the future”, and so moving from A2 to A6 or one of its disjuncts is simply the move 
from one set of A-characteristics, to two sets. Therefore, if one set was a problem, i.e. A2, 
then two sets, i.e. A6, will be too. 
However, it is clear A6 and its disjuncts are compatible with A1, just as e’s being 
present is, or its being future is, or its being past is. We don’t need to say “e is past, present 
and future”, to say “e is past”, “e is present”, or “e is future”, that is, we needn’t adopt A2 
to adopt the tensed theory or A-series. Similarly, we don’t need to say A7, e was present, 
is present, and will be present, to say A6 or one of its disjuncts. A7 could be problematic, 
and could be a step on a vicious circle or infinite regress. But A6 and its disjuncts are not. 
We have seen that the tenseless theory, like the tensed theory, ought to deny A2, 
and clearly the same considerations show they ought to deny A7, and hence P3. Thus far 
the two theories are in fact on a par. However, it might appear that the tenseless theory has 
an advantage with A6. The tenseless theory will say, for example, a token of “e was 
future” tokened at t, is true if and only if there is a time t* such that t* is before t, and e is 
after t*. In this there is no implication that we must introduce a new aspect or dimension of 
time, or even a new time series. However, it appears that the tensed theory must introduce 
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a second A-series to account for the truth of such a token. As far as I can see, this is the 
only advantage the tenseless theory has over the tensed theory in accounting for 
McTaggart’s paradox. Further, it is not much of an advantage. It is not clear that a second 
A-series is necessary, as Prior38 says, the ‘was’ and ‘future’ in ‘e was future’ appear to be 
just our usual ones. Moreover, if the A-series is coherent, there is no impossibility in 
having more than one. (A6 needn’t be introduced to solve a paradox or make time possible, 
so there need be no circle or infinite regress.39) 
Lowe40 denies that one even ought to say A6 or something equivalent, on the 
grounds that one cannot iterate indexicals. It makes no more sense to say “e will be past”, 
or “e is after now before now”, than it does to say “Bath is here there”, or “I am JP at 
you”. 41  (This links with my comments concerning the truth-conditions of tensed 
utterances.) Lowe instead accounts for why someone might be tempted by A2, by saying 
that they are really tempted by something meta-linguistic. Namely, if it is true to say “e is 
future”, it will be true to say “e is present” and subsequently “e is past”. 
McTaggart’s paradox is no problem for the tensed theory as A2 and hence P3 are 
false. Further, one should not be tempted to A2 or P3 by McTaggart’s theory of change. 
 
9.5 The Private Language Argument 
 
The first-personal fact that I am aware of when I correctly believe ‘I am making a 
mess’, is a fact that cannot be captured by any non-first-personal beliefs, nor by anyone 
else’s first-personal beliefs. To this extent the fact is knowable only to me. The implication 
of this is that when I utter “I am making a mess”, I express a fact that no one else can 
comprehend. To this extent I appear to be saying something private. Wittgenstein42 has 
argued43 against the possibility of a private language, and in this section I will consider this 
argument, and how it bears on my position. (I will refer to Wittgenstein’s argument as 
PLA.) 
                                                 
38
 Prior:1967 p.19. 
39
 For examples of those who have adopted such harmless infinites or circles see Smith:1993 and 1994a, and, 
Schlesinger:1994a and 1994b. 
40
 Lowe:1987b, for discussion of this point see also Lowe:1987c, 1992 and 1993, MacBeath:1988, Le 
Poidevin & Mellor:1987, and, Le Poidevin:1991 ch.2 and 1993. 
41
 This means we cannot describe change as McTaggart does, but I have argued that this is no obstacle. 
42
 Wittgenstein:2001b. 
43
 I will speak in this manner, but I do not wish to enter disputes as to whether or not Wittgenstein actually 
argued the case, or was merely trying to get us to see right etc.(cf. Canfield:2001). 
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It is commonly thought that the core of the PLA appears between sections 243 and 
271 of the first part of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. 44  By private 
Wittgenstein means: “The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only 
be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.”45 The focus of the 
argument appears in section 258: 
 
“Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a 
certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a 
calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. – I first want to remark that a 
definition of the sign cannot be formulated. – But still I can give myself a kind of 
ostensive definition. – How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. 
But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention 
on the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this 
ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the 
meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; 
for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. 
– But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I 
remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no 
criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to 
me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.” 
 
There have been a great number of different interpretations given of the PLA.46 The idea 
that one must remember the connection right can be variously understood. It might be 
taken as a reference to the idea that we appear to have a certain incorrigibility as regards 
our own sensations, I can be wrong about the cause of my pain but not that I have pain. 
Therefore, if the diarist is to establish meaning, then they must establish something 
involving incorrigibility, U1.47 Alternatively, one might consider that the act at issue is to 
establish the meaning of the sign for the individual, therefore, if it is possible for the act to 
                                                 
44
 Kripke:1982 is an exception. 
45
 Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.243. 
46
 I do not intend my following distinctions to be exhaustive, nor exclusive of one another. Further, the 
references I give are not intended to pigeonhole writers, whose views are often far more complicated than my 
distinctions might suggest. 
47
 Cf. Cockburn:2001 ch.4 (though Cockburn makes this point in order to show how the case of “S” differs 
from our normal use of sensation words such as “pain”). 
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occur, and the individual to fail to grasp the meaning, then the act did not succeed, and 
therefore is not after all an act which establishes meaning, U2.48 (Or one might simply take 
this to be pre-empting the comment to follow two sentences later.) 
The idea that in the present case there can be no criteria of correctness can also be 
variously interpreted. One might think that there is no criterion for checking that the 
sensation had when ‘S’ is first used, is the same as that had when it is later used, U3. Or, 
one might think that there is no criterion to verify that the meaning ‘S’ had when first used, 
is the same as it is taken to have when later used, U4.49 Or, one might doubt whether there 
was a meaning established in the first place, and hence any sort of criterion of correctness, 
U5. 
There are no indicators of the presence of S other than the diarist’s awareness of S. 
Therefore, when the diarist tries to confirm that a sensation they have now is the same as 
that which they had when they first used ‘S’, all they can compare their current sensation 
with is the memory of the past sensation. However, this memory can only act as a criterion 
of correctness if it can itself be verified. There is nothing against which the memory can be 
checked, and therefore, the diarist has no criteria for recognizing that their later sample is 
the same as S, U3. Similarly, the diarist will have no access to the original meaning of ‘S’, 
other than through their memory, which as noted cannot itself be verified by the diarist, 
and hence, cannot provide a criterion for checking that a later use of ‘S’ shares meaning 
with the original use, U4. 
U3 and U4 thus imply that the diarist can be mistaken in their later use of ‘S’, 
because memory is not infallible. Thus they conflict with U1 and/or U2, and the idea of the 
diarist, and hence of a private language appears to contain an inconsistency, and hence to 
be impossible. 
U3 and U4 might also be taken to be worrying in their own right, as one might 
believe that an expression can only be meaningful if it is possible to verify whether or not 
it is used correctly, U6. Or, that one can only learn to use, or continue to use an expression 
meaningfully, if they can verify when that expression is used correctly, U7.50 Or, one 
might think that the memory of the first experience of S, was supposed to provide one with 
the meaning in the later use, but, it can only do that if one knows which sensation to 
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 Cf. Canfield:2001. 
49
 The former of these views is perhaps held by those Kenny dismisses, the latter by Kenny himself 
(Kenny:1973 ch.10 especially p.191-2), and in a rather different form by Canfield:2001 insofar as he 
questions the possibility of continuing a practice. 
50
 Cf. Pears:1988 ch.13, and, Glock:1996 entry ‘The Private Language Argument’. 
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remember, and that presupposes already knowing what the meaning of ‘S’ is, U8.51 If any 
of these theories are right ‘S’ lacks meaning, and a private language thus looks impossible. 
One might believe that a criterion of verification alluded to in the previous 
paragraph was a general requirement on all uses of language, perhaps because all uses of 
language must accord with a rule, and the existence of a rule requires the possibility of 
verification.52 Alternatively, one might think that although this isn’t a general requirement, 
the diarist’s sets it up as a requirement of their position, because they set up a case in 
which ‘S’ might be misapplied.53 
U5 perhaps becomes most plausible when one also bears in mind other aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s position. Focusing one’s attention on a sensation and a sign might simply 
be inadequate to provide meaning. This could be because the possibility of naming 
something presupposes a great deal of ground work, such as a practice of naming. Or, it 
might be that one thinks that introspecting a sensation, or ostensive definition generally, is 
not sufficient alone to establish the identity criteria of a referent. More generally, an 
ostensive definition alone cannot delimit a pattern of correct use, a practice for a sign, but 
this is essential for it to be meaningful.54 
Thus it can be seen that there are a number of arguments against a private language 
that one might think of under the heading of the ‘PLA’. At this stage, I wish to raise an 
initial response. If the PLA is right, then we ought to conclude that Perry’s utterance “I am 
making a mess” does not express a fact known only to Perry. However, this is clearly a 
meaningful utterance. Moreover, as noted above, it is clear that Perry’s making of this 
utterance informs us that he has a belief different from one which he had before he was 
willing to make that utterance, different from any non-first-personal belief of his. We can 
then inquire as to the nature of this belief, and, we can apply the argument given in 
Chapter Six to conclude Perry must be aware of a new fact. I can accept the private 
language argument, and that hence first-personal utterances don’t express private facts, 
without this denying my conclusion that first-personal beliefs/utterances involve an 
awareness of facts not captured by non-first-personal ones. It would also follow that when 
I said “the fact Perry is aware of when he uttered “I am making a mess””, I was not 
referring to a private fact. But this needn’t undermine my point. The ability to gesture 
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 Cf. Hacker:1987 p.109. 
52
 Cf. Malcolm:1986. 
53
 Cf. Canfield:1991. 
54
 Cf. McGinn:1997 ch.4, and, Candlish:1980. 
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beyond what is known is different from the ability to refer to something ‘unknown’. At 
least some interpretations of the PLA will allow the former even if not the latter, there 
doesn’t appear to be an analogue to U1 or U2 in the former case, and nor is ostensive 
definition required. 
There are, however, good grounds for finding the PLA unconvincing. U1 takes 
incorrigibility to be required as it takes our everyday talk of sensations as a paradigm. But 
it is not clear that all sensations must involve incorrigibility, and very doubtful that all 
private objects must. U1 succeeds in standing S apart from, for example, pain, and this was 
no doubt a large part of Wittgenstein’s concern, but this difference needn’t damn privacy. 
U2 is implausibly restrictive. An ostensive definition could establish meaning, even 
if people are sometimes forgetful. One’s knowledge of a meaning needn’t be unfaltering 
for them to know that meaning, nor for the meaning to have been established. 
U6 supposes a form of verificationism, the idea that something must be verifiable 
to be meaningful, but this is an idea that ought to be abandoned (after all, it is an idea that 
cannot itself be verified). It is similarly implausible that it must be possible to verify that 
someone is continuing to use a sign with the same meaning, for them to do so. It is 
possible for someone to act in a way that accords with a rule without anyone being able to 
verify as much (as if there were no patterns where patterns couldn’t be verified). It is also 
not required that the use of a sign can be verified in order for someone to learn the use of 
that sign. This would be so if all learning involved a process of trial and error, but it 
doesn’t seem that it must, further, one can adopt a practice without learning that practice, 
therefore U7 is questionable.55 
There is no necessity for the diarist, or the private language theorist, to enter into 
the circle highlighted in U8. One needn’t be able to call to mind a sample of the referent of 
a sign to recall what that sign means. If one had to do this it would cause trouble for all 
referring terms. Nor is the diarist committed to the idea that this is peculiarly how things 
are in the case of ‘S’. 
U3 and U4, are also implausible. Memory can itself act as a source of verification. 
Memory is generally reliable, and therefore, remembering something to be the case can act 
to verify that it is the case. Further, there could be other sources of verification available. 
Blackburn56 points out that if the diarist in fact kept note of a number of their sensations, 
then their diary may indicate a pattern, for example, S always occurs with T and after R. 
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 In this paragraph and the one below it I am following Law:2004. 
56
 Blackburn:1984, see also Bain:2004. 
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Such a regulation could provide them with grounds for thinking they have 
mischaracterized a sensation on an occasion, for example, if they note an occurrence in 
their diary of ‘R’ followed by ‘T’ and ‘Q’, they will have grounds for thinking that the ‘Q’ 
was mistakenly applied to an S. The regularity will itself have been empirically confirmed, 
but if it is well established and embedded in a theory of these emotions, there could be 
grounds for holding onto that regularity and rejecting outliers. Moreover, just because the 
sensation is private, it needn’t follow that it cannot leave traces which the diarist can be 
aware of and which can provide a criterion of verification, as ashes are evidence that there 
was a fire. 
When considering U5 it is important to bear in mind that Wittgenstein believed that 
a person could follow rules and have a language even if they were and always had been 
alone, a Crusoe character. Section 243 which I quoted part of earlier in fact starts 
 
“A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish 
himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human 
beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to 
themselves.”57 
 
Moreover, Wittgenstein seems right in this. We can imagine Crusoe, somehow alone on an 
island from birth, following practices and using signs meaningfully, scratching a cross 
onto a rock near streams that he has drunk from and been made ill by and a circle next to 
those which have not made him ill. Hence, either ostensive definition alone can lead to 
meaningful language, or, there is a source of meaning besides ostensive definition and 
linguistic definition, and which does not require the cooperation of other people. Either 
way, U5 is no longer plausible. (Hanfling 58  extends this point by making use of 
Wittgenstein’s own notion of a family-resemblance. Showing that although ‘S’ is unlike 
‘pain’, one can trace family-resemblances from ‘pain’ to ‘S’, for example through 
descriptions of dreams, and phrases for sensations such as ‘pins-and-needles’, thus both 
‘S’ and ‘pain’ are meaningful.) 
This brings to the fore the notion of privacy, which isn’t simply a matter of only 
being known to one person, but is more specifically a matter of having no outward 
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 Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.243, a number of other and sometimes more explicit quotes from 
Wittgenstein’s manuscripts can be found in Canfield:1996. 
58
 Hanfling:1984. 
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appearance, apart from the private linguist’s awareness of it. Thus Wittgenstein speaks of 
what can only be known to the diarist and invites us to imagine sensations with no outward 
signs59. Privacy in this strong sense is thus crucial to the PLA, as it is what the diarist has, 
but Crusoe lacks. I am hence encouraged to offer the following different reading of the 
PLA: For a sign to be meaningful it must have a use, to play a role in a practice.60 For a 
sign to refer to an object, that object must play a role in this practice, it must influence the 
use of the sign.61 Therefore, if a sign referred to an object, the use of that sign would 
indicate the existence of that object. Any object referred to therefore is not private, as it 
would appear in something external to it and one’s awareness of it. Conversely, if an 
object was private, it could not influence the use of a sign, therefore the use of the sign 
would be invariant to it, and therefore, there is little ground to say that the sign refers to it. 
This does render Wittgenstein’s argument very simplistic, but it would still have a 
bearing on those who are often recognized as Wittgenstein’s targets, i.e. those who might 
think that for all anyone else can know, I might have no sensation at all when I see red. 
Such a person would have to deny my red experience had any influence on the use of the 
word ‘red’. 
My understanding of the PLA, PLAI, does not succumb to the criticisms I raised 
above against the PLA. However, PLAI does not conflict with the existence of first-
personal facts, as these facts are not private in the strict sense. Rather, they provide reasons 
for action and belief, and therefore, are manifest in human practices. To this extent it is 
appropriate to take Perry’s ‘I am making a mess’ to express a fact not expressed by any 
other non-first-personal utterance, nor anyone else’s first-personal utterances. 
A first-personal fact is unlike S, because S is strictly private. But, there is also a 
difference between a first-personal fact and the sensation of pain. Wittgenstein at times 
denies that there is an inner sensation of pain, to the extent that, “I am in pain”, should not 
be understood as expressing a relation between two objects, myself and pain. The idea is 
captured in section 271: 
 
““Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant – so 
that he constantly called different things by that name – but nevertheless used the 
word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain” – in 
                                                 
59
 E.g. Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.257. 
60
 E.g. Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.260 & 268. 
61
 E.g. Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.270, 271, & 293. 
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short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned 
though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.”62 
 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein is happy to admit that ‘pain’ expresses a sensation: “How do 
words refer to sensations? … Here is one possibility: words are connected with the 
primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place.”63 
If ‘pain’ refers to a sensation, it is because a sensation gives rise to the natural 
expressions of pain, but there is no particular sensation nor perhaps any sensation at all 
that must fulfil this role. Thus “I am in pain”, shouldn’t be recognized as expressing a 
relation between objects. 
The sensation of pain is not the m-reason one behaves as they do when they stub 
their toe, if anything it is closer to the cause of that behaviour. The case with a first-
personal fact is different. It is a reason for the behaviour it brings about. If there were no 
pain sensation and no first-personal fact, then we must conclude that the behaviour was not 
a response to these objects. But, because the first-personal fact was the reason for the 
behaviour it is associated with, this would also mean that that behaviour was unreasonable. 
The pain behaviour, conversely, would not be rendered unreasonable by the lack of a pain 
sensation. Or if it was, we ought to think it is not the idle wheel one might imagine. 
The PLA as commonly understood does not undermine my reference to first-
personal facts, crucially, because its argument is unreliable. PLAI survives these criticisms, 
but, it does not undermine first-personal facts, which are not private in the relevant sense. 
First-personal facts are in a manner knowable generally, they are evinced in things besides 
themselves, and even if one’s first-personal facts are not known to others as the content of 
their propositional attitudes, they are known in their practices. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have defended the argument for the essential indexical from 
criticism. The opacity of the belief context, and the potential to refer to oneself third-
personally, do not undermine the fact that an indexical belief is essential for certain 
rational actions. 
                                                 
62
 Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.271. 
63
 Wittgenstein:2001b pt.I sect.244. 
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I have also shown that many of those who have considered the argument for the 
essential indexical have not paid attention to the role of rationality. Due to this their 
responses to the argument fail to account for this element of the phenomenon, and are thus 
inadequate. 
My previous chapters give rise to the conclusion that the tensed theory of time is 
correct. The tensed theory is often criticized because of McTaggart’s paradox, however, I 
have shown that McTaggart’s paradox admits of various solutions compatible with the 
tensed theory. 
My previous chapters also imply that someone’s first-personal facts cannot be fully 
grasped by anyone else. This appears to conflict with Wittgenstein’s argument that a 
private language is impossible. However, I have shown that a number of interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s argument are inadequate, moreover, first-personal facts are not private in 
the sense Wittgenstein’s argument is concerned with. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My intention in this thesis has been to provide an argument for the tensed theory of 
time. I have done this by focussing on issues already familiar within the debate about 
metaphysical tense, namely, the need for tensed beliefs in action and emotion. I showed 
that previous discussions of these issues were inadequate as they failed to account for the 
rationality of the actions, and the appropriateness of the emotions. This is unsurprising 
given that rationality and appropriateness were not considered in detail. 
I examined the nature of rational action, and showed that the rationality of an 
action stems solely from the reasons it is performed for, and that the role of belief in an 
action is simply to provide the agent with an awareness of their reasons. This account of 
rational action fits the contemporary status of the field, and is defended and plausible quite 
independently of the issues surrounding metaphysical tense. However, it does entail that, 
given that tensed beliefs are often required in rational actions, tensed beliefs must capture 
facts that tenseless ones do not. 
In a parallel manner I defended a cognitive view of emotions according to which 
emotions are had for reasons. These reasons are the facts represented in the cognitive 
component of an emotion. This view of emotions advances the field which has been 
incapable of fully accounting for the normative value of emotions either by referring to 
their pragmatic value, or to the appropriateness of their cognitive components. This view 
of emotions also entails that tensed emotions capture facts not captured by tenseless ones. 
These arguments for the tensed theory of time have a general form, so that, for 
example, if two sentences which differ only in containing different co-referring names can 
play a different role in rational action (or appropriate emotion), then these sentences must 
capture different facts. These implications are not problematic, and in fact have 
independent plausibility stemming from theories of reference and accounts of cognitive 
significance. For example, a descriptive theory of reference will associate different facts 
with different co-referring names, and more generally, it is tempting to think that two co-
referring names will have a different cognitive significance precisely because the two have 
different facts associated with them. 
The tensed theory of time has been criticized on the basis of McTaggart’s paradox, 
however, I have shown that these criticisms are ill-founded as the tensed theory needn’t 
lead to the paradox envisioned, as the tensed theory does not entail that anything is at once 
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past, present, and future. Besides metaphysical tense, my arguments also show that a 
person’s first-personal beliefs will capture facts not captured by any other beliefs. This 
conclusion appears to conflict with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. However, 
again, the conflict is merely apparent. Certain interpretations of Wittgenstein’s argument 
present poor arguments. On the other hand, stronger interpretations show that these first-
personal facts are not private in the manner that concerned Wittgenstein, they are 
knowable, and if not known by others as the objects of their propositional attitudes, they 
are nevertheless recognized by them in their practices. 
Thus the primary value of my thesis is providing a novel argument to establish a 
disputed view in the philosophy of time, namely the tensed theory of time. This conclusion 
is reached in a manner that leaves it open exactly how this tensed aspect of time ought to 
be understood, for example, in terms of tensed properties, or tensed existence, etc. I take 
this to be an advantage of my argument, affording it a certain freedom. On the way to this 
conclusion I also provide an original tying together and embellishment of a number of 
arguments within the philosophy of action. Further, I use my understanding of these 
arguments to present a view of emotions which provides an insight into the inadequacies 
of many existing accounts of emotions. 
If one were to disagree with my accounts of rational action and appropriate 
emotion – as I have argued they ought not to – then they might in this way try to preserve a 
denial of the tensed theory of time. However, they ought still to appreciate the link that I 
have shown to hold between certain intuitive accounts of rationality and appropriateness, 
and the tensed theory of time. I have shown that one cannot decree time to have a 
particular nature independently of considering the nature of other facets of our lives, here 
specifically, normative ones. Similarly, it follows from what I have argued, that one cannot 
decree the meaning of indexicals to have a particular nature independently of considering 
the nature of these normative issues. 
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